

ELEMENTARY SOCIOLOGY

NEW EDITION

by
ROSS L. FINNEY

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ELEMENTARY SOCIOLOGY

A CONSTRUCTIVE TEXTBOOK FOR HIGH
SCHOOLS AND JUNIOR COLLEGES

BY

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NEW EDITION

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THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THIS BOOK

This textbook in sociology differs from others that have been offered to the high schools and junior colleges in the following features: (1) its attitude toward so-called social problems; (2) its emphasis upon the normal functions of fundamental institutions; (3) the principles upon which the outline is built; (4) the frequent recurrence of certain fundamental ideas; (5) the philosophy of life implicit in it; and (6) the question lists at the end of the chapters. Each of these features merits a few words of explanation.

1. *As to "social problems."* This book is not primarily a discussion of social problems. To employ a metaphor, the book treats of social anatomy, physiology, and hygiene, and deals only incidentally with social pathology. That the teaching of sociology has so heavily stressed poverty, crime, divorce, and other social disorders was doubtless unavoidable; but it is none the less unfortunate. That emphasis has a certain morbid effect upon the minds of young people; it makes them imagine that they ought to be agitators, radicals, reformers, philanthropists, or "social workers;" it tends to fill their heads with queer, half-baked ideas. It may even increase the danger of their failing to function normally in the fundamental relations and institutions of society. That would be disastrous! No amount of reform and agitation could compensate for social disintegration. For these reasons the treatment of "social problems" is incidental in this book.

2. *As to the usual and normal in social life.* The central purpose of this book is to explain the fundamental social institutions. The young student needs to know what the family, the school, the state, etc., contribute to the welfare of mankind, so that he may understand and appreciate the social service he himself is rendering when he takes his own part normally in each of these institutions; and, conversely, the harm he would do by any breach or neglect of normal rela-

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tionships. Functioning normally in the fundamental relations of life is the most important social service that the typical citizen can render. If all citizens could be depended upon to do that, our social problems would pretty much take care of themselves. This book aims to increase that kind of dependability on the part of those who study it. It is believed that this kind of a flank attack upon our social problems is far wiser and more effective than the usual frontal drive.

3. *As to the outline.* It seemed unwise to build the outline on any abstract classification of social relations, such as social control, social conflict, social organization, social progress, etc. This is doubtless desirable for more advanced treatises. But for an elementary text the more concrete and tangible social institutions seemed obviously preferable, such as the family, the community, industry, the state, the school, the church, morality, etc. Accordingly, the first four chapters having presented the human material out of which society is made, the bulk of the book is devoted to man's more or less institutionalized activities.

4. *As to certain recurrent ideas.* Certain fundamental ideas are implicit in every chapter of this book. Their recurrence amounts to an emphasis not usual in elementary texts. They are as follows:

(a) Sociology seeks to explain the biological, geographical, technical, and social causes for the origin, development, functions, and shortcomings of social activities. This definition is implicit in almost every chapter (after the fourth) as a sort of invisible outline.

(b) Social relations are essentially mental interactions. Institutions are made up of the prevailing states of mind. Social change is, therefore, a change in the social mind. This is the central concept in social psychology; and it is of the greatest practical importance because of its obvious bearing on social reform. It accounts for the first four chapters, it recurs frequently throughout the book, and receives its final emphasis in the last chapter.

(c) The school is the steering gear of a democratic society. Education is the chief agency for social control and social

progress, and the chief means of social salvation in the present crisis. "Civilization is a race between education and catastrophe." The book aims to show the reader clearly that this is so; and why.

(d) The institutions were made for man, not man for the institutions. The welfare of human beings is the end of all social regulations, the criterion by which all social processes are to be judged. This is the so-called ethical point of view, a point of view too much neglected in the old political economies, and in the social theory implicit in the public mind. Exploitation benefits nobody in the long run; the welfare of the masses is to the best interests of all concerned. This point of view prevails throughout the book, and receives a unique and original emphasis in one or two of the chapters.

5. *As to a philosophy of life.* The present work aspires to be something more than a mere textbook in sociology. It is, in a way, an elementary treatise in ethics. It is intended to help the student discover for himself what the most worthwhile activities and satisfying interests of life are; and why they are worth while and satisfying. The prevailing confusion, uncertainty, and misguidance as to the really worthwhile ends of existence constitutes the gravest social problem of our age. A sound and credible philosophy of life is the deepest need of most young persons. A good deal has been written lately about the alleged moral debacle in the younger generation. So far as there is any cause for alarm, we of the older generation have ourselves to blame for our failure to transmit to them a moral philosophy of life that they can really believe, and that is workable and steady. This book aims to present the young reader with understandable material out of which he can construct such a philosophy of life for himself.

6. *The question lists.* The questions at the end of each chapter are, for teaching purposes, the most important part of the book. By their use the content of the chapter can be connected with concrete, local realities. In other words, the beginner in sociology should study the tangible social facts in his immediate environment; and these questions are designed to help him do that. The factual material he himself gathers

in answering them will illustrate the principles set forth in the text, thus rendering the textual material vivid and real. They will also give the student an inkling of the technique by which sociologists make scientific studies of social phenomena. Finally, they suggest problems, the solutions of which can often be inferred from the text.

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AUGUST 1, 1923

FOREWORD TO THE NEW EDITION

The original edition of this book was accorded such a gratifying response from high-school and junior college teachers that no changes in its fundamental character seemed necessary in the revision. The main purpose of the revision has been to increase the quantity of the content. The book now contains nearly twice as much teachable material as before. There are now four, instead of three, introductory chapters on human nature. Chapters V, XVI, and XVII are new and additional material. Of course, the statistical facts have been brought up to date. Sociological material has been substituted for biological in the chapter on heredity.


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CHARLES HORTON COOLEY

PROFESSOR COOLEY (1864-1929), OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, WAS AN OUTSTANDING LEADER AMONG AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE PRESENT CENTURY. HE THOUGHT WITH PENETRATING INSIGHT AND WROTE IN CHARMING LITERARY STYLE. THE PRESENT WRITER IS DEEPLY INDEBTED FOR HIS STIMULATION

CHAPTER I

THE "ORIGINAL" NATURE OF MAN

The two sides of the social question. A six-horse team is six horses hitched *together*. The efficiency of the team would depend, first, upon the kind of horses, and, second, upon the kind of *togetherness*. As for the first, the individual horses might be big horses or little horses, spirited horses or heavy legged, young horses or old horses, thrifty horses or sick horses. Obviously, the quality of the team would depend upon the quality of the individual members. As for the *togetherness*, that might involve many things: the quality of the harness, the arrangement of the horses (whether three or more abreast or three pairs tandem or otherwise), or the habits resulting from the way the horses had been trained. The nature of the *togetherness* is quite as important as the nature of the individual horses themselves.

A society is persons, doing things, together. The character of a society depends, first, upon the nature of the individual persons. It depends, second, upon the nature of the togetherness, or association. The first four chapters of this book will be devoted to the nature of the persons who take part in the teamwork of society. The rest of the book will be devoted to the nature of human association. That is the field of sociology.

The raw material of society. The English language contains numerous names for animal societies, but the name one uses depends upon the species of animals to which one is referring. A society of sheep is spoken of as a flock, of horses as a drove, of cattle as a herd, of wolves as a pack, of beavers or prairie dogs as a colony, of bees as a swarm, of fish as a school, and so forth. This use of different names

may serve to suggest that the kind of society depends upon the nature of the species. Wolves have a different nature than sheep; and hence a pack of wolves is a very different society from a flock of sheep. And similarly of any other species that lives in groups: to understand the society it is necessary to know the nature of the species. And likewise, also, with human societies. To explain human society it is therefore necessary, first, to describe human nature, since human nature is the raw material out of which human society is made.

The significance of biological needs. Such a description naturally begins with the biological, or innate, needs of the human organism. Each living creature has certain needs; and these innate, biological needs are the most fundamental characteristics of the creature. Enumerate the needs of an organism and you have described it. A certain animal, for example, needs a wooded habitat, nuts and other seeds for feed, and hollow trees in which to store its winter food and to hide itself for protection. Another creature needs warm weather, stagnant water in which to develop during the first part of its life history, and during the latter part, the blood of living animals for its food. The reader will have no difficulty in recognizing each of these creatures from even this partial description of their biological needs. Thus each of the species has its own peculiar needs. The activities of a creature's lifetime consist in its efforts to satisfy its needs. If its needs are not satisfied it will suffer and perhaps die.

The variety and scope of human needs. Man is peculiar—indeed, marvelous—in the number, variety, and complexity of his innate needs. He needs food, clothing, and shelter. He needs protection from wild animals and microbes. He needs sympathetic association with a group of his fellow-men. He needs beauty, play, and contact with nature. He needs various means of communicating with other persons

distant from himself in both space and time. He needs knowledge of his environment, and he needs it in endless quantities. He needs some explanation of the infinite and unknowable. He needs a peculiar kind of family relation. He needs settled methods of adjusting his behavior to the behavior of his fellow-creatures. He even needs a theory of his own needs. So various and complicated are his needs, indeed, that any attempt to enumerate and classify them all is sure to caricature and belittle him. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Corresponding feelings and actions. For each of these innate needs of human nature there is a corresponding desire. Some of these desires are very indefinite; we often feel vague yearnings for something, we hardly know what. Such, for instance, is our need for beauty; we often feel the lack of it in our environment without being overtly aware of what it is we are craving.

When we succeed in getting the things we need we generally have a satisfied feeling. When our needs are denied and our desires thwarted we usually suffer discomfort or pain. As a rule, a feeling of pleasure indicates well-being; and, conversely, unpleasant feelings usually indicate that all is not well with us. However, our feelings are not always a safe guide; our pleasure-pain monitor is as indefinite as our innate tendencies to action are. This deceptiveness of our feelings as guides to action arises chiefly from the indirect and round-about way in which civilized people seek the satisfaction of their innate needs. For example, a civilized man may derive no such pleasure from a day's work, say at digging ditches, as a savage derives from a successful hunt; but that is the civilized man's indirect way of getting a more dependable supply of meat and clothing. Again, the postponement of courtship among civilized peoples, as compared with savages, sometimes goes

a little against the grain of adolescent human nature; but it is the round-about way to a much higher type of adult life, especially for women.

Corresponding also to each of the various biological needs is a more or less definite tendency to perform the actions that will get us what we need. These innate tendencies to certain actions are very definite and precise in some of the lower animals. A good example is the tendency of the chick to begin picking for its living soon after it is hatched. Another good illustration is the mating instinct in practically all animal forms. Man's inborn tendencies to act for certain ends are many and insistent; but in the case of most of his innate needs the precise way in which he pursues them depends quite as much upon his social equipments and arrangements as upon his original human nature.

The "original" nature of man. Human nature—meaning the nature we are born with—is the raw material of society. But what *is* human nature: that is the question! It is a simple matter to tell what is sheep nature, or wolf nature, or squirrel nature, or mosquito nature, because those animals learn so little. Animal behavior is mostly instinctive, that is, unlearned, behavior. Bees build honeycomb without first learning to build it; similarly do wolves hunt deer and rabbits, and squirrels build nests in the trees—without first learning. Hence the behavior of any given species is practically the same everywhere and always; and to learn their innate nature and needs it is only necessary to observe their usual behavior. Not so with man, however, since his behavior is mostly learned. He may learn this instead of that; with the result that human behavior is almost infinitely varied in different times and places. Hence the difficulty of determining just what is the "original" nature of man.

This problem—of the original nature of man—is an old, old problem; and no final solution has ever been reached upon which all scholars could agree. Nothing better than

partial solutions can, therefore, be offered the reader. In general, it may be said that there have been three sorts of attack upon the problem. These may, for lack of better names, be called the psychological, the behavioristic, and the sociological. Each of them will now be outlined.

A psychologist's list of instincts. The psychologist begins with the idea of instincts. He defines an instinct as an in-born tendency to act and feel in a more or less definite way, under a given set of circumstances. Then he proceeds to define and classify what he regards as the instincts. Thorndike's list¹ is as follows:

- I. Food-getting and protective responses.
 1. Eating.
 2. Reaching, grasping, and putting objects into the mouth.
 3. Acquisition and possession.
 4. Hunting.
 5. Collecting and hoarding.
 6. Avoidance and repulsion.
 7. Rivalry and coöperation.
 8. Habituation.
 9. Response to confinement.
 10. Migration and domesticity.
 11. Fear.
 12. Fighting.
 13. Anger.
- II. Responses to behavior of other human beings.
 14. Motherly behavior.
 15. Gregariousness.
 16. Responses of attention to other human beings.
 17. Attention-getting.
 18. Responses to approving and scorning behavior.
 19. Responses by approving and scornful behavior.
 20. Mastering and submissive behavior.

¹Assembled in tabulated form by Starch (see his *Educational Psychology*, p. 10).

21. Display.
22. Shyness.
23. Self-conscious behavior.
24. Sex behavior.
25. Secretiveness.
26. Rivalry.
27. Coöperation.
28. Suggestibility and opposition.
29. Envious and jealous behavior.
30. Greed.
31. Ownership.
32. Kindliness.
33. Teasing, tormenting, bullying.
34. Imitation.

III. Minor bodily movements and cerebral connections.

35. Vocalizations.
36. Visual exploration.
37. Manipulation.
38. Cleanliness.
39. Curiosity.
40. Multiform mental activities.
41. Multiform physical activities.
42. Play.

The social significance of the instincts. Such a list of the human instincts suggests the kinds of behavior that may be expected of human beings, in all countries, and in all ages. A human society differs from other societies by being one in which the participants do the sorts of things indicated by this list.

The social nature of man is indicated by Part II of Thorndike's list, including items 14 to 34. The reader will do well to note these items carefully, thinking of illustrations of each, and considering the difference between animal and human behavior in each case. No other gregarious animal displays so many social instincts,

But such a list of human instincts is really most significant in what it fails to explain. The tendency of water to flow down hill does not explain the cataract at Niagara nor the crooked course of the Columbia River; neither does the fighting instinct explain the World War; nor the play instinct account for the games of bridge and baseball. There is nothing in this list to explain why men live in monogamous families, conduct agriculture, cultivate music and the graphic arts, or develop systems of steam transportation by land and by sea. The psychological analysis of human nature is helpful, but fractional.

The behavioristic analysis. Behaviorism¹ is a particular brand or school of psychology that has been attracting attention for a decade prior to the present writing (1930). It is an attempt to apply more rigid scientific methods of research to psychology. The behaviorists insist, accordingly, upon a far stricter definition of instinct. With them the word instinct is equivalent to reflex, and means a very definite act that is entirely unlearned. Examples are the eye wink, the knee-jerk, and the sucking reflex of infants.

The physiology of the reflex. It is worth while at this point to make some explanation of the physiology of the reflex. For this purpose a comparison will serve. The University of Minnesota has a private telephone system connecting its many buildings and offices. So has the University of Wisconsin. Suppose now that Professor Smith at one University wishes to talk with Professor Brown at the other, numerous *connections* would have to be made between Smith's office and Brown's office. The reader can help the illustration out by picturing these various connections to his imagination in detail. The connections made, Smith's voice

¹The word *behavior* is equivalent to action or activity, as distinguished from thought or feeling, and has no moral implications. The behaviorists say that science cannot get at thought and feeling, so they insist on studying activity only; that is, behavior. Hence they call themselves *behaviorists*.

would reach Brown, and Brown would act upon the suggestion contained in Smith's message.

The nervous system is quite like that. *Connections* have to be made from the nerve-end that receives the impression of sight, sound, touch, or other sensation, through the nervous system to the nerve-ends in the muscles or glands where the resultant action occurs. Such connections are called "permeable pathways" for the transmission of the "nervous current." Many of these connections have to be made during the life-experience of the individual, as a result of learning, but some of them are ready at birth. Such inborn connections are the physiological basis of the reflexes, or instincts.

For example, upon the sensitive nerve-ends in the eye of the moth impinges the light from the candle. The connections are ready; the nervous current runs directly to the muscles, and into the flame the moth goes. To the eye of a cat comes the impression of a mouse running across the kitchen floor; the connections are ready and the mouse is supper for the cat. To the eyes of a horse come the sensations of seeing an elephant; the connections are ready and the horse instinctively performs the antics of fear. The behaviorists, however, would scrutinize such examples as these of the cat and the horse with extreme scientific care; and if they found in them any results of learning they would rule them out as instincts. With them, learned and instinctive are opposite terms.

The reflexes. The behaviorists have reduced the unlearned in human behavior to almost nothing. Floyd Allport¹ recognizes the following six classes of human reflexes:

Starting and withdrawing	Sensitive zone (tickling)
Rejecting	reactions
Struggling	Sex reactions
Hunger reactions	

¹*Social Psychology*, p. 50.

These terms require but little explanation. The first refers to the jerking motion a new-born infant makes in response to loud sounds, to the sudden removal of support, or to a dash of cold water. An example of the rejecting reflex is the pushing with hand or foot against the hand of the experimenter who pinches the infant's nose or the inner surface of its knee. "If the limbs or head of a new-born child are held so that the usual random movements are impossible, a struggle ensues." The other three are doubtless self-explanatory.

An explanation that explains nothing. Now the real significance of the behavioristic analysis lies precisely in the fact that it leaves us hopelessly in the dark, thus compelling us to look elsewhere for an explanation of human nature. The assumption with which the psychologists began was that what is *unlearned* is innate, and nothing else is; and hence that human nature is revealed only by what is *unlearned*. But the behavioristic school of psychology has proven that almost no human behavior is strictly unlearned. Thorndike's instincts, for example, consist mostly of learned behavior, and hence beg the question. And what little the behaviorists have left to the unlearned—Allport's reflexes—explains nothing. The sucking and kicking reflexes of new-born infants (to express the matter jocosely) do not account for the suckers and kickers among adults; nor can the art, industry, science, government, and the rest, of civilized society be explained by Allport's six classes of reflexes. Behaviorism has then reduced the psychological explanation of human nature to absurdity, leaving us with no explanation at all. Light will have to come from somewhere else.

The sociological explanation. Thus an orphaned problem—that of listing the contents of human nature—is left on the doorstep of sociology. And to solve it, sociology begins

with a new and entirely different assumption, namely, that the *universal* is innate. Not what is *unlearned*, but what *all* races show a tendency *to* learn, reveals the inborn and "original" traits of human nature. Let us see where this assumption leads us.

Man, like any other species, has his characteristic biological needs; and, as in the case of any other species, it is toward the satisfaction of those needs that his characteristic activities are directed. Therefore, his needs also are to be discovered through a study of his activities. The obstacle, in the case of man, lies in the difficulty of classifying his activities, since they are so diverse, complicated, and variable. Nevertheless, such a classification, however partial and incomplete, lies ready at hand in the common thought of humanity, if only one has eyes to see it. To talk about the great institutions of society, such as the family, the state, the church, the school, and so forth, is to talk about the outstanding kinds or classes of human activities; since each of these institutions is a great custom-rutted program of social activities. Similarly, to talk about languages, science, art, morality, religion, and the industrial arts, is also to talk about outstanding and distinguishable kinds of human activity. The same is likewise true of such popularly used terms as competition, social order, control, change, progress, and the like. Just as everybody *uses* such grammatical forms as tense, number, case, mode, etc., even though he does not *know* grammar as such, so does everybody classify human behavior, without realizing that he is doing so. And just as the grammarian only clarifies and labels what is implicit in the popular use of language, so the sociologist has only to specify and elaborate what is in the common thought, and, behold, he has a scientific classification of human behavior.

The sociological analysis of human nature. Pursuing this sociological method of analysis into further detail we derive

the following classified invoice of the contents of human nature:

- I. The institutions of society.
 1. The family.
 2. The local community.
 3. The state.
 4. The industries.
 5. The church.
 6. The school.
 7. The press.
 8. The standard of living.
 9. The customary recreations.
 10. The health-preserving institutions.
 11. Miscellaneous.
- II. The intellectual resources of the social life.
 1. The means of communication.
 2. The techniques of industry.
 3. The techniques of amusement.
 4. The sciences.
 5. The fine arts.
 6. The creeds.
 7. The codes.
- III. The types of social relations.
 1. Communication.
 2. Coöperation.
 3. Conflict.
 4. Organization.
 5. Control.
 6. Progress.

A paragraph or two in explanation of terms, most of which are self explanatory. "The local community" and "the standard of living" are defined in the chapters of those titles. "The press" should perhaps read "gossip and the press," since gossip performed the function of the press in ancient times, and still does in backward societies. "The

health-preserving institution" implies that the physicians and nurses are operating an institution just as truly as are the clergymen, or the teachers. "The customary recreations" includes the theatre, baseball, bridge, and a hundred other custom-rutted activities, many of which have professional people devoted to them, just as does the church, the school, or the press. "Miscellaneous" is a confession that no complete and exhaustive list of institutions can be formulated.

"The means of communication" includes language, both spoken and written, and also such devices as telegraph, telephone, radio, etc. By "the techniques of industry" we mean the knowings-how; for example, the knowledge of how to make glass, or to raise potatoes. Obviously, there are the corresponding knowings-how of recreation; for example, the rules of bridge or baseball. Under "the creeds" are included not only religious creeds, but political beliefs (as that democracy is superior to monarchy), economic beliefs (as that competition regulates prices), and beliefs in all other fields. Under "codes" are included not only the rules of moral conduct, but those common rules of procedure usually called the folkways (as that one should knock or ring the bell before entering a house).

Culture implicit in the germ plasm. The above outline means that human nature is the kind of nature that does such things as living in families, developing fine arts, engaging in conflict, and so forth. It is in the "original" nature of man to organize these institutions, accumulate these intellectual resources, and engage in these types of interaction. These are man's characteristic activities; they reveal the kind of creature he is.

In other words, the "original" nature of man is revealed in his accumulated *culture*. This term *culture* is one that must be introduced in the very first chapter of a textbook in sociology. It does not mean "high-toned" manners, "ex-

clusive" connections, or "conventional" accomplishments. Culture, as a term in sociology, means all the accumulated mental achievements of the human race. It includes all discoveries and inventions; inventions, not only of machines, but of arts, creeds, and codes, and of institutions such as the state, the church, and the school. Culture includes all the institutions of society and all the intellectual resources of the social life. Now there is a sense in which "all culture is implicit in the germ plasm"; inasmuch as man produces culture because he has the kind of body, nervous system, and germ plasm that he has. Hence the "original" nature of man is revealed only through a study of his culture.

PROBLEMS¹

1. Make a drawing showing how the eveners and whippletrees are arranged for a three-horse team.

2. What was wrong with the "togetherness" of folks in France prior to the Revolution?

3. (a) Enumerate historic improvements in the social arrangements of Americans.

(b) What influences have been at work to improve the quality of individual persons in America?

4. Could the evils of slavery have been overcome by improving the skill, intelligence, and character of individual slaves and masters; or were its evils the direct result of the institution itself?

5. Are our labor-capital troubles due to bad persons or to a faulty "togetherness"?

6. Compare the instincts of the cat with those of the rabbit. The corresponding needs.

7. Try to imagine what society would be like if instinct No. 29 in Thorndike's list were absent from human nature. Other instincts.

8. How would instinct No. 30 be affected by a life of isolation? Other instincts?

9. Glance through the introductory paragraphs of chapters VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, noting the instinctive needs that give rise to each institution.

¹Some of these questions cannot be answered with completeness and finality. They are intended, instead, to open up interesting questions for further study.

10. Illustrate the aesthetic needs of human nature. How does it affect one to be deprived of beauty in his environment? Draw some practical inferences.

11. Discuss the spiritual (i. e. the moral and religious) needs of human nature in the same way.

12. What is meant in animal husbandry by a balanced ration? Apply the principle to human life.

13. Show that the needs of civilized peoples are better provided for than the needs of primitive peoples.

14. Is the bee's honeycomb, the spider's web, the beaver's dam, or the squirrel's nest, culture?

15. What do you think of the theory that to hold a child firm, as in the quotation, is likely to make a rebel, a radical, or a revolutionist out of him?

16. Experiment with a puppy or a kitten, to ascertain whether it shows any of Allport's six reflexes?

17. What have you to say about Allport's theory (*Social Psychology*, pp. 57, 58) that cleanliness is a development of the rejecting reflex?

18. How would civilized life be modified if there were no such things as I, 9, in the sociological analysis above? II, 6? III, 3?

19. Savage society?

20. Why do dogs not accumulate culture? Giraffes? Rabbits?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

ALLPORT, FLOYD H., *Social Psychology*. Houghton Mifflin Company.¹

This book treats of human nature from the behavioristic standpoint.

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology* (1924), Chapters IV, V, and VI. Harcourt, Brace & Company

This is a very useful text of the symposium sort.

EDMAN, IRWIN, *Human Traits*, Chapters I-XI. Houghton Mifflin Company.

A most useful discussion of the psychic factors in human experience. This book will help any intelligent young person to understand himself, and will make an invaluable contribution to his philosophy of life.

GROVES, ERNEST R., *An Introduction to Sociology* (1928), Chapters III-VII. Longmans, Green & Company.

¹ The publisher of a book will be cited only once in this volume, and that upon the first reference to the book.

This is a relatively brief and quite readable text. Chapter V discusses human nature from the standpoint of the developing child. Cultural classification is not suggested, however.

HANKINS, FRANK H., *An Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (1928), Chapters VIII-X. The Macmillan Company.

Hankins has given us a well-accepted textbook in sociology, in which the social process, as such, is emphasized. The chapters cited fall just short, however, of pointing out that human nature is to be analyzed by classifying culture; but his chapters are interesting.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (1915), Chapter XIII. D. Appleton & Company.

An illuminating discussion of the "predispositions" of human nature upon which social organization is based.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology* (1928), Chapters II-IV. McGraw-Hill Book Company.

These chapters discuss the geographical as well as the psychological basis of human society.

PARK and BURGESS, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921), Chapter I. University of Chicago Press.

Discussions of human nature in its relation to social organization. A classic, but difficult for beginners.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology* (1920), Chapters I and IV. The Century Company.

Chapter I treats of the physical make-up of the population, stating some interesting facts about the distribution of males and females; Chapter IV treats of the instincts.

ROSS, E. A., *Social Control*, Chapters I-VII. The Macmillan Company.

In Part I of this brilliant book Ross discusses the three instincts that he thinks are at the foundations of social organization.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology* (1927), Chapters XIII and XIV. Alfred A. Knopf.

An interesting text, but not easy for the beginner. Sociology is treated from the cultural standpoint. The method is somewhat philosophical.

CHAPTER II

HUMAN NATURE

Human nature in the different races. It is often remarked that human nature is the same the world over. With respect to fundamentals this is true. There is a massive core of similarity. The outlines on pages 5 and 11 apply to all races, however embryonic some of the items (science for example) may have been among primitive peoples. And yet, there are very important fringes of differences. The cultures of different races differ enormously. The Englishman carries himself on a high civilization, whereas the Bontoe Igorot is handicapped by a barbarian culture. It is quite natural for the Englishman to assume that the innate needs and intelligence of a race correspond to its culture. The inference is that advanced races are advanced because they have finer desires and superior brains, while the backward races are inherently incapable of taking on advanced culture. This is at least partly fallacious. It may turn out to be a complete fallacy. The consensus of opinion among sociologists at present is to that effect.

There are many reasons for assuming that the great races of mankind are approximately equal in the native endowments of the mind. For one thing, all nations are mixed races; no stocks are pure. In the second place, advanced races were recently backward; while there are races that have lost the culture they formerly possessed. The Nordic peoples have no better brains today than they had two thousand years ago, when they were savages. And it only begs the question to assume that the Latin, Greek, or Egyptian stocks have degenerated biologically during the last two thousand years. Travellers in central Africa find much to admire in the native temperament and culture.

In this connection it is a startling and significant fact that even mediocre minds can imitate. The Spaniards had not invented gunpowder, they had only borrowed it. But the Aztecs and Peruvians had never had a chance to borrow it. Yet the possession of it enabled the Spaniards to destroy an indigenous civilization not so very much inferior to their own. To the Japanese there has only recently come the opportunity to borrow our western civilization; and the speed with which they have taken it up suggests that they may be our own equals or even superiors. And, finally, inventions may be almost forced upon a people by other elements in their culture. A group that had domesticated cattle would be almost forced to invent containers for liquid food; and one that had learned to use gasoline would be half way to the invention of flying machines. Also, there is such a thing as a cult of progress that a people not specially superior biologically may come upon almost by social chance. When their cult blows over that people may stagnate socially without degenerating biologically. This may account for the decline of Greek culture, or the shift from the German intellectualism of the early nineteenth century to the German militarism of the early twentieth. However this may be, it is certainly an unproved assumption that cultural progress and cultural differences are due chiefly to biological differences. Some of the backward races whom we now regard as "the white man's burden" (that is, the white man's plunder!) may prove to be our equals in native ability, and capable of calling us to account eventually. As St. Paul said to the proud but really effete Athenians: "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth." This idea of the biological brotherhood of man cannot be declared unscientific in the light of our present knowledge; and we shall never have a peaceful world to live in until we get rid of our unscientific race prejudice. II. G. Wells asserts that race prejudice

is the greatest single cause for the world's future troubles.


On the other hand, it may be true that sharp and significant racial differences actually do exist. It may turn out that races possess special traits of human nature from which unique contributions to culture are derived. The galaxy of Greek geniuses that appeared in the fourth century B. C., or of German geniuses in the early nineteenth century A. D., may have been due to biological traits in the stock. But it is far easier to assume this than to prove it. Anthropologists and psychologists are apt to fall into that easy assumption. Until reliable psychological tests have been applied to the measurement of racial differences we shall have to admit that we really know little about such differences. Meantime we ought to respect racial peculiarities; they may prove the signs of genius and the seeds of progress.

The "spread" of intelligence. If there really are racial differences, the "spread" of a race's intelligence might be more significant socially than its average intelligence, in comparison with other races. The term *spread* may be explained by reference to certain theories about sex differences.

With respect to any physical trait, the males of a species are supposed to be more variable than the females. It is a widely accepted (though really unproven) supposition that this is true of human intelligence also. The average intelligence of the two sexes is supposed to be the same, but the "spread" greater for men than for women. This would mean a larger percentage of idiots and low-grade morons among men; and also a larger percentage of geniuses. It would also mean a larger percentage of average intellects among women. This hypothesis would account for the larger number of men than women in penitentiaries and institutions for feeble-minded, and the larger number of men among the great names of history. However, writers who insist that the hypothesis is unproven point out that the

sheltered way in which women live protects them from criminality, and that families commit their defective men to institutions with less hesitation than their defective women. They also argue, with obvious soundness, that the artificial inferiority in which women have been held for centuries accounts for the fact that so few have become famous. But whatever the facts may turn out to be, the theory clearly illustrates what is meant by the "spread" of intelligence.

Suppose two races, *A* and *B*, have the same average intelligence, but race *A* has a wider "spread" than *B*. That



INDICATING THE HYPOTHETICAL DIFFERENCE IN DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE AMONG MEN AS COMPARED WITH WOMEN. THE SOLID LINE IS FOR WOMEN, AND THE BROKEN LINE FOR MEN.

would give them geniuses surpassing in intelligence any members of race *B*, as indicated by the shaded spot in the drawing. Now it is presumably these geniuses who achieve the discoveries and inventions upon which social progress depends. *A* would accordingly have a decided advantage over *B* in the struggle for progress.

It is well to repeat, however, that the actual facts about racial averages and "spreads" we really know little or nothing about. These paragraphs are useful chiefly in acquainting the reader with certain terms and theories in common use, and to suggest the limitations of our knowledge.

Our ancestors had as good a human nature as ours. Human nature changes far less from age to age than we are wont to suppose. In fact, the best authorities agree that it has not changed perceptibly for many, many centuries. Our

savage ancestors of two thousand years ago undoubtedly had just as good brains as we have. Their outfit of instincts was also the same as ours. Moreover they had at least laid the foundations of every one of the institutions listed on page 11, and had made at least a beginning in every class of the intellectual resources mentioned in the same list. The same is true, indeed, of those who lived ten thousand years ago; perhaps even a fifty thousand. The centuries have added to our inventions, but not to our innate intelligence; they have improved the tools our minds work with, but not our minds themselves; they have multiplied our incidental wants, but have not modified our fundamental human needs. Human nature has been essentially the same in all centuries.

Cro-Magnon was a breed of man who inhabited Europe for twenty-five or thirty thousand years, and became extinct some five or ten thousand years ago. The Cro-Magnon man had stone implements, and drew on the inside of the caves which he inhabited remarkable pictures of the animals he hunted—species long since extinct. The capacity of Cro-Magnon's cranium, and his works of art, imply that he was at least our equal, perhaps our superior, in intellect. Could he have been miraculously transplanted into our civilization and brought up in it from early childhood there is every reason to believe that he could have used it as well as we do. Is there not something tragic and strangely suggestive about these early men moving about in a world so utterly inadequate to the needs of their natures and the capacity of their intellects?

Weismann's law. This inference, that the men of so long ago were just as good stock as we are, is based partly on Weismann's law, that acquired characteristics are not transmitted through the germ cells. This means that changes which take place in an individual during his lifetime cannot be transmitted to his offspring. Dehorning cattle, for example, does not cause them to produce hornless

calves; and it makes no difference how many generations of cattle are dehorned. Weismann performed a now famous experiment of cutting the tails off from nineteen successive generations of mice, without producing a tailless breed of mice. It did not even shorten their tails! Educating a person does not cause him to produce offspring with better brains; nor does it make any difference how many generations of parents are educated. Kipling has taught us that the giraffe's neck has grown longer because he has stretched it for so many generations; but this is very bad biology. Acquired characteristics are not transmitted. The biological facts upon which this doctrine is based will be more fully explained in the next chapter.

This doctrine is hard to accept because it is pictured to the imagination with difficulty, whereas the Kipling type of false biology is so easy to imagine. True, it is unproved that there are absolutely never any exceptions to this law, especially in the lower orders of life; but there is so very little question of its applicability to the higher forms of life, including man, that for purposes of elementary sociology it may be taken without qualification. Now from Weismann's law it follows that the change in man during the historic period, and vastly more, has not been a biological change.


Early, inferior types. However, if we go far enough back we do come to predecessors who were biologically unlike ourselves. They belonged to the genus *Homo*, but not to our own species, *sapiens*. They had hairy bodies, low foreheads, and inferior natures. It is debated whether they should be called men, or not. The skulls and some other bones of these inferior types have been found in various parts of Europe. One of them is known as Neanderthal. His brow was low in comparison with that of contemporary man, and his cranial capacity small. In 1891 a skull cap, a femur bone, and a molar tooth from a still lower species of the genus *Homo* were found at Trinil, Java. These latter

fossils are of peculiar interest to us because the owner was so much inferior to us, and even to the Neanderthal man, that scientists hardly know whether to regard him as a man or an ape. They call him the upstanding monkey-man, or *Pithecanthropus erectus*. He must have lived a million years ago. Whether or not he was in our direct line of ancestry we do not know. These discoveries of lower types of *Homo* have all been made within the last half century, and only small portions of the earth's surface have as yet been explored. As time goes on we shall, in all probability, accumulate a very great fund of accurate and illuminating information about these remote ancestors of ours.


A fierce struggle for the possession of the earth must have gone on for thousands of years between these hairy, ancestral races, and the naked ancestors of our own particular species, *Homo sapiens*, of whom Cro-Magnon is the earliest known example. The latter had superior intellects and the more coöperative instincts, and so of course they won, and finally exterminated the inferior breeds.

Individual differences. The innate traits of human nature are common to all human beings; and the common possession of these traits constitutes the similarity of human nature the world over. But none of these innate traits is exactly alike in any two individuals. Sympathy is a little stronger in Smith than it is in Jones. Walter is naturally more sociable than Richard. Louis XIV was more disposed to domineer than was Louis XVI. Individuals differ as to musical appreciation. And so on throughout the list. And when the combination of innate traits that makes up each personality is considered, we see what a rich variety of personalities is provided for. And yet the similarity is greater than the differences: all conform to the human type.

As to the quality of their intellects, individuals differ all the way from idiots to the most brilliant geniuses. Within



DISTRIBUTION OF CURVE FOR SIZE OF 448 BEANS. A NORMAL DISTRIBUTION CURVE



THE DISTRIBUTION CURVE FOR INTELLIGENCE OF 609 THIRD TO SIXTH GRADE CHILDREN IN A CERTAIN MINNESOTA TOWN. THIS CURVE IS NOT QUITE NORMAL, BEING SKEWED TO THE LEFT. THE APEX OF A NORMAL CURVE WOULD BE AT 100. THE AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE OF THIS SCHOOL IS A LITTLE LOW.

the last two decades psychologists have devised more or less serviceable instruments for measuring the intelligence of individuals. The relative quality of one's intellect is expressed in terms of an "intelligence quotient" (I. Q.). An intelligence quotient of 100 is average. Individuals group themselves around this average in a "normal curve of distribution"; that is to say, there is a certain fixed and definite percentage of the population for each and every grade of intelligence.

For example, the distribution of intelligence of 609 children in the third to sixth grades inclusive of a certain school system was found to be as follows:

I. Q.	NO. PUPILS	PERCENTAGE
46— 50	2	.3+
51— 55		
56— 60	1	.1+
61— 65	6	1.0
66— 70	13	2.1+
71— 75	43	7.6—
76— 80	43	7.6—
81— 85	62	10.1+
86— 90	71	11.6+
91— 95	79	12.9+
96—100	76	12.4+
101—105	66	10.8+
106—110	46	7.5+
111—115	27	4.4+
116—120	28	4.5+
121—125	18	2.9+
126—130	12	2.0
131—135	4	.6+
135—140	4	.6+
141—145	8	1.3+
	609	

Class differences: Old ideas. How do the different social classes differ with respect to these typical traits of human nature, especially with respect to intelligence? It has long been customary to regard the lower classes as inferior in mentality. The bottom layers of ancient Athenian society were made up of slaves; and the Greek philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, frankly taught that these slaves were as much below the upper classes in native powers as brutes are below the lower grades of human beings. Similar ideas have obtained throughout the centuries; and to this day it is not uncommon to hear the laboring classes referred to as brutish. And it is quite generally assumed that prosperous persons are such precisely because they have brains, whereas the poor and humble have fallen into their social status just because they lack the brains to succeed. On the other hand, persons who pin their faith to the ideal of the brotherhood of man, as taught both by Christianity and democracy, find this old pagan doctrine of class differences revolting. They cannot believe that it is true.

In an "open-class" society. But the fact is that men are not equal. They actually do vary widely as to all human traits, including intelligence. In a society of "open classes," that is, a society in which opportunities were open with *perfect* equality to all, it may be assumed that ability actually would find its level, and each person—especially each male adult—would find a place on the industrial and social ladder exactly corresponding to his ability. Such equality of opportunity is the only equality that democracy can reasonably aspire to; such is the only brotherhood of man that is biologically possible.

In a caste society. Conversely, in a caste society, a society in which all opportunities are closed, and each person is condemned to the social station into which he is born, it may be assumed that the distribution of intelligence within each class would be the same as in every other class.

In such a society the inferiority of the lower classes is doubtless artificial and unreal, just as was the inferiority of women in European society five hundred years ago. In a rigidly stratified society, like that of India, there are in all probability the same fundamental human needs, and just as much good brain-stuff in the lower classes as in the higher; it is prevented by utter lack of opportunity from asserting itself; while persons are held in the pampered, privileged classes by social custom whether they have good brains or not.

Equality of opportunity not yet perfect even in America. During the nineteenth century there was abundant unoccupied land, so that any young man who found his opportunities restricted could "go west and grow up with the country." This kept the pressure relieved in the industries. Educational facilities have constantly grown more liberal, so that it is now more nearly possible, theoretically at least, for anybody to get an education who wants one. Still it would be absurd to contend that we have already made things perfect so far as equal opportunities are concerned. Inheritance is still an important factor in success. Boys whose fathers are wealthy and successful have an advantage over those whose fathers are poor. They have it made easy for them to get any kind of education they want. They can get into their fathers' business and be given special training as rapidly as possible for the management of the business which they are to inherit. For the sons of the poor and ignorant the case is quite different. The ambitions, even, of the vast majority are tuned for them to about the same standards that they have been accustomed to in childhood. There is a strong tendency to take them out of school as soon as the attendance laws permit and set them to work. Such young people naturally drift into blind alleys. They are handicapped from the start. The exceptions prove the rule; it would be sheer mathematical impossibility for all to

be like the few who do rise above their class. We are too wont to blind ourselves to the average facts by reference to the exceptional person.

Even our schools, fine as they are, still fall somewhat short as yet of providing equal opportunities. The course of study interests and profits only certain types of mind. Those types stay in the schools as teachers, and serve up similar courses to the young people of the next generation. The types of mind that do not respond to the academic program often get too little out of the school that profits them. If the school program were better adapted to the varying wants of various types, the school would open opportunities to many whom it now helps but little. This is especially true of our high schools; although they are fast correcting this very defect. As for vocational training, our public schools have as yet made little more than a beginning. A century from now, in all probability, the schools will offer free and readily accessible opportunity for all to get some kind of vocational education for which their natural abilities fit them. At the same time it will furnish to all classes alike the arts and sciences by which men live well when off duty.

Besides all this we are constantly receiving a stream of new stock from older countries where opportunities have been relatively closed for centuries and where the best stock has never had much chance to escape from the lower classes.

The classes do differ in intelligence. Under these conditions two inferences would seem to be perfectly safe. The first is that there must be a somewhat lower type of brains on the average among the lower than among the higher social classes. This stands to reason, and is also a matter of common observation. Men of low mentality are less likely to aspire to the higher walks of life; and if they do, they are foredoomed to failure. Inherited advantages may hold sons, but can hardly hold grandsons and great-grandsons in the upper levels. On the other hand, the brightest young men

from the ranks are constantly struggling into the high positions. The little scientific research that has been done tends to confirm this inference from common sense. During the World War large numbers of soldiers were given the mental tests. The findings indicated that men of the unskilled and humbler callings had somewhat lower intelligence on the average than men of the more pretentious callings. From the findings of the army tests the various trades and professions have been ranked as to the average intelligence of the men engaged in them. And while there are numerous reasons why the findings of the army tests should be regarded as only tentative, still they are not without some scientific value.

But far less difference than is usually assumed. The second inference is that there is far less difference in the average intelligence of the social classes than there is in their social status. This must be true so long as the artificial advantages and handicaps referred to in previous paragraphs continue to exist. It is a gross and insulting mistake to assume that all poor, humble, and uncouth persons have only brutish needs, and are of low mentality and dull sensibilities. Many, perhaps most, of them have as good brains and hearts as have the prosperous, educated, and fashionable. There is undoubtedly a vast amount of latent talent and even genius in the lower classes that society is still allowing to go to waste through lack of adequate opportunity—and much thwarting of natural human desires.

The latent talent of the masses. The talent latent in the lower classes is a theme for poetry. It is well expressed in Gray's *Elegy*. It was part of the sublime insight of Jesus that he discerned the fundamental similarity of human needs in all men. It is the dream of democracy to give it all a chance. We have made great strides toward that goal during the last century and a half; but the goal is still a long way off. We still furnish some communities with such

meager educational opportunities that ignorance is almost forced upon them. We still surround gangs of boys in city slums with conditions that almost drive them into crime. Opportunity to go to school still depends altogether too much upon the income of the family. Teachers still discover but a fraction of the special talents of their pupils. Vocational education is as yet but little better than nothing. Art is still a privilege for the few. We are still too blind to the suppressed desires and latent talents of the poor and ignorant. We are still too much inclined to assume that social status is an accurate index of need, ability, and usefulness. Class prejudice is one of the most serious obstacles to social progress.

PROBLEMS

1. Why hasn't cutting their hair generation after generation, resulted in adult males having short hair without cutting? Shaving, beardless faces?

2. Can you make it seem real to you that the Stone Age man had as good brains as ours? If not, why not?

3. Search through the magazines for the past ten years for new discoveries about early man, especially of superior types. This should be a project for one student, or a small committee.

4. What have you observed about individual differences in innate musical ability?

5. Give illustrations of cases in which the behavior of dull and bright cannot be distinguished. How do you account for such similarity?

6. If the intelligence tests have been given in your school, invite the superintendent, or some teacher whom he may suggest, to explain the subject before the class. Tables and charts should be shown.

7. Make quiet observation among your schoolmates as to brilliant intellects among the children of the poor. Do not discuss.

8. Of your former classmates who dropped out of school between the sixth and ninth grades, were there any brilliant intellects who quit school because they felt the need of going to work?

9. Explain the terms, "open classes," "caste." Do these terms apply to American society?

10. Read Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*. Discuss.

11. Summarize the theory of racial differences.

12. Find out what you can about the art of the men of the old Stone Age in Europe.

13. Read from other sources on Neanderthal, Pithecanthropus, and other inferior types.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chapters V, X, XI, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXXVI, XXXVII.

These chapters discuss individual, class and racial differences from various points of view.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927), Book I, Chapter II; Book II, Part II, Chapter VI. D. C. Heath and Company.

A voluminous treatment by a group of brilliant sociologists of the younger school.

HANKINS, FRANK H., *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chapters II and III.

On human origins and racial differences.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters XIX-XXI.

Evolution and the social origins.

OSBORN, H. F., *Men of the Old Stone Age*. Charles Scribner's Sons.

A most fascinating account of prehistoric man in Europe. Profusely illustrated.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters VI, XVIII, XXVI-XXX.

Chapter VI deals with the race problem; Chapters XVIII, XXVI-XXX discuss social classes.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapters X, XXX and XXXI.

Shows that race traits are not responsible for culture. Chapter XXXI treats of immigration.

WALLIS and WILLEY (1930), *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter IV. Alfred E. Knopf.

On racial differences.

CHAPTER III

HEREDITY AND HEREDITARY EQUIPMENT

Significance of population quality. The quality of a society obviously depends upon the physical, mental, and moral qualities of its population. Increasing attention is accordingly being paid, in democratic societies, to the improvement of mind and morals through education. But some individuals seem so base and dull that neither church nor school is able to improve them much. They are born with low mentality and slight educability. Modern biological science is making it clearer than ever it was before that many human traits are innate and heritable. If a person is equipped by nature with a poor quality of brains a definite limit is thereby set to the improvement of which he is capable. Epilepsy, most forms of feeble-mindedness, some kinds of insanity, certain types of blindness and deafness, and various other sorts of physical and mental weaknesses are now known to be hereditary; that is, they are passed on from generation to generation, and cannot appear in an individual unless they have previously existed in his ancestry. Certain good traits, as well as these bad ones, are generally regarded as hereditary also, such as musical, literary, artistic, mathematical, mechanical, and general mental ability, strong constitution, longevity, moral sensibility, and good disposition. In view of these things, many thoughtful persons have been turning their attention to the problem of breeding a better human stock.

The social science of eugenics. *Eugenics* is a word of Greek origin the root meaning of which is "well-born." Eugenics is the social science which treats of methods of breeding a better human stock. Its chief practical aim is to weed out the human culls; for it may as well be understood

from the outset that science offers no suggestions for producing new and better human strains. It is possible only to raise the average; and that by merely getting rid of the worst. But if the bad traits mentioned above could be eliminated, or even considerably reduced in frequency of occurrence, it would lift a great burden from society, and make possible a better world to live in. Hence the subject of eugenics has aroused much interest among sociologists, and cannot be omitted from a text of this kind. And this is especially true since the popular mind is full of grotesque misconceptions and superstitions on the subject, against which every intelligent young person ought to be warned. These will be mentioned incidentally in the course of the chapter.

Underlying the social science of eugenics is the biological science of genetics, which treats of the physical mechanism and laws of heredity. While some knowledge of genetics is essential to a scholarly understanding of heredity, only certain inferences drawn from it are absolutely necessary to an elementary summary like this. The subject of genetics properly belongs in the department of the natural sciences, rather than in sociology.

Various heritable defects. The word *insanity* names a class of mental afflictions too complicated to be analyzed here. Insanity may be due to injury, alcoholism, syphilis, tumors, or apoplexy; or it may also be due to simple heredity, some persons being born with inherited tendencies to insanity. Dr. Pearson, of Oxford, collected statistics from which he concluded that when both parents were insane sixty-six per cent of their offspring would be insane, but when only one parent was insane only forty per cent of the offspring would be insane. Epilepsy is a nervous trouble that causes loss of consciousness often accompanied with convulsions. It may be caused by syphilis, but more often it is hereditary. Epilepsy is closely related to feeble-

mindfulness, epileptic parents often producing feeble-minded offspring. Some of the children of an epileptic parent are likely, and some of the grandchildren are almost certain, to be either epileptic or feeble-minded; and if both parents are epileptic most of their children are pretty certain to be afflicted either in the one way or the other. Certain types of blindness and deafness are hereditary; so are albinism, haemophilia, cretinism, skeletal deformities, color-blindness, skin spots, and other defects.

Persons having the above defects are more or less of a burden, and in some cases a menace, to society. Each one of these defects discounts to some degree the joy of life for the one afflicted; and it would have been a blessing to many such defectives if they had never been born. The birth of a defective baby is a tragedy in any family. It will be a real gain, therefore, if eugenics can reduce the number of such, and eventually effect their complete disappearance.

Feeble-mindedness. Feeble-mindedness is defined as a type of intelligence so low that one is unable to care for himself or manage his own affairs with ordinary prudence. A moron is a feeble-minded person having intelligence approaching normality.

Feeble-mindedness is hereditary. Moreover, it is a so-called recessive trait; that is, it may skip a generation, but with the certainty of showing up somewhere in later generations. Thus, if one parent is feeble-minded, some, and possibly all, of the children, may be normal; but some of these normal children are pretty sure to have feeble-minded children—the defect being transmitted to the grandchildren instead of to the children. In rare cases a feeble-minded child may appear in a family all of whom are normal as far back as the ancestry is known. But the appearance of such a child is almost conclusive proof that there has been a feeble-minded person somewhere in the forgotten ancestry. Since feeble-mindedness is recessive it is possible

for a taint of it to lie hidden in almost any normal stock; and for this reason it may take thousands of years to eradicate it entirely.

But the most startling aspect of this matter is the fact that feeble-minded persons, whether married or not, are likely to produce numerous offspring, since they are not capable of moral self-restraint nor of a sense of responsibility. In less humane societies than ours they are very likely to perish in the sheer struggle for existence; but our modern charity tends to keep them alive. Unless something is done, therefore, to prevent them from reproducing, their percentage of the population is certain to increase. In fact, such increase is actually occurring at present.

Feeble-mindedness is therefore a burden, and perhaps a real menace, to society. The low-grade feeble-minded can not earn their own living. But the serious aspect of the matter is that a large proportion of such persons become paupers, drunkards, prostitutes, and criminals. Several investigators, most conspicuous among whom is Dr. H. H. Goddards, have furnished evidences of these tendencies by statistical studies of youthful criminals in several state reformatories. The conclusion is that at least fifty per cent of such offenders are feeble-minded. They become paupers because they are too dull to win in the competitive struggle of modern industrial life; they become drunkards and prostitutes because they lack intelligent self-control; they become criminals because they lack the imagination to realize the consequences of their misdeeds or the probability of their being caught. But perhaps the most serious phase of the matter is its bearing upon the success of democracy. Morons can hardly contribute anything to self-government, since they are not capable of voting intelligently, except by imitation.

— In view of these considerations it would seem that eugenics is one of the most important movements in modern civiliza-

tion. If we are to reduce pauperism, drunkenness, prostitution, and crime we must quit breeding the kind of human stock from which these classes are largely recruited. If we are to make a success of democracy we must raise the average level of intelligence and educability.

Three famous families. In connection with this subject it is usually customary to mention three famous families. Martin Kallikak, a revolutionary soldier of good stock, had a feeble-minded son, born of a feeble-minded mother. Of this son 480 descendants have been traced, of whom 143, or 30 per cent, were feeble-minded. Later Martin Kallikak married a Quaker woman of good stock. From this union there were 496 known descendants, all but two of whom have been of good mentality, and these two were not feeble-minded.

Max Jukes was a drunken, ignorant ne'er-do-well who resided in western New York when that region was still a frontier. The personal histories of 540 of this man's descendants are well known, and many others are partly known. About one-third of them died in infancy, 310 were paupers, and 440 were physical wrecks, 130 were convicted criminals, of whom seven were murderers. One-half of all the females were known to have been immoral. None of the 540 had a common school education, only 20 learned a trade, half of these doing so in prison. The inference seems to be that all these Jukeses were a bad lot because of their bad heredity; and certainly such a bad lot, running through generation after generation, are a burden and a menace to society.

In striking contrast with these two strains is the Edwards family. Of the descendants of Jonathan Edwards, 1394 have been traced. Among these is an amazing list of successful and even prominent people: college presidents, eminent physicians, clergymen, United States senators and congressmen, mayors, foreign ministers, bank, railroad, and steam-

ship presidents, etc., etc. The inference seems to be that it is worth while for society to encourage the fecundity of such a stock. The imagination plays readily upon the kind of world we might have if such strains as the Kallikaks and the Jukeses could be eliminated entirely, and the world peopled only by such folks as the Edwardses.

Balancing heredity and environment. Sometimes, however, the imagination plays all too readily. Some enthusiasts too easily infer that all the evil in the world is due to bad heredity, and that eugenics alone will reform society completely. But this is not true. We must remember the old allegory about the two knights who fell into deadly combat with each other over the question as to whether a certain shield was made of steel or bronze. After they had grievously maimed each other they learned that it was steel on one side and bronze on the other. Similarly, any person's success, virtue, culture—or the opposite—is made up of his heredity on one side and his opportunities on the other side. And one can never be quite sure which is the thicker metal.

Take the Kallikak and Jukes families, for example: there are enough bad individuals in such families to make a very bad environment; so that if an individual of good native equipment should happen to appear in such a family he would almost certainly be spoiled in the rearing. In other words, he might turn out badly because of his environment; but the outcome would be charged to his heredity. Nobody knows how many actual members of these two families might have turned out fairly well if they had had a better environment. Conversely, individuals of a family like the Edwardses are born into a good environment, with ambitious family traditions, and the influence of connections, to help them get a start in the world. Who knows how many, even of them, might have been swamped if they had been transferred at birth to the homes of paupers, criminals, and

degenerates. It is not sound logic to credit all the achievements of the Edwardses, nor to charge all the badness of the other two families, to heredity. Unquestionably heredity played a large, perhaps a major, part; but it is easy to claim more for it than can be soundly proven, and to overlook the importance of environment almost altogether.

The practical danger here is that our enthusiasm about heredity and eugenics may dampen our enthusiasm about education, moral training, and social reforms. More can be done for morons and feeble-minded than we sometimes imagine. There are many kinds of unskilled work that morons can do if they are properly supervised; and even the feeble-minded are capable of simple tasks. And Professor W. F. Dearborn, of Harvard, has expressed the opinion that they would be no more disposed to crime than normal persons if they were properly trained and environed. Since these things are so, a program of eugenics alone would surely fail of the desired results unless supplemented by a program of training and supervision for these classes. As for persons who are really normal, though of less than average intelligence, it is quite the fad just now to underestimate the educability of such persons. The unfortunate result is a decline of faith in popular education, the only means by which the average mass can be lifted to a higher level of life and culture. And, moreover, it is usually persons of brilliant minds but low morality who corrupt the government, start wars, commit hideous crimes, and exploit the helpless. What can eugenics do about that? Only moral education will rid the world of their cupidity and lust. Important as eugenics is, therefore, dependence upon eugenics alone for making this a better world would surely prove disappointing.

The program of eugenics. But this is a chapter on heredity, and its purpose is to emphasize the importance, and expound the methods, of eugenics. What shall we regard

as a scientific and acceptable program of eugenics? In the first place it needs to be said that such a program aims primarily to prevent defectives from reproducing their kind. No scientific eugenicist ever advocates murder in any form. Persons who are epileptic, or decidedly feeble-minded, or who are seriously afflicted with hereditary insanity, should be confined in institutions where the sexes are separated. This is a method of preventing their reproduction about which there is no disagreement. The only difficulty is the expense, which is so great that society has thus far been reluctant to undertake the burden. However, it must be obvious to any thoughtful person how shortsighted that reluctance is.

Voluntary measures. There are persons who are afflicted with some of the defects mentioned earlier in this chapter, or whose parents or grandparents were afflicted with such defects, so that they themselves carry them recessive and are hence liable to transmit them to their offspring, but whose intelligence and sense of responsibility are affected little or none. For example, one might be perfectly normal but know that epilepsy or feeble-mindedness ran in his family; or one might have congenital blindness, or intermittent spells of hereditary insanity, but be otherwise normal. Such a person would do well to forego parenthood voluntarily. As enlightenment on the subject of heredity becomes more general it is probable that such cases of voluntary renunciation of parenthood will become more frequent.

In selecting a mate it is well to scrutinize not only the parents, but also the grandparents of the party under consideration, as the undesirable traits of the mate's parents and even grandparents are likely to reappear in one's own children. Fiction-writers sometimes make very amusing use of such incidents; but in actual life they are often tragic in the extreme. If a young person is actually confronted with such a problem he should seek the advice of a specialist,

since in matters of this kind a *little* knowledge is liable to prove a very dangerous thing. It is easily possible, moreover, to become fanatical on this subject, because almost any person can find some sort of minor taint somewhere in his ancestry; and especially because persons often become alarmed about traits that are not hereditary at all.

What eugenics cannot do. In plant and animal breeding it often happens that new and better strains are produced, and this fact leads some persons to imagine that eugenics can produce a new human stock quite better than anything which now exists. The imagination easily runs wild on this subject; and it is often encouraged by cheap magazines and the Sunday papers. But let us restate with emphasis that nothing of the sort is contemplated by scientific eugenists. There are two very important reasons for this. In the first place any attempt to mate persons not mutually attractive for supposedly eugenic purpose only, either through compulsion or persuasion, would interfere with normal family life. But the spiritual aspects of marriage and family life have too much social value to admit of any such brutish policy, even if it were otherwise desirable, which it is not. It is not desirable because, in the second place, the mental, moral, aesthetic, and emotional traits of human nature are so varied, complexly balanced together, and so important that nobody could say who are the persons most desirable to society. What kind of cow or horse is most useful to men is a very simple matter; but what kind of man is most useful to his fellow men, and to posterity, is an infinitely difficult problem.

The standard of living as a eugenic factor. There is one measure that has received surprisingly little attention in the literature of the subject, but which is of prime importance in the long run, and that is the standard of living. The standard of living is defined and explained on page 173. The standard of living determines the birth rate (cf.

p. 181). As a rule, a high birth rate results from a low standard of living, and a low birth rate results from a high standard of living. The birth rate is higher on the average among the poor and squalid classes of society than it is among the well-to-do and cultured classes.

It is safe to assume that the average mentality of the lower classes is somewhat lower than that of the higher classes. To be sure this assumption can be overworked, as was pointed out in the last chapter. Still it stands to reason, and has been proved by investigators, that there are more dullards, natural-born ne'er-do-wells, and temperamental failures among the poor than among the prosperous; and more capable persons among the prosperous than among the poor. Obviously, then, if the poor and degraded classes reproduce faster than the rich and cultured (as they do), the average quality of the population will gradually decline, the baser crowding out the better stock. There can be little doubt that this is actually happening among Americans.

The remedy is to raise the standard of living of the masses at the bottom, through public education and economic reforms. Help them all to secure better food, better housing, more education, and more wholesome recreation. Then their birth rate will decline, and hence their percentage of the population. Even people on the moron level of intelligence would doubtless respond to this influence, especially where it is the prevailing custom to rear small families.

Racial crossing. In the sociological and popular literature of the day one frequently encounters discussions of racial crossing. Is racial crossing a good thing or a bad thing? Race prejudice, one of the most irrational and fanatical of popular superstitions, runs rampant in the most of such discussions, especially in the unscientific. It is well, therefore, for young citizens who are ambitious to be intelligent to fix the fundamental principles of this matter clearly in their minds. To do so they must distinguish sharply

between facts that are biological and facts that are sociological; and also between what is proved and what is unproved.

Professor W. E. Castle, of Harvard, whose book on *Genetics and Eugenics* is mentioned in the reading list at the close of this chapter, is unquestionably a trustworthy authority on the biological aspect of this subject. From his chapter on "Human Crosses" one gathers the following




DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING "SPREAD."

biological principle, namely: that such crossing "may be expected to produce on the whole intermediates as regards physical and psychical characters." This statement may be interpreted by the aid of the accompanying diagram. Let *aa* represent the inferior race, *bb* the superior, and *cc* the hybrid. The average of a hybrid race would be lower than the one, and higher than the other; but the "spread" would equal the total spread of both. That is, the hybrid race would have a few individuals as good as the best in the superior race, but not so many; and likewise of the worst.

As to the superiority or inferiority of the various races—it is significant that the most careful scientists claim to know almost nothing conclusive about the matter. The uninformed would naturally suppose that the most civilized races are the innately superior races; but this belief wrecks on the biological fact that acquired characteristics are *not* transmitted. Three thousand years ago the Chinese or the

Egyptians, for example, were far more civilized than our savage ancestors in the forests of western Europe. To claim that the Chinese or the Egyptians were innately superior then, whereas the west Europeans and their American descendants are innately superior now, is out of the question; because biological science denies the probability, if not the possibility indeed, of any such change. Whoever grasps the import of Weismann's law (p. 20) will realize the force of this statement. Trained scientists are cautious, therefore, about inferring innate superiority from superior cultural achievement. For the same reasons they sometimes apply the terms "Nordic myth" or "Anglo-Saxon myth" to that easy confidence with which we of west Europe descent are wont to flatter ourselves upon our own superiority. Suffice to say that young persons who aspire to be scientific-minded in this age of science will be disposed to suspend judgment on this vexed question.

Immigration. What shall we say then of immigration? Does it deteriorate the American stock? Probably the answer is not the one that runs current in the popular mind. Probably the correct answer is that it depends upon the kind of individuals that come to us. If we get the best, or even the average, from any stock there is probably no *biological* damage to our own stock from the admixture. But if it is the culls that we get from any race, then, of course, our stock will be damaged. The obvious moral is that we should apply physical and mental tests, and accept only desirable individuals as immigrants. However, there are other than eugenic reasons for restricting immigration.

In this connection it is interesting to note the historical fact that not a few of the people who came to America during the colonial period were "the offscourings of the earth." Some were paupers, sent here as indentured servants, some were actual criminals, both sorts being sent here to be gotten rid of. Evidently we can jump too quickly to the

conclusion that poverty, or even criminality, "run in the blood."

The sociological aspects of racial crossings. Thus far we have discussed only the biological aspects of racial crossing. We come now to the sociological aspect, and that is an entirely different matter. The two phases of the subject should be clearly distinguished if one wishes to think clearly about it. Almost always a person of mixed blood finds himself in a somewhat difficult social position. He does not belong to his father's race; he does not belong to his mother's race. The chances are that his parents are both more or less out of harmony with their own race, for having married out of it.

The children of such a marriage are therefore at a disadvantage, not only among their associates away from home, but inside the home as well; at least, such is liable to be the case, though there are doubtless numerous exceptions. And, obviously, the case is even worse with an illegitimate child whose father is of a different race from the mother. There are numerous spots upon the earth—Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, and certain Spanish-American countries, for example—where racial crossings facilitate the study of such conditions; and sociologists have availed themselves of such opportunities for research, with the findings outlined above. It should be carefully borne in mind that the disadvantages under which persons of mixed races live are social rather than biological.

The children of immigrants are under a somewhat similar disadvantage. The manners and customs that their parents brought from the old country are not like those of the new country. As the young people get acquainted with the ways of the new country—the only country they know, as a rule—the ways of their parents naturally seem strange to them. Most young people have a period during adolescence when they suspect their parents of being sadly behind the times

and quite inferior in their judgments to the up-to-date young people. Now the children of immigrants naturally suffer from this mental disorder in aggravated form. It is doubtless for such social reasons as these that statistics show an abnormally high percentage of criminality among the "native born of foreign parents."

An interesting case of racial crossing. In connection with this subject of racial crossing Castle tells a very interesting and romantic story, which illustrates his expert opinion that if persons of mixed races are at a disadvantage it is for sociological and not for biological reasons. More than a century and a quarter ago there occurred a mutiny on board a British ship, with the result that nine Englishmen and eighteen Polynesian natives, twelve of whom were women, found themselves refugees on Pitcairn Island, just south of the equator, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. These refugees quarrelled among themselves, with the result that, when they were accidentally discovered in 1808, there was one man left, an Englishman, with eight or nine native women, and several children. The descendants of this nucleus now number approximately one thousand persons, of whom Castle says: "So far as present information goes, the results have been excellent both biologically and sociologically." This seems to be a clear case of racial crossing uncomplicated by race antipathies. The other case is a tribe formed of mixed Boer and Hottentot blood, which had penetrated far northward among hostile tribes in South Africa, where they isolated themselves from both whites and blacks. He concludes, "The experiment has progressed far enough to show that under conditions that do not interfere with cultural inheritance" (i. e. in the absence of racial prejudices) "crossing of racial stocks as widely separated as Europeans and Africans has no evil consequences, but produces a vigorous, sound race." The inference is that it is race prejudice rather than racial crossing that does harm.

PROBLEMS

1. Gather the figures, so far as they are accessible, of the number of defectives in your state, and the cost of maintaining them. In your county.

2. To what extent are irresponsible defectives permitted to run at large in your community? Supplement personal observations with inquiries of physicians, health officers, school superintendents, and others.

3. Discuss, as concretely as possible, what would be the effect upon society of eliminating the mentally lowest five per cent.

4. Show how ideals, especially ideals as to desirable mates, operate as eugenic factors. Give illustrations.

5. Gather samples of newspaper material on eugenics that are unworthy of consideration.

6. In some instances persons desire expert advice as to the eugenic risk involved in contracting a given marriage. From whom can really expert advice be secured in such cases?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CASTLE, W. E., *Genetics and Eugenics*. Harvard University Press.

The theory of heredity, and its application to plant and animal breeding and to human eugenics. A long quotation from Professor Cattell, beginning on page 298, discusses the limitations of eugenics in a very able fashion. Profusely illustrated.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Part II.

A rather elaborate discussion of the biological equipment of man, by Professor Hankins.

ELLWOOD, C. A., *The Social Problem*, Chapter III. The Macmillan Company

Sets forth a scientific program of eugenics, with the biological reasons for it, and its social importance.

HANKINS, FRANK H., *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chapters VI and VII.

A lucid discussion of the biological factors in the social life.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapter XIV.

On racial differences, hereditary defects, and eugenics.

WALTERS, H. E., *Genetics*. The Macmillan Company.

A very clear presentation of the biological facts and theories involved in heredity, with many helpful charts and drawings.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter VI.

On heredity, eugenics and population.

CHAPTER IV

ACQUIRED TRAITS

Acquired vs. innate traits. Human traits are of two sorts, innate and acquired. In view of the fact that the characteristics and qualities of society are predetermined by the innate traits of human nature, it seemed proper to devote the first three chapters of this book to the discussion of such traits. But because the characteristics and qualities of any society depend obviously in large part upon acquired traits, it seems like a logical necessity to devote at least one chapter to that subject also.

Preventable diseases. Acquired traits are either physical or mental. Of acquired physical traits the most apparent and important are preventable diseases.

Tuberculosis, pneumonia, smallpox, malaria, yellow fever, and hookworm have been the most destructive. Medical science has discovered the causes of these diseases, and the means of preventing them. But successfully to apply the preventive measures depends upon social coöperation; and successful coöperation in turn depends upon enlightenment of the people who are to coöperate. The enormous sale of patent medicines, and the patronage that quack doctors still receive, in this age of science, is a disgrace to civilization.

Nevertheless civilized societies have very greatly reduced the ravages of these diseases in recent years. Through vaccination the death rate from smallpox in New York City has been reduced practically to zero since 1905. The death rate from tuberculosis in the United States has been reduced to about one-tenth what it was in 1860. However, it is generally understood among medical men that we are now in for an increase of tuberculosis, especially among women,

on account of insufficient feeding due to the weight-reducing fad, of exposure to the cold due to the fashions in clothing, and of nicotine poisoning due to women's smoking. Deaths from diphtheria have been almost abolished in our most progressive cities. The death rate from typhoid fever was about thirty-five per 100,000 of the population in 1885; it is now about three. The unconquered disease is cancer. To the list of preventable diseases must be added the deaths and injuries from industrial accidents and diseases.

Similar gains have been made in the matter of infant mortality, the rate in 1922 being sixty-seven out of every 1000 babies born, the rate varying from fifty-five among the wealthy to 240 among the very poor. Great gains have been made through coöperative efforts in securing a supply of milk that is safe so far as microbes are concerned. Baby clinics in many cities have taught ignorant mothers how to feed and care for their babies.

The death rate. One of the greatest achievements of modern times is the reduction of the death rate, due to the discoveries of medical science, and to improvements in co-operative measures for health protection. The death rate in this country is now about 11; that is, there are annually about eleven deaths among each one thousand of the population. It is safe to assert that fifty years ago it was at least twice as high as it is now. In former ages it was doubtless from three to five times as high; and it is yet, in backward countries.

The reduction of disease and the death rate is having important effects upon the social life. It means that comfort and happiness are being substituted for suffering, anxiety, and grief, especially for women. It means more wealth and better standards of living; though the money cost of sickness is still estimated at about twelve dollars a year for every man, woman, and child in the United States.

The declining death rate is chiefly responsible for the

enormous growth of population, in Europe and America. A lower death rate has been accompanied by a lower birth rate. Nevertheless preventable disease is still one of the great burdens under which humanity staggers.

Significance of acquired mental traits. For sociology the acquired contents of men's minds are quite as important as their acquired physical traits. A society is good if the acquired mental traits prevailing among the population are good traits; a society is bad if they are bad. Indeed, social customs and institutions *are* acquired mental traits. This is the central fact of sociology. The central task of sociology is, therefore, to present this fact vividly to the student's imagination. This idea will accordingly be repeated in every subsequent chapter of this book, and its application to each particular institution will be carefully pointed out. In this chapter some general considerations will be presented to show the social importance of acquired mental traits; in the next it will be made clear that civilization itself, as contrasted with savagery, is nothing more nor less than a great mass of acquired mental traits.

Educability and plasticity. But to start with, the fact that mental traits can be acquired is something that demands explanation. The lower forms of life can acquire nothing of the sort. They are not educable; their behavior is all instinctive; it cannot be changed by experience. Even the highest animals are but slightly educable. True, the dog and the horse can be taught; but man is educable out of all comparison with any other creature. There seems to be almost no limit to his capacity to acquire new knowledge, ideals, and habits, and to modify his behavior accordingly.

The biological reason why man is educable is because his nervous system is plastic; that is, new connections through the nervous system can be formed as a result of experience. The nervous systems of the lower animal forms are but slightly plastic; most of their neural connections are pre-

formed before birth. But in the human nervous system such is not the case. Very many connections are formed during the life-experience of the individual. If a person sets out to learn the piano, for example, it means that he deliberately undertakes to perfect certain connections in his nervous system, so that when, seated at the piano, his eyes fall upon the first bars of the Rachmaninoff Prelude, his fingers proceed, without thought, to strike the corresponding keys.

To be sure, there are some connections that we are more predisposed to form than others. One is much more likely to form the habit of eating good beef than of eating sand and gravel as fowls do. Most persons find it easy to mingle sociably with others; whereas for a normal human being it would be hard to form the habits of a hermit. Habits of play come easier than habits of uninterrupted drudgery. Our instincts determine which connections come easy and which come hard. It is hard to form habits that go directly against our instinctive tendencies. It can be done, however—a fact of great sociological importance.

Habit vs. instinct.¹ It is important to distinguish sharply between instinct and habit. The former is innate, the latter is acquired. The behavior of the lower animals is entirely instinctive; that of the higher vertebrates is largely so. But the behavior of adult human beings is very largely a matter of habit. Instincts predetermine in a general way what kinds of behavior human beings will engage in; but the particular acts are largely a matter of habit. Thus instinct decrees that a man must eat; but what he eats depends upon how his tastes have been educated. Some people like half-incubated eggs, raw; others prefer raw oysters. Thus people's habits differ. Instinct decrees that a man must worship something; but what he worships depends upon the religious customs of the society in which he is reared.

¹ In this book the word instinct is used—despite the protests of the behaviorists—to include not only reflexes (cf. p. 8), but also innate tendencies to learn this instead of that. Only in this sense is religion, for example, instinctive.

Historic peoples compared. The acquired contents of men's minds differ radically from age to age. And, according to biology, these differences in the civilizations of the past do not imply any differences whatever in the inborn traits or abilities of the peoples of those different periods. The differences are acquired.

It is hard for us to imagine the contents of the medieval mind, for instance. It contained the idea of a flat world, with a jumping off place at the edge, held up on the back of Atlas and a series of monsters; with the stars—but we just can't picture it! There were no disease germs; but there were demons, and fairies, and goblins, and gnomes; all taken seriously. Fifty miles was regarded a long way from home. Babies it was expected would die—five chances out of ten. For amusement one went to see deadly combats between men on horseback, and thought it fine sport. Such ideas were prevalent. To have acquired the ideas now held would have been impossible; they were not extant.

To imagine the mind of Cro-Magnon is still more difficult; quite impossible, indeed! What things he did not think about we can enumerate in a long list. All our science, art, religion, history, industrial technique, methods of communications, recreations, fashions, ambitions, were non-existent to him. His young men had ambitions to make weapons and ornaments out of bone and stone, and to organize gang expeditions for the capture of animals now extinct; but how they planned to accomplish these things we can only conjecture. We infer that he believed in a hereafter; but of what sort, we have very little notion. Concerning the forests and the mountain fastnesses he had a great mass of detailed information that would amaze us. What he thought about a fight, and whether he liked music, and whether he revered or killed his grandfather, we do not know. We can therefore picture his society to our imaginations only in vague outlines.

Contemporaneous peoples compared. The same may well be true of the different peoples now living upon the earth. It is unproven that civilized and savage races differ with respect to inborn traits; and it may not be necessary to assume that they do. Their social differences may be explained solely by differences in acquired traits.

Compare, for example, the society of England sixty years ago with that of Japan. A detailed study of each would reveal the fact that the prevailing ideas, ideals, and habits of the two peoples differed in very many particulars. For a child growing up in England it was impossible to acquire the Japanese traits; and conversely. But a Japanese child, growing up in an English home, would have acquired the English traits, in spite of physical traits distinctly Japanese. And conversely, also. But during the past sixty years, due to modern communication, so much mental material from the west has been imported into Japan, that Japanese society is rapidly changing toward the European type. It is now much less unlike the English.

Different social classes compared. It is equally significant to study the acquired mind-stuff of different social groups living in the same country at the same time. Through certain American works of fiction one becomes familiar with the mental material prevailing in certain typical groups. Hamlin Garland portrays the interests and mental habits of Iowa farmers forty years ago; Jacob Riis reveals to us what the slum dwellers of New York City had to think about; and George W. Cable introduces us to the mind of the old South.

In fiction, economic theory, and common sense it has long been recognized that children and young people acquire the mental material prevailing in certain typical groups. If a child is born and reared in some remote rural region where schools are very poor and superstition is rampant, he will acquire the mental poverty of his environment. Only

a very small per cent will escape into a larger world. Such regions are likely to retain their social qualities for generations, unless outside influences penetrate them forcibly. If young people grow up in a congested industrial quarter, where all the people work for low wages in some industrial plant, live squalidly, and take their children out of school at the age of fourteen, the vast majority will grow up with corresponding ideas and so become almost hopelessly incapable of living otherwise. On the other hand, young persons who grow up in families and association groups of wealth and culture acquire ideas, ambitions, and habits that give them special advantages. These facts are so self-evident that one wonders why their force is ever overlooked, much less denied. In exceptional cases persons do, through luck, chance, or rare capacity, break into some other social group; but to infer from exceptional cases that all can do so is of course absurd.

"The Kingdom of Evil." "The Kingdom of Evil" is a phrase that Professor E. C. Hayes used with telling effect. It refers to the prevalence in some societies of vice habits and degrading ideals. For example, a century and a quarter ago in New England the custom prevailed of drinking large quantities of distilled liquors. Almost nobody abstained. Rum was freely used at funerals and weddings. Clergymen were not infrequently drunkards. Rum was king, as one may say; all young persons were born subjects of his realm; the many who died as drunkards were the victims of his power. The prevailing notions constituted a kingdom of evil. But the temperance reform which swept over the United States during the middle of the century, broke the power of that kingdom in large measure. Our present struggle to enforce prohibition is a struggle against the power of that "king." In some communities and social groups habits and ideals prevail that virtually doom the rising generation to some vice or other; whereas young people

in other social groups are in almost no danger of acquiring the same vices. The quality of a society depends upon the vices or virtues that prevail, and which the young people are predestined to acquire. And the strange thing is that where a vice is prevalent its victims believe its absence to be impossible. When reforms are impossible it is usually just because so many persons have acquired the belief that they are impossible.

Who the important and capable persons are. A person is a capable and important member of society somewhat in proportion to the usefulness and importance of the ideas, appreciations, and skills that he has acquired. If a naturally bright person has a great deal of information about trifling matters (e.g. puzzles, neighborhood gossip, royal genealogies, etc.); appreciates only things of small value (e.g. having clothes of the latest fashion); and has skills that are of small utility (e.g. to carve trinkets out of nuts or to polish shoes rapidly); he is a person of small consequence. But if a person has information of large importance (e.g. how to manage a military campaign or solve the labor-capital controversy); appreciates things of great value to mankind (e.g. the benefits of science and art, or of international federation); and possesses skills that have great value (e.g. in managing a parliament or inventing useful machines); that person is an important member of society.

The importance and utility of the acquired material with which a person will store his mind with depends only in part upon his I.Q.; it depends quite as much upon the environment from which he acquires the contents of his mind. Who has not heard the legend of the shipwrecked twins! The one was set adrift in a tub, and floating far was found at last by a pair of monks on the coast of Spain. Reared by them in monastic walls, he passed through life a pale and pious priest. The other clung to a spar of mast till overhauled by a pirate gang, cruising the Seven Seas.

Reared by them on their salty decks, he grew to a peg-legged pirate's life, as bloody and bold as the best of his mates. To each it was *possible* to acquire only the traits of a narrowed world; so there was no choice but to grow to the form.

The same may even be true of persons of different social groups living in the same country and at the same time. One youth grows up in the family of a small village merchant where the chief problems are those of the store, the garden, and the limitations of a small income. If the local schools and churches are poor and no books or magazines come to the home, the youth's chief interests are likely to become neighborhood gossip and the daily passenger train. Even the occasional youth who does escape, to become, say, a college professor, is likely to betray throughout his life the cultural limitations of such an early environment. There is an old saying that it takes three generations to make a gentleman; and there is a core of truth in this aphorism. Another youth may grow up in the family of a great statesman, where almost daily he hears such problems discussed as the control of monopoly, the extension of popular education, international credit relations, and so forth. The best periodicals of America and Europe may be available, and the best schools patronized. As guests the youth may meet leading personalities and listen to their conversation. This youth's mind will become richly stored; and he is likely to become a far more useful citizen. It has been asserted that the superiority of British diplomacy arises from the fact that her diplomats are mostly taken from the class whose sons through several generations have been brought up in such an environment. The resulting differences of personality might easily be acquired in spite of identical I.Q.'s.

To be sure, a person of high native intelligence is better able to profit by a rich environment if he has it; or is more likely to break away from a meagre environment if

he is born to it—facts which no sensible person will overlook. But the fact is too often overlooked that individual superiorities may be due solely to fortunate opportunities and acquired intellectual resources.

Artificial inferiority. From the foregoing it is clear that there is such a thing as artificial inferiority. Suppose a person, or a group, or a whole social class, is unprotected from disease, is underfed, is overworked to the point of constant fatigue, is constantly worried over the problem of getting a bare living, is occupied with manual tasks of small importance. Suppose also a community life where schools are poor, culture is meagre, religion is fanatical, and vices are rampant. Suppose further that there exists an insistent belief on the part of their superiors or masters that such persons or classes actually are inferior. The victims of such conditions will certainly appear distinctly inferior; moreover, they will themselves come to believe quite hopelessly in their own inferiority. Such things have happened. The inferiority of women in the past was exactly that kind of an artificial inferiority. The peasant classes in Europe have been held in such artificial inferiority for centuries. It may well be that the inferiority of our own so-called lower classes, or of people in backward rural regions, is only an artificial inferiority. That may also be true of so-called backward races.

It is easy to underestimate the mental wealth that persons of average or meagre native intelligence can acquire, and what they can accordingly achieve. A Cro-Magnon man with an I.Q. of say 90 would doubtless have made a rather poor showing among his fellows; he would have seemed quite hopeless material for a better society. And yet men with I. Q.'s of 90 actually did make successful adjustments to the richer society of medieval Europe. And even to the vastly richer civilization of modern America. Moreover, the distribution of intelligence has probably been about the

same in all three of these societies, however different their cultures have been. And men with I. Q.'s of 90 will doubtless make fairly successful adjustments to the far higher civilization that will exist 10,000 years hence. From which it may be inferred that the ignorant, skillless, squalid people of our "inferior" classes at present could undoubtedly acquire considerable culture, technique, taste, and dignity if they were given adequate opportunities to do so.

Human nature acquired. It has been said that man is not born human, but that his human nature is acquired; and this saying expresses a centrally important sociological principle. This principle may be introduced by the following clipping from *The Literary Digest* for October 8, 1927:

"When an incredible thing is reported again and again, always by people of standing, it at last becomes at least debatable, and this is what has happened to stories of wolf-children. The most recent one—that of the Maiwana wolf-child captured seventy-five miles from Allahabad in British India—is taken seriously by writers noted for their hatred of sensationalism. The child, a boy, supposed to be between seven and twelve years old, is 'able to stand' and 'walks with a fair degree of ease,' but at times 'prefers to crawl, sitting on his haunches with his legs curled underneath him and propelling himself forward with the palms of his hands on the ground.' As we are told, 'doctors who have examined him say that he has lived on roots and herbs for years. Although he is now given meat, he frequently eats grass when taken out in the cool of the evening. He has a voracious appetite, and at times exhibits fierceness. His only talk is a kind of bark, which he keeps up continuously. He was found by herdsmen in a wolf's cave.'"

Several other similar cases are mentioned in the article from which the following statements are selected:

"For a long time he tore off the clothes that were supplied him and persisted in eating his food from the ground. As the years went by he became more docile."

"His arms were only nineteen inches long, and scientists believed their development had been arrested by going on all fours. He lived in an orphanage thirty years, but never learned more than a few words."

"She can now walk upright, and has become fairly human in her habits, but her mind develops very slowly."

Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (pp. 239 ff.) give several cases, which they regard

as authentic, of wild children found in Europe. Here is a sample:

“The girl came out of the forest near Chalons in 1731. She was thought to be nine years old. She carried a club in her hand, with which she killed a dog that attacked her. She climbed trees easily. She caught fish and ate them raw; a cry served for speech. She showed an instinct for decorating herself with leaves and flowers. She found it difficult to adapt herself to the customs of civilized life and suffered many fits of sickness. In 1747 she was put into the convent at Chalons. She learned something of the French language, of domestic science, and embroidery. She readily understood what was pointed out to her, but always had certain sounds which were not understood. She claimed to have first begun to reflect after the beginning of her education. In her wild life she thought only of her own needs. She believed that the earth and the trees produced her, and her earliest memory of shelter was of holes in the ground.”

Acquired through the learning process. For the explanation of such cases we must turn to the paragraphs on behaviorism in Chapter II. The behaviorists have shown that almost all human behavior is *learned* behavior. If, therefore, a child has opportunity to learn only from animals, he learns only animal behavior. If a child is to learn human behavior it is absolutely necessary that he be given an opportunity to learn it from other human beings. That is what each of us has done, as a matter of fact. Human nature is acquired nature. In isolation one could not ever become human. As Goethe put it: “Ein Mensch ist kein Mensch.”

Such considerations throw a very bright and interesting light upon the question-asking of small children. Their continuous, persistent questions, day in and day out, have been a topic for jokes, time out of mind. Often parents grow so tired of the pumping process as to pay no attention to them, or else to turn them off with evasive, frivolous answers. But this business of learning to be human is such a serious business with the child! However, it is not merely through his questions that he learns to be human, but also through sheer imitation. That is the way he learns language

and the common emotions of life. And eventually we send him to school where learning can be made a regular business with him for several years. They want him to become not merely human, but civilized.

The social heritage. What is it now that the young candidate is learning in this process of acquiring human nature? The answer is: the *social heritage*; which means the great mass of inventions and discoveries, information and wisdom that our ancestors have been slowly accumulating through the centuries. The list of "Intellectual Resources," on page 11 will help the reader to understand what we mean by the social heritage. It consists of the race's accumulated means of communication, techniques of industry and recreation, sciences and fine arts, creeds and codes. Only by learning and using this mass of mental capital are we able to live like human beings. But by so doing each of us acquires in a few years that human nature which it has taken the race as a whole many thousands of years to acquire.

The term *culture* is often used nowadays by sociologists as practically equivalent to the term *social heritage*.

Mental interdependence. It should be observed that we learn the contents of the social heritage from one another. Most of the items we get from persons older than ourselves. Each rising generation learns from the older generation; thus the social heritage is passed on from generation to generation. By absorbing information from others, quite dependently, each individual is able to acquire the gist of what it has taken the race thousands of years to learn. Animals do not learn from one another, except to a negligible degree; hence they develop no culture. Now culture is what makes man human. Thus it is by *dependent* learning from others that we acquire human nature. We learn ten thousand necessary items dependently for every one that we learn independently. Independence of thought and learning is ninety-nine times out of a hundred a fiction of our

own conceits. If one had to learn everything for himself it would take him one hundred thousand years to become civilized—as long as it has taken the race! Dependent learning from others is one of the most human traits of our minds. The interdependence of human beings is thus seen to be a far deeper matter than the mere team work of games or even the coöperation of industry and of war. We are interdependent for the very contents of our minds.

PROBLEMS

1. Ascertain the number of cases annually of each of the preventable diseases, and the number of deaths from each. Information can be got from the United States Census reports, from Senate reports on national health, and from literature issued by the Rockefeller Foundation. These documents can and should be secured for your school library.

2. From the census reports ascertain the figures on infant mortality. Also get information about child health from the American Child Health Association, 370 Seventh Avenue, New York City.

3. Get literature from the Anti-Tuberculosis Association, and inform yourselves about the fight against that plague.

4. Compute the money loss from preventable diseases.

5. Collect figures on industrial accidents and diseases.

6. What is the law in your state relative to compensation for industrial accidents? This law will probably furnish a good topic for debate.

7. What is the present death rate in your city?

8. Read the *Book of Judges*, and reconstruct the mental contents of the ancient Hebrews.

9. To what extent do writers of historical fiction succeed in inducting us in the ancient atmosphere?

10. From a study of Grimm's Fairy Tales and Scott's novels contrast the mental worlds of medieval peasantry and nobility.

11. Would present-day Americans rally to the standards of a military conqueror as the French people followed Napoleon into Italy, Austria, Egypt, and Russia?

12. Speculate on the possibility of the Mexican people adopting the culture of the United States. On the tribes of central Africa adopting European culture.

13. Enumerate the intellectual resources of the Aztecs now lost by their descendants.

14. Discuss further "The Kingdom of Evil."

15. State the sociological truth in the old theological doctrine of predestination.

16. Does a big job make a big man? A little job, a little man?

17. Is it the ideal of democracy that the opportunity be open for capable individuals to escape out of the lower classes?

18. Collect theories calculated to convince the artificially inferior that they are inherently inferior.

19. Illustrate the progress possible as a result of popular education. The aim of this discussion is to kindle the imagination of the class with respect to this subject.

20. Is successful democracy possible, considering the low intelligence of the masses?

21. Slavery was a bad social practice; why were there persons who defended it? Discuss other bad practices similarly.

22. Give historic illustrations of bad social practices that have finally been discarded.

23. What, according to the principles set forth in this chapter, is the chief obstacle to the League of Nations?

24. Will the Golden Rule always be hopelessly impracticable?

25. Why are geniuses more numerous in some periods than in others?

26. How did ancient Sparta pour her young men into the soldier mould?

27. How did Germany, between 1871 and 1914, imbue the minds of the various social classes with the pan-German ambition? The problem is not the same for the different classes.

28. How does a person become a Democrat or a Republican, a radical or a reactionary?

29. Have some member of the class make a report on Ross's *Social Control*, especially Part II.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

COOLEY, C. H., *Social Organization*, Chapters XVIII-XXVII. Charles Scribner's Sons.

A fascinating and illuminating discussion of social classes.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Part III.

On the individual and his remaking, by Professor L. L. Bernard.

EDMAN, IRVING, *Human Traits*, Chapters XII-XV.

See note under Chapter I of this text.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapter XVI.

On public health. Statistics are taken from the 1910 Census.

HOAG and TERMAN, *Health Work in the Schools*. Houghton Mifflin Company.

A good discussion of the prevalence of physical defects among school children, and of the work being done in schools for the correction of the defects.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters X-XXV.

These chapters offer a rather elaborate development of the fact that acquired traits make up the stuff of the social life.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL HERITAGE¹

One of the most important laws of nature is the law of change. "Nothing ever is, but always is becoming." Everything is *in process*. Nothing is just what it was yesterday, or will be tomorrow. Every time it rains, a little silt is washed down the gulleys. Returning to the haunts of his boyhood forty years later the elderly man finds that the little brook he used to fish in has cut its channel four or five feet deeper through the neighbor's pasture. Given enough millions of years, and we get a Grand Canyon or a Royal Gorge.

And taken by and large this law of change displays itself as a process of development. In nature, things change from the simple to the complex. Through long ages the physical world has gradually been preparing itself to become the abode of man, and adapting itself to the needs of the human species. From the human standpoint the law of change has been a law of progress.

And this is as true of the social life as of everything else in the world. Institutions are constantly in process of change. For example, the British government has developed during the past three hundred years from an all but absolute monarchy to one of the most democratic governments in the world. Again, our free public school system, with which we are so familiar, is a growth of the past century and a quarter; indeed, most of its development has been made since the Civil War. Still again, a most significant change in business organization is going on right under our very eyes, namely, from small local firms, independently owned, to

¹ The term *culture base* is in general use among sociologists as a synonym for "second heritage." In this book the term *culture mass* is sometimes used.

great nation-sized corporations. The chain stores constitute but one example out of many that might be mentioned. As a result of this centralization young men are aspiring nowadays to become the salaried employees of great corporations, instead of independent business men on their own accounts, as did the young men of two generations ago.

The change and development of institutions are diligently called to the attention of history students even down in the elementary grades; for history, whether of the United States, of Europe, or of the world as a whole, is nothing more nor less than a record of the growth of institutions. And yet surprisingly few people seem to grasp the idea. Nothing seems harder than to reconcile ourselves to changes that are actually occurring in things as they are. The attitude of expectancy toward social change is one of the marks of an educated mind; and to impart it is one of the duties of sociology.

One of the most significant kinds of social change is the gradual accumulation of what was called on page 11 the "Intellectual Resources of Society." Take the means of communication as an example. We can only speculate and guess as to how spoken language got started. Nor do we know just when the art of writing was invented; we know that Cro-Magnon did not have it, but that the early Egyptians did. The Phoenicians are given credit for inventing a phonetic alphabet as a substitute for the clumsy hieroglyphics of the Egyptians; while the latter invented paper as a substitute for stone or brick tablets. Printing first appeared in Europe during the fifteenth century, presumably from China. And now, within a century, have been introduced the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, the fast mail train, the rotary press, and the phonograph as means of communication. And these new inventions, from the earliest to the most recent, revolutionized society, each in its turn. Every other class of intellectual resources has had

a similar development; and to an outline history of that development the present chapter is devoted.

It is never possible to begin at the absolute beginning of any story. There are always earlier events that have a bearing on the narrative. Forced, therefore, arbitrarily to select something as our starting point, we select Cro-Magnon, since he was the first specimen of *Homo sapiens* of which the anthropologists are as yet able to give us information. It appears that his inventions and discoveries gradually put an end to the Old Stone Age, and started the Neolithic or New Stone Age.

What culture elements did Cro-Magnon inherit from his hairy, low-browed predecessors—the Neanderthal race? In answer we may think of the girl who came naked out of the Chalons forest with a club in her hand—except that the Neanderthal man lived and probably hunted in groups. Doubtless he lived on herbs, roots, fruits, eggs, and such birds, fish, and small animals as he could capture. Doubtless, also, he knew how to “gang” on larger animals and kill them. But besides a club he used a fist hatchet, roughly shaped of stone. It is almost probable that the Neanderthal man had already learned to fasten his fist hatchet to his club, and so make crude spears, harpoons, and hunting axes. There is evidence that he knew how to use fire. He availed himself of the caves and ledges for shelter; and presumably wrapped himself in the skins of animals. So much the Cro-Magnon man inherited as mental-social capital on which to begin.

But Cro-Magnon had a genuinely human brain and he invented innumerable contributions to culture. He perfected his fist hatchet into a variety of spear points, knives, and scrapers, all skillfully chipped into symmetrical shapes. He also worked in bone and horn, making awls, needles with eyes, and harpoon points with several barbs.

But the most amazing achievement of Cro-Magnon was

his plastic and graphic art. He did sculpturing in clay, bone, horn, and ivory. Among several samples, perhaps the most impressive is the head of a whinnying horse. The tiny piece is only about two inches long, but it is as realistic and lifelike as the work of any modern artist. Cro-Magnon was also a great painter. This work he did on the ceilings of his caves. The figures are of bison, horses, deer, wild hog, ibex, and reindeer, with an occasional mammoth. They are in four colors; and no modern artist could draw details more precise, or postures more vivacious.

From these indications of advanced intelligence, and from other evidences, it is inferred that Cro-Magnon cooked his food, stitched skins together into garments, lived in monogamous families, practiced a tribal organization with laws and settled usages, had some sort of a religion, and possessed a considerable repertoire of songs and legends.

Cro-Magnon is placed in the last of the Old Stone Age, which came to an end in Europe some ten or fifteen thousand years ago. His inventions and discoveries laid the foundations of the New Stone Age, which lasted perhaps ten thousand years and ended with the dawn of history in Egypt and Babylonia, approximately 3500 B. C. The greatest achievement of this Neolithic period was agriculture. Most of the fowls and animals that we breed now were domesticated then—except the horse and the turkey. During the Neolithic period, likewise, most of the plants with which we are familiar now—except maize, potatoes and tobacco, natives of America—were brought under cultivation. Cultivation, however, was all done with a hoe, doubtless of wood. Neither the plow nor the wheel were invented till long afterwards. Animals were not used for draft purposes, but only for their flesh, milk, and skins. The revolutionary extent to which the domestication of plants and animals modified human institutions is described in Chapter VIII.

Two other achievements of the Neolithic period were

weaving and pottery making. Perhaps it was the use of milk that created a felt need for pottery. Spinning and weaving were done with tools not much improved upon till medieval and modern times.

The beginnings of architecture were also in this period. Villages were built of lumber, sometimes on pile-supported platforms in lakes. Stone tombs were constructed; and also great stone monuments, presumably for religious purposes. Of these the most notable relics are at Stonehenge, England.

Neolithic man was not an artist. Of science, in the modern sense, he had none, of course; though he possessed a mass of practical knowledge about nature. That knowledge must have been fantastically mixed with superstition, however, for his religion was animistic. He believed that every tree, spring, field, animal of the chase, or what not, had its animus, that is, its spirit, or indwelling demon, which had to be placated, deceived, and managed through magic and incantations. He had no proper notions of cause and effect, nor of logical methods of thought. His life must have been filled with fears both imaginary and real. He probably knew the medicinal properties of some plants; but for curing his diseases he probably depended mostly on the incantations of the "mumblety, mumblety, medicine man." He must have had some kind of a government, else how could he have carried out such large coöperative enterprises as the building of Stonehenge and the lake villages? It is also safe to infer that he lived in families, usually monogamous; that he had a moral code; and socially guaranteed property rights. But he had, as yet, neither wheeled vehicles, metals, writing, nor sailing vessels.

When the curtain of record rises, at about 3500 B. C., it reveals civilizations in the Nile and Euphrates valleys far in advance of the pre-literary, Neolithic culture we have just been considering. Let us next observe, then, what had been

added to the social heritage by these ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. First of all must be mentioned the use of metals. Implements and weapons made of stone had given place to those made of iron and bronze. Also the wheel had come into use. Doubtless their most important contribution of all, however, was the invention of writing. The sailing vessel had been invented; so that the Egyptians, and especially their Phoenician neighbors, put to sea in ships almost as good as those in which Columbus crossed the Atlantic.

We have seen that they inherited agriculture. But they improved it, systematizing it over large areas. The Egyptians early used iron plows. Both the Egyptians and the Babylonians developed elaborate systems of irrigation. In fact, these ancient peoples already farmed with tools and techniques that were not improved upon for nearly five thousand years; that is, until the middle of the nineteenth century. It may be added, however, that the horse was not used in agriculture. In fact, he was introduced into civilization by the Persians, after 1000 B. C., and was then used only in war and for rapid traveling; and was regarded as "a vain thing for safety."

The most spectacular contribution of these ancient peoples was in architecture. They invented the pillar and the arch; and devised techniques for moving very large blocks of stone, and elevating them to prodigious heights. They constructed massive buildings with a hair-line exactitude that rivals the best engineering of today. Of the Egyptian temples, with their rows of splendid columns, even the ruins are awe-inspiring to this day, and the pyramids are still among the wonders of the world. The Babylonians built with unbaked brick, using stone and glazed tile only occasionally, so that their buildings though splendid and massive are now but mounds of earth.

Quite as fascinating, if less spectacular, was their sculp-

ture, which they wrought in wood, the precious metals, and stone, including the very hardest kinds. Much of their work was very skillfully executed. They also did excellent painting, and they fashioned exquisite jewelry and beautiful vases. They also made creditable contributions to the development of instrumental music.

These peoples were the first to organize government on a large scale. In the place of the tribal chieftains they had city kings, some of whom built up great empires. They codified great systems of law. They also made extensive use of slavery. In religion, primitive animism gave way to a pantheon of great gods. It was reserved, however, for their younger neighbors, the Hebrews, to give the world an ethical monotheism. They produced substantial literatures and made creditable beginnings in astronomy and mathematics.

The Greeks and Romans. The Greeks were the real beginners of science. Not that their discoveries were so numerous or important, but that they were the first to set the example of fearless curiosity, unsuperstitious inquiry, and systematic investigation. This example later proved the inspiration of modern science. They also perfected the fine arts, particularly architecture, sculpture, and poetry. And they invented money. But neither they nor the Romans after them made any significant contributions to the methods of agriculture, manufacturing, mining, or transportation—except that the Romans taught the world how to build permanent roads. The contribution of the Romans was mostly in the field of law and government.

The Middle Ages. It was not till late in the Middle Ages that important new contributions were again made to the social heritage. Then the fine arts of the Greeks were revived and improved upon, especially in the fields of painting, architecture, and music. The same is true of Greek science, numerous important discoveries being made about 1500

A. D. Printing, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass were the most important inventions of that period—their social effects have been far-reaching. Perhaps the most important contribution of medieval times was the addition of the Western Hemisphere to the land area of civilization.

The dawn of modern civilization. It seems to be almost a social law that culture accumulates with increasing rapidity. "Nothing succeeds like success." After five thousand years of very slow progress, the last century and a half has seen more additions, especially to science and industrial technique, than did all the preceding five thousand years put together.

Innumerable machines have been invented. This modern movement began with the invention, in England, of machines for making cloth. This was at about the time when England was fighting Washington. Since then machines have been introduced into almost every field of industry: machines for hoeing potatoes and machines for mixing mortar; machines for cutting hair and machines for going upstairs; machines for making shoes and machines for cutting out clothes; machines for sawing wood and machines for sweeping floors; machines for making almost every imaginable article of modern use; machines, indeed, for almost everything except washing boys' hands and taking care of little children! Ours has suddenly become, in fact, a machine age, machines having largely taken the place of hand tools; the power of steam, gasoline, and electricity having been largely substituted for the muscles of men and animals.

Equally important are our new means of communication and transportation. Washington could neither travel nor send messages any more swiftly than could Cyrus the Persian; nor could the English of King George the Third's time ship goods, either by land or sea, any more efficiently than could the ancient Phoenicians. The steamboat, the locomotive, and the telegraph came in during the first half of

the nineteenth century. Since then have come the telephone and the radio, the trolley car, the automobile, and the airplane. As a result, the whole world is almost within speaking distance, the average person travels more in a year than his great grandfather did in a lifetime; and the volume of freight shipped from place to place has increased out of all comparison.

While the most spectacular additions have been in the field of industrial technique, there have been just as many in the field of science. Indeed, it is scientific discoveries that for the most part have made the mechanical inventions possible. However, recent scientific discoveries have had other important effects also, of which perhaps none is more significant than the mastery of disease. It is hard for us now to realize the extent of sickness and suffering before medical science was added to the social heritage. Motherhood was martyrdom, and from one fourth to one half the babies died before they were five years old. Scourges of smallpox, diphtheria, cholera, and what not, swept over society, in extreme cases killing half the population. Soldiers had their legs and arms sawed off without anæsthetics, or died of gangrene and dysentery. With the result that there was little or no growth in the population, in spite of a very high birth rate. And changed conditions are not yet a century old! On the other hand, science and modern communication applied to war make it so extensive and effective as to threaten the race with self-destruction.

Another new item in our social heritage is the creed of democracy. It is true that the ancient Greeks played with the idea a little, and so did a few medieval communities; but it was never taken very seriously, nor given practical application. The ancient empires of Assyria and Babylon were absolute monarchies of the most tyrannous sort; and Rome was little better. When the modern nations came upon the stage of history, they all thought in terms of the

divine right of kings; and the Stuarts, the Bourbons, the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Romanoff's were all dictators. Even the New England colonists could not conceive of a government by all the people; and it is quite startling to read about the terror with which the first magistrates and ministers of Massachusetts Bay contemplated such a suggestion. For nothing else than merely advocating the very democratic ideas that we all believe in today was Roger Williams driven out of Boston in the dead of winter. Our modern belief in "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" is a new idea in the modern world; it remains to be seen how well we can make it work.

One of the most important by-products of the democratic idea is the rise of popular education. It is hard for high school students of today to realize that schooling for all the people was never dreamed of till a century ago. This miracle of modern democracy will be discussed in a later chapter.

Such are the most important additions that have been made to our intellectual resources during the past century and a half. How they are modifying our institutions will be indicated in subsequent chapters. Suffice it here to say that they will give our children a social world as different from that of our great grandparents as Washington's world was different from that of the American Indians, or as Caesar's was from that of Cro-Magnon.

From the foregoing account of social change and development two inferences should crystallize definitely in the reader's mind. First, is our immeasurable dependence upon the past. Each individual has to learn from his associates, as we observed in the last chapter. But more than that, each generation learns from the last. We are the heirs of all the ages. It is the social heritage that the child is learning through his questions and imitation. It is from our social heritage that we derive our human nature. Thus

the interdependence of human beings goes far deeper than the unenlightened are aware. We owe an immense debt to our ancestry, which we can pay, however, only to posterity.

The other inference takes the form of a question, as follows: What are the additions to the social heritage that will be needed next? Ordinarily the question takes this form: What marvelous mechanical inventions will next appear? But that is an almost silly turn for the mind to take. It is almost as if the Egyptian mind had expected bigger and ever bigger pyramids, and the late-medieval mind, loftier and ever loftier cathedrals. A civilization may go off on a tangent; and it is just possible that our age may be going almost crazy on the subject of inventions.

Is it not time for us to observe that our scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions are themselves *creating social problems*? Consider war, for example. Chemistry and physics have made war intolerably destructive; the new means of communication and transportation make it very probable that a war, once started, will spread to the whole world. What we have not invented is a *social* arrangement for stopping wars before they get started. Again, our new medical science enables us to keep weaklings, defectives, and morons alive, of the sort that would formerly have been weeded out by the very struggle for existence. What we have not invented is a *social* arrangement for preventing the birth of such undesirables. Our new power-driven machinery has enabled us to produce goods of all kinds much more rapidly per capita than ever before. But, strange to say, we have not been able to abolish poverty as a result (cf. Ch. X.). Instead, enormous wealth and power are concentrating in the hands of a few. What we have not invented is a *social* arrangement for "passing prosperity around." In the fine arts we have made but little progress recently. The Greeks progressed in art, but not in mechanics; we, too, stand on one foot, but it is the other one.

Yet the world has as much to hope for from art as from mechanics.

In the writings of sociologists the term *cultural lag* has recently made its appearance. The term names the fact that progress occurs unevenly, on limited sectors of the cultural front. Thus Neolithic man made great progress in agriculture, but he did nothing in art, and very little in religion and government. Egypt progressed in architecture, but stood almost stationary in science, agriculture, and mechanics. Greece contributed to science, philosophy, and art, but nothing to industrial technique. Rome improved government, but collapsed under the weight of slavery, bad morals, and the resentments of her neighbors. The moderns have made phenomenal advances at some sectors of the front; our "cultural lag" is in the social arrangements necessitated by the new machines and their accessories. What we need is *social* discoveries and inventions. We need new economic and political creeds; new legal and social codes. And we need to apply the fine arts to the wholesome use of leisure. The "cultural lags" of the new social regime will appear from chapter to chapter as we proceed.

PROBLEMS

1. Let a member of the class write a story (or a play) in which time plays some sort of a backward trick and makes yourselves and your parents companions in play, work, worship, and other ~~social~~ relations. You and they are to be young people together; but keep strictly intact and separate the ideas, habits, and so forth, that they had when they were young, and the ideas, habits, and so forth, that you have now.

2. Describe the best historical novel you have ever read. Most historical novels fail to put the reader into the real atmosphere of the times presumably described. Compare *Kristen Lavrensdatter* by Sigrid Undset, with Scott's novels.

3. Are there any architectural features of your own school building that you can trace back to Greece?

4. Let the class visit a museum of art or archaeology, if one is accessible.

5. Read up on the architectural ruins of Mexico, and conjecture as to the social heritage of those people.

6. How did the invention of printing modify European society?

7. Does any member of the class possess a quilt that his grandmother made? Other samples of domestic art? Here is a most interesting field of local inquiry.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chapters VII, VIII, and IX.

On the nature of social evolution and the stages of culture.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book I.

A superlatively fascinating account by Professor Barnes of the history of human culture. The present author is greatly indebted to Barnes' book for the contents of this chapter.

HANKINS, FRANK H., *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chapters XI-XIV.

Industry, religion, science, the family, and social organization are discussed from the standpoint of their gradual development.

OSBORN, H. F., *Men of the Old Stone Age*.

A most interesting account of the rise of the earliest culture in Europe. The pictures are the most fascinating aspect of the book.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Part I.

A brief survey of the history of culture, with a chapter on its oriental phases.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY

The basic institution of society. The family is often spoken of as the basic institution of society. It is basic in several respects. First of all, because it is fundamentally necessary to human welfare—as this chapter will explain. Also, it is the main stem from which the other institutions originally branched out; for in the earliest human society government, industry, education, religion, and so forth, were bound up in family life. The family is therefore the oldest of all human institutions—unless we regard the neighborhood group as an exception, since human beings originally lived in little groups of closely related families.

The instinctive basis of the family. The fundamental cause for the existence of the family is the inborn tendencies of human nature. Human reproduction is a biological fact that demands mating; but that alone does not demand permanent affectionate pairing, which is the characteristic feature of the human family. The kind of love between a man and a woman that is idealized in our best songs, poetry, fiction, and art is one of the chief psychic forces by which the human family is produced—a fact that has been perversely overlooked in the literature of sociology. If this instinct with its spiritual aspects were absent from human nature, the family, in anything like its present form, would be absent from human society. The parental instincts are also important. They prompt parents, especially mothers, to love, care for, and take pride in their children. Of course there is a large element of habit and custom in the permanent attachment between parents and children, lasting often to the end of life, and prompting parents to provide through inheritance even for their unborn pos-

terity. Still these habits and customs have a strong basis in instinct. There are also other instincts, such as the affectionate reaction of children to their parents, the property-acquiring instinct, and so forth, that figure in the institution of the family, but they are of minor importance.

The lengthened period of infancy. When one is surveying the traits of human nature to find the biological causes for the human type of family he must not overlook the long period of human immaturity. Other creatures have a relatively short period of "infancy," as it is technically called. They are far less helpless at birth, far better equipped with innate, unlearned skills, and are capable of caring for themselves at a relatively much earlier age. This long period of human dependency, and the fact that so much of man's equipment has to be learned, renders parental care necessary. If the period of parental care and instruction was to be so greatly lengthened by the Creative Intelligence, it became a creative necessity to plant the instincts in human nature that would prompt prolonged care and instruction. And it may be added that this long period of human "infancy" is precisely what makes social progress possible. Since the skills and techniques of animals are unlearned, no generation can improve upon the last. But each generation of men may improve upon the knowledge, skills, and techniques of their ancestors, precisely because they are learned. And the ability to learn is incidental to a helpless beginning and a long immaturity. The human family is nature's way of providing the care and instruction which the long period of "infancy" makes possible.

The primitive family. A word is in place here about the form of family life that probably prevailed among our earliest ancestors upon this planet. It used to be assumed that they practiced an animal-like promiscuity, but this theory has been definitely abandoned by the best authorities on the subject. Anthropologists have studied most of the

savage tribes of mankind now living; and practically always they find that a man and a woman pair off for life, and rear their children. Among some savage societies this arrangement is enforced with great severity. True, strange practices occur, as, for instance, among the Bontoc Igorots of Luzon, where courtship was conducted on a sort of trial-marriage plan quite shocking to us. Still, these strange practices do not seriously interfere with permanent mating among such primitive peoples; so that marriage, once contracted, is held sacred. The wide prevalence of permanent monogamous mating among peoples still on the primitive level of social life leads to the conclusion that it must have been general among our remotest human ancestors.

Not only our remotest human ancestors, but our closest cousins in the animal kingdom practice permanent monogamous mating. The anthropoid apes pair off for life, much as human beings do. These two facts, permanent mating among practically all savages, and permanent mating among anthropoid apes, point to the same inference, as perpendiculars on two chords of a circle point to the center. That inference is that permanent monogamous mating is instinctive, and not a mere social custom. The instincts upon which the monogamous family is based are thus seen to be older than the human species itself. Indeed, so very deep in the human instincts has nature planted this institution that it may truly be said, in religious phraseology, to be God-made, not man-made. Hence it is safe to assume that any wide prevalence of practices other than permanent monogamous mating would deform human nature itself, and eventually disrupt human society.

The metronymic and patriarchal forms of family life. Many peoples have practiced a form of family life known as the metronymic. In this arrangement the young man came and attached himself to the horde, tribe, or clan of his bride. Inheritance was reckoned through the mother,

children took the mother's name or belonged to the mother's tribe, and the mother's brothers had quite as much authority over the children as the father had. Some authorities go so far as to say that women were regarded as the superior sex in this type of society, that they enjoyed rights accordingly, and even took the initiative in courtship. Evidences of this type of family relation have been found by so many students of primitive life that some authorities believe it to have been a universal arrangement among peoples at a certain stage of social development, and that the ancestors of all advanced peoples must have passed through the metronymic stage. Other authorities, however, doubt its universality, admitting its frequent occurrence only.

The patriarchal form of family was that in which an old man's sons and grandsons, with their wives and children, remained associated with him in a sort of clan, of which the old man himself was the ruler. This type of family seems to have flourished among nomadic herdsmen. The Book of Genesis furnishes our most easily accessible descriptions of this type of family.

Erratic perversions of family life. While the monogamous family is doubtless favored by the instincts of human nature, and has been all but universal, nevertheless many erratic perversions of family life have been experimented with by various peoples part way up the ladder of civilization. The custom by which one man has several wives at the same time is usually called *polygamy* (many marriages), but sociologists give it the technical name of *polygyny* (many wives). This custom works badly for many reasons that can readily be imagined, in the long run degrading the nation that practices it. That, of course, is the reason why it is immoral, though the peoples actually practicing it have usually failed to brand it as such. *Polyandry* is an unusual arrangement by which one woman has several husbands at the same time. This is said to have been practiced in sterile

regions—Tibet, for example, where nature is niggardly of food supply, and the killing of female infants is accordingly practiced to keep down the population. The reader should understand, though, that such erratic forms of marriage, however interesting, have really been rare and exceptional in racial experience.

Promiscuity, that is, a sheer immoral breakdown of permanent mating, is a degenerate condition into which decadent civilizations have fallen. It prevailed in Rome to a shocking degree during the period preceding the collapse of the Republic and in the corrupt period of the Empire. Divorce was also lightly regarded. It was a not inconsistent part of the general moral breakdown of Roman society. Of course, it renders normal home life impossible by its effects upon the mind, if by no other; it spreads loathsome and destructive diseases broadcast, causing incalculable suffering and misery; and it is said to give rise in some mysterious way to racial degeneration.

Thus practically every conceivable type of unnatural family life, and every form of perverted relation between men and women have been tried out to a demonstration of their results. If there is anything that racial experience may be said to have settled it is that the stable, monogamous family is the only type upon which the welfare of a people can be based. All other forms have proved unnatural and destructive. Racial experience confirms the teaching of religion that marriage should be regarded as a sacred relation.

The functions of the family: first, happiness. It runs in the popular beliefs that the main purpose of marriage is the romantic happiness of the married pair, and in this view, there is a large measure of truth which has been too often overlooked in serious and scientific treatises on the subject of the family. The instincts of human nature are such that "it is not good for man to be alone," as the

Scriptures put it. But the joy of romantic love is by no means the only satisfaction of family life; as a matter of fact it proves, in the long run, to be rather secondary indeed. The happiness of childhood and youth is equally important, and is absolutely dependent upon a wholesome family life. No child can be really happy in an orphanage. Moreover, a stalwart, loyal affection between parents is quite indispensable to a normal, joyous childhood for their offspring. It is equally indispensable to youth. Even in middle life there is a very real joy in love for one's aged parents; and no friendship is quite like that of middle-aged brothers and sisters for one another. And in old age no satisfaction is more substantial than the love and respect of sons and daughters. These are among the fundamental and abiding kinds of happiness that human existence affords. They are ends in themselves, and among the ultimate values of life. The person or society is extremely unwise, therefore, that sacrifices them to wealth-getting, fashionable display, social frivolity, carnal indulgence, or any other lure.

While romantic, parental, and filial love are ends in themselves, there is, however, an important sense in which they are only means to an end; and that end is the care and nurture of children. The chief end of the family is the child—as subsequent paragraphs will shortly indicate. The affection of the married pair seems designed by nature to ease the friction of family life, and so render the proper nurture of children successful. But love must always be accompanied with a strong sense of duty; for in the long run the latter is the more fundamental. Many children have been reared in homes that were almost ideal, despite the fact that romantic love had given place to the sense of duty and parental affection.

Marriage vows and parental responsibilities may not be lightly repudiated, therefore, when some individual fancies he sees a forbidden short cut to personal happiness. For

happiness is a coöperative enterprise, the happiness of all is bought by the hard duty of each. A soldier may not run away from his duty because it is hard; he must die at his post if need be, otherwise his army may be cut to pieces and his cause lost. To desert one's family duties sometimes does quite as serious damage to society, even if the damage is less apparent. Desertion is therefore legally punishable as a crime, and rightly so. Nor is there any more effective opportunity for the ordinary person to do good in the world than just to perform the duties incident to his family life with joyous, affectionate, or even dutiful efficiency.

Second, the physical care of the child. Primarily, the family exists for the sake of the child. It provides, in the first place, for the physical care of children. Parental affection is an almost indispensable motive in the proper care of children. Nature's arrangement seems to be that the father supports the mother and the offspring so that the mother may without interference give herself to the physical care of the children. The alternative is apt to be a high death rate among children. There is therefore no right of women which society is more interested in guaranteeing than the right of mothers to adequate support for themselves and their children. And a civilized society has no duty more basic than to so educate girls that they may later be able to care intelligently for their children's health. And not only for the children's physical care does the family provide, but also for the sick and aged as well; indeed, for all members of the group.

Third, the educational function. An almost equally important function of the family is the educational. In less developed societies the family took care of vocational education and elementary schooling. It is only within a century that elementary schooling for the masses has been taken over by the state. But there is a more basic type of education than either, namely the moral, that never can be wholly

taken over by the school, because such an important part of it occurs before school age, and because the school cannot get close enough to the child's heart. In the home the child is taught the fundamentals of decency, manners, and customs. The family teaches the virtues and habituates them, more effectively than either the school or the church can, because family relations are more intimate and constant. It also trains the child in obedience and respect for properly constituted authority. It has been repeatedly observed by prison wardens, educators, and others that children who miss a good home training in childhood have suffered a serious moral loss that can never be made up to them fully by any other influence in later life. Numerous recent studies have connected the increase of juvenile crime with a decline in family influence. No society can succeed permanently in which families as a rule fail in this function. When family discipline breaks down, national collapse is liable to follow shortly.

And it may be added that the moral education of the family is not confined to the children. Adults also derive moral training from family life, for the responsibilities of parenthood are a vigorous moral discipline.

The responsibility of the family is increasing. The student of modern social life should observe that the period of "infancy" is lengthening. It is a principle in biology that as life ascends in the scale, the period of "infancy" lengthens. Young fish, for example, get no parental care at all, whereas the young of cattle and horses get parental care for six or eight months, while human beings take care of their young for many years. It is also a principle of sociology that as civilization advances the period of dependence upon the parental generation lengthens. Thus, savages are regarded as adult as soon as they are as tall as their parents; Shakespeare's medieval women were old enough to marry at sixteen or even younger; but modern young

people are not regarded as adults until they are twenty or so. The reason is that modern civilization requires a longer preparation. Education, whether for vocation, general culture, or citizenship, takes longer than formerly. This is especially true of the professional and more cultured classes; it is also true to some degree even of the laboring class. As society becomes more civilized, and democracy more successful, it will be increasingly true of the laboring classes. All of which means that young people normally remain longer now than formerly in the parental home, and are therefore increasingly subject to parental guidance and even support.

And these added years are the most difficult years, from the parents' standpoint. It costs more to support young people approaching twenty than it does to support children. Also they are harder to influence in case they need moral guidance; and they usually do, since they are subject to strong temptations, the dangerous consequences of which they do not usually understand. It is partly because so many families are failing with the vocational guidance and training of their adolescents that there are so many vocational failures; it is partly because so many families are failing with the moral nurture of their young people that the problems of vice and crime are becoming so critical. It is, therefore, of very great importance for modern people to understand that modern life is demanding more instead of less of the family. More instead of less, if our modern complex civilization is to succeed!

Influences affecting family life. A. Changing conditions of living. First, there is the growing urbanization of life. We are gradually changing from a nation of farmers and villagers to a nation of city dwellers. Family life is necessarily very different in the crowded city than it is in the open country. In the old-fashioned village and country homes there was opportunity for parents and children to

be much together. There were chores and tasks for each member of the family to do, and there was much room outdoors to play in wholesome contact with nature. City life deprives many families of these advantages, substituting attractions away from home, as, for example, the movies. In the slums housing conditions are very bad and overcrowding is extreme. All these things interfere seriously with family life.

Second, there is the industrialization of life; that is, the change from hand tools to machines. The old-fashioned hand tools were used mostly in little shops near home; hence that old-fashioned industry was called the domestic system. The machines, on the other hand, are usually placed in big factories, away from home; hence the new industry is called the factory system. The factory system keeps the father more away from home than was the case under the old domestic system; besides, it affords boys less opportunity to work with their fathers. Also, it tends to draw girls, and even mothers, into the so-called gainful occupations away from home. Thus the family is less and less a team-work economic enterprise. All this tends to interfere with family life; so much so that there are many families in which the members almost never sit down at the table together for a meal.

Third, poverty. As a result of poverty many families, especially in our great industrial centers—perhaps as high as thirty or forty percent—are too poor to maintain a wholesome family life. The effect is most serious when poverty compels the mother of young children to work away from home.

Fourth, there are the problems peculiar to immigrant families, who, in 1920, constituted much more than half the population of five of our greatest cities (New York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, and Detroit). With these immigrants the sheer difficulty of getting used to American

ways of living puts a strain upon family life. Usually the mother had been used to simple methods of housekeeping in an old-world village or rural environment. She does not know how to keep house in a crowded city tenement; and the fresh fruit, vegetables, and milk on which she had been accustomed to feed her family, are hard to procure. Besides, the children adjust themselves quickly to the new ways of the new country; and so come to regard their parents as old fogies. Thus family affection, influence, and discipline tend to be broken down. Such families often fail, accordingly, to perform their normal functions.

B. Changing ideals of life. The ideals of a people have quite as important a bearing upon their prevailing types of family life as do the external conditions under which they live. Among these is the new standard of living. Our modern life has developed many new wants, some of which are a net gain to civilized life; for example, better sanitation, more education, phonographs, radios, and mechanical appliances for doing housework. But many of the new wants are wholly artificial and meet no real needs of life. Cosmetics, silk stockings, and the excessive craze for entertainment are examples. Some one has cynically suggested that we are no happier on oriental rugs than our grandmothers were on rag carpets. Very many families worry and strain to keep up appearances, as we say, and so miss the peace and love of home life. The gold is sacrificed for the glitter.

In the second place, there has been a very marked decline in the size of families, especially among the so-called middle classes. This represents a very definite change in ideals. The newer ideal is to rear few children and give them comforts, education, and a good start in life. This has not been without its effects upon the character of family life. In a large family children get a rather different kind of moral training than they get in a small family. Small families

are more apt to abandon themselves to the artificial standards mentioned in the previous paragraph. If a small family is to be a better family than the old-fashioned large one, it must be sincerely devoted to the right kind of family ideals. Moreover, the mother must devote her surplus energy to intellectual, cultural, and spiritual interests of real value to her family. If she does that she may lift her own life, and that of her whole family with her, to a higher and more wholesome level. And the average level of the families is the level of the nation. No civilization can rise higher than its mothers.

Third, there is a notion abroad that it is improper to compel the obedience of children. Some persons seem to imagine that democracy is a place in which everybody, including children, does as he pleases. They fail to recognize that coöperation, compulsory if necessary, is the secret of satisfying individuality. It must be admitted that the old-fashioned type of family discipline was often unnecessarily harsh. Sometimes it was disgustingly arbitrary. But that constitutes no valid excuse for swinging to the opposite extreme. The foolish neglect of family discipline, now so generally prevalent, often seriously interferes with the moral education which the family ought to perform. Hence it is a serious menace to social order. Teachers complain that the decline of family discipline has very much increased the difficulty of their work in recent years; and to it many attribute the increase of juvenile crime.

And fourth, among certain classes that need them the most, the old-time reverence and piety have been lost, with nothing to take their place. Religious incentives used to hold people to their duties and responsibilities. But they have lost part of their old-time force. Divorce, for example, is most common of all among people of no religion, while it is four times as prevalent among Protestants as among Catholics, since the Catholic Church practically forbids

divorcee, and succeeds in enforcing obedience upon most of its communicants. Doubtless there are other aspects of family life that have suffered from the same cause.

C. The new status of women. The new status of women in modern society is due to the new conditions and ideals of life; but it is of sufficient importance to deserve a separate treatment. For centuries woman had occupied a position of artificial inferiority. There are two chief reasons why this is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. One reason is the growth of democratic ideals. Democracy, borrowing its ideal from Christianity, teaches that every individual has a right to be a person on his own account. Democracy resents as injustice any artificial interference with a person's opportunity to live his own life. Hence women are demanding and are gradually being granted equal rights and opportunities with men: education, the vote, property rights, control of their offspring, entrance into industry, command over their own persons, and respect as equals in the home. This is one of the greatest gains in civilization.

The other reason for this new status of woman is the new demand for her services in industry. Under the old, domestic system of industry, when textiles, clothing, shoes, furniture, meats, cheese, and all foods were prepared in the home, largely from home-grown products, there was plenty of work for all the women of the family. But when the factories took over nearly all of these processes it was natural that the women should follow the work to the factories. The growth of commerce, correspondence, and education also increased the demand for woman's services at good wages. This has given her economic independence. In the olden days she was almost compelled to marry for support. This is no longer the case; she can now earn her own living. Hence she refuses marriage unless she can be treated as an equal. Her new economic independence is thus a weapon by which she can enforce her rights.

All this has had its effect upon the family. It has tended to postpone the age of marriage. In former days when a young man could get a piece of new land, and a young girl could do the various kinds of housework, there was no reason for postponing marriage. But now a woman hesitates to give up a good salary. Hence many young women are postponing marriage; while many who do marry keep their jobs. A married woman with a job instead of children keeps a very different kind of a home than does a married woman with children but no job. Besides, she acquires habits, ideals, and tastes which cause her to conduct a different kind of a home after children do arrive than she would have conducted if she had never had a job. And still further, this means a society in which the percentage of unmarried persons between the ages of twenty and thirty-five is much higher than formerly. In such a society those who postpone marriage are likely to be very different homemakers than they would have been had they and their associates all married early, for reasons that the reader can readily imagine, all of which may or may not be for the better.

Furthermore, all these new liberties, equalities, and opportunities that are open to women have turned the heads of some and made them regard home-making as menial, commonplace, and unworthy. This tends to lower the dignity of home life. Some flippantly abuse their new liberty and seek pleasure in self-indulgence, indolence, and foolish fashion. Such selfish women keep houses that are not homes, or swell the scandalous lists of divorce.

The adverse effects of women's opportunities. However, these new economic opportunities for women are not all clear gain, by any means. There are some bad effects also; and these we are too little inclined to notice. The presence of so many women in the gainful occupations has some tendency to depress the wages and salaries of men. This it does

in at least two ways. One is the competition of girls and women, which tends to make jobs scarcer for men. The other is more obscure and roundabout, of which the explanation is suggested on page 177. It lies in the fact that if the women contribute to the support of their families, their husbands can afford to take less, and so, in the long run, they tend to get less. It is on the same principle as sleeping-car porters getting less wages because they get tips. These effects of women's wage-earning upon men's wages can easily be exaggerated; but some such tendency there unquestionably is. Hence it is harder for the men to support families, just because the women are helping to do it. This fact somewhat decreases the number of acceptable opportunities for women to marry. Another long-run result is that, among the poor, many mothers are compelled to work away from home in order that the family may be supported. The natural result is that their families are neglected. Thus, opportunity becomes necessity to some, and the new economic freedom turns out to be a sort of back-handed slavery.

Summary: a problematical transition. All the causes described above combine to create a problematical situation for family life in America. The dangers are all incident to the coming in of a more efficient industry, and a larger freedom for all. The prevalent maladjustments of family life are really the growing pains of our developing civilization. Eventually we hope to solve our incidental problems and perfect a better family life than the world has ever seen before. But we must do so promptly. For temporary and transitional though our family problems be, they are nevertheless serious; and even the temporary deterioration of family life might make our society very sick indeed for centuries to come.

Readjustment of family life a matter of our prevailing beliefs and ideals. Reform is a matter of our minds and

hearts. Changes in the prevailing states of mind tend to change family life; in spite of the fact that human nature tends to hold family life fairly close to the monogamous pattern. Close scrutiny of the foregoing pages will reveal the fact that the causes described there are really prevailing states of mind. Our knowledge, ideals, valuations, approvals, and habits have changed; and the changes have affected families. It follows, therefore, that our problems of family life can be solved only by improving the prevailing states of mind. We need more uniform divorce laws, it is true, and better incomes for breadwinners among the poor; but these in themselves would not go far enough. The real need lies deep in the minds and hearts of the people. The people need knowledge that they do not now possess. They need more wholesome notions as to what the desirable experiences of life really are. In other words, they need new ideals, valuations, and approvals relative to family life; and new habits to correspond. The problem is at bottom one of a new intelligence and a new morality. The task is really a task for education, in the broadest sense of that word. It is hoped that this will be apparent from the following pages.

A new type of housekeeping. First and above all there is needed a new conception as to the dignity and value of home-making. Housekeeping ought to be lifted to a quasi-professional level. Too often it is thought of as a mere unskilled drudgery, which prevents a woman from living a dignified, useful life. That is a total misapprehension. It is largely because women are blind to the intellectual dignity and social usefulness of housekeeping that they crave social excitement or business careers. The work of a home-maker is as useful as any professional work, a fact which any person must realize who understands the social function of the family. If a profession is a work involving the use of art, science, and a difficult technique, then housekeeping

certainly ought to become a near-profession. Is house-keeping the only work in the world that is never to be invaded by modern science? The modern housekeeper needs to know a great deal about the sciences of chemistry, bacteriology, and physiology, if she is to prepare foods intelligently, so as to furnish each member of her family with a well-balanced ration. To care for the health of her family she has use for the sciences and for the technique of a nurse. She should be able to apply psychology to the training of her children quite as efficiently as a teacher should. She needs to know domestic art in its various phases, as applied to textiles, clothing, house-furnishing, architecture, and exterior decoration. She ought to be well versed in juvenile literature if she is to use its resources in the spiritual training of her children. She will even, as they grow older, want to lead them on into the world of good reading for adults. If she is a musician she will have an additional rich resource at her disposal. And to whom will she wish to consign the religious education of her children? But religious education is a profession in itself in these perplexing times. There is really no limit to the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual resources that a modern home-maker can profitably use.

A new education for girls. What sort of an education should democracy furnish to its girls? That will depend upon what use democratic society is to make of its women. If they are to be used mostly as wage-earners in the gainful occupations, they should be regimented accordingly; but if they are to function chiefly as housekeepers, they should be trained for that. Undoubtedly the happiness and welfare of American society would be augmented by decreasing the proportion of women "gainfully employed," and increasing the proportion contentedly and efficiently devoted to home-making. Our schools should aim their education toward that end. The high school, even if it seriously

undertook the task—as it should—could only make a beginning in imparting the knowledge necessary to putting house-keeping on a quasi-professional level.

One or the other of two things must happen to the family life of the future. It cannot stay as it has been. Either family life will lose its moral quality, degenerate, and fail to perform its functions; or else we shall rise to a new and higher type of family life. If we do that the new family will have the moral soundness of the best old-fashioned homes, but it will also have a cultural and intellectual quality that family life never possessed before, except in rare instances.

The family is still the basic institution of society. But its educational responsibilities are increasing instead of decreasing. The moral, spiritual, and cultural education which it gives the young must be far more extensive than in the olden days. We shall not make a complex and highly cultural civilization succeed unless a large majority of our homes succeed in training the young people for such a civilization. Only by maintaining a complex technical and cultural civilization can we escape reverting to social confusion and conflict. Only by developing a family life of a new cultural and intellectual type can we maintain a complex technical and cultural civilization. Only by lifting house-keeping to a higher level can we evolve a family life of a new intellectual and cultural sort. Such homes can be maintained only by women of a very high type, morally, intellectually, and culturally. This new and higher type of motherhood is one of the deepest needs of society in the present crisis; and the eyes of women should be opened to the important social service and the rich self-realization there are in such motherhood. This new attitude, together with the knowledge and skills to make it effective, our system of public education should produce in the minds of all girls.

A return to the simple life. In millions of middle class homes an intolerable strain is put upon family life by the mere struggle to keep up artificial appearances. There must be new clothes, new furniture, a new automobile, or a new house, only because the old are a little out of fashion. The Smiths have new, you know; and the Joneses must be just a little outdone. Many people have gotten themselves into such habits of mind that they simply cannot think of life's values in any other terms. The whole thing is an illusion. And the unnatural strain it puts upon life is terrific. It keeps many persons single who might otherwise be happily married. It spoils the happiness of many homes, and ruins the characters of the children. It breaks up some families entirely. It is the fever that threatens to undermine the constitution of democratic society. A simple life is really more satisfying. Family affection, friendships, interesting work, good books, wholesome play, and a savings account—these are the really good things of family life. And they wear well.

A more reverent attitude toward sex, love, and courtship. Too many persons entertain vulgar, obscene, and irreverent notions of sex. A moment's reflection will reveal the fact that the family, and the functions it performs, would be impossible without physiological sex. Around sex cluster, therefore, the very finest things in human life—the good things that lift human life above the brute level. Those are brutish minds that think brutishly of sex. It should be the object of intelligent reverence; and no perversion is more humiliating, degrading, and destructive than the perversion of sex.

The poets, novelists, and artists are sociologically sound in the dignity and importance they attach to true love. But the counterfeit is easily mistaken for the real. The basis of true love is partly spiritual. It should begin in the admiration of mental and moral qualities. Moreover, if one

is to experience real love eventually, its counterfeits must never be trifled with beforehand. "Keep thy heart with all diligence for out of it are the issues of life." It is tragically easy for a whole life to be spoiled by some ill-advised impulse of youth, or by some innocent though flippant bit of trifling. If two persons are to be satisfactorily joined together for life they must have mutual aims, ideals, and purposes that will last for a lifetime. These are necessary for a lasting love. Trifles, like graceful dancing or a pretty slipper, will not endure. In a mate one should find sympathetic approval of the deepest aspirations one feels within himself. Good health, good character, and ability to earn, to spend wisely, and to save are all necessary to happy marriage. Young people naturally dream of the future; they should also plan for the future. The sympathetic counsel of an older person is often to be desired.

A better distribution of prosperity. Two or three times in this chapter the poverty of the poor has been referred to as a handicap to family life. It will be found as a causal factor in the dregs of all our social problems. Discussion of its causes and remedies will, however, be reserved for a later chapter. But its mention cannot be omitted here lest the student leave the present subject with somewhat ill-balanced conclusions in his mind. Modern civilization must find means of mitigating, indeed, of eventually abolishing, poverty, if family life is to be put upon a normal basis; for poverty doubtless does as much damage to family life as all other causes put together.

PROBLEMS

1. Compare the family activities of an old-fashioned village or farm home with those of a modern city home. Get facts enough to make a clear picture of each type of family life. Compare. How can the modern urban home make up for the loss of the most wholesome interests of the old rural homes?

2. How would it affect our civilization to live in great dormitories,

eat at great common tables, and merge other family activities into common, mass activities? In this connection study the education of the Spartan boy. Also the effects of institutional life upon orphans.

3. Read *The Cotter's Saturday Night* and discuss the moral of the poem. What really wholesome cultural interests did that family lack?

4. How does extreme poverty affect family life? Excessive wealth?

5. From the census reports find out what proportion of adults are unmarried. Compare the different states in this respect.

6. Set forth social and economic reasons why there are so many unmarried adults.

7. From the census reports find out what percentage of females are gainfully employed.

8. Survey any small local group and find out what percentage of females are gainfully employed.

9. Discuss the idea of making housekeeping a profession.

10. Find out whether there are families in your neighborhood in which the mother has to neglect her children because she is forced by poverty to work away from home for wages. Observe the effects upon the children.

11. What is the law in your state about desertion? Is it enforced? If improvement is needed, discuss ways and means.

12. How is the radio modifying family life? The movie? The automobile? Discuss this with your parents.

13. How does the gainful employment of young wives affect their home life?

14. Devise a cross-section survey of your community designed to find out what percentage of families gather around their own tables once a day or oftener.

15. What percentage of girls are likely to marry rich men?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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An interesting chapter, by Professor Jerome Davis of Yale, on the American home.

ELLWOOD, C. A., *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1910), Chapters IV-VIII. American Book Company.

These chapters deal with the origin of the human family, its various historic forms, and the problems of the modern family.

FINNEY, ROSS L., *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, Chapter X. The Macmillan Company.

This chapter is on the education of girls relative to home-making and motherhood.

GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, *The History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*. The Macmillan Company.

One of the most useful books on this subject.

GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, *Problems of the Family*. The Century Company.

A later book by the same author.

GROVES and OGBURN, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*. Henry Holt & Company.

An objective study, by two outstanding sociologists.

HANKINS, FRANK H., *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chapter XIII.

On marriage and the family.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapter XXIX.

The development of the family.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter XIV.

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ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters XII, XVII, XLIX.

Chapter XLIX deals with the family as an institution; Chapter XII contains some interesting material about the exploitation of members of the family by one another; Chapter XVII discusses the conflict between men and women.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapter XXI.

Philosophical in method.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter XI.

Consisting of readings from Ogburn, Groves and others.

WESTERMARCK, E., *A Short History of Human Marriage*. The Macmillan Company.

The classic on this subject.

CHAPTER VII

THE COMMUNITY

The primary groups. The term "primary groups" was originated by Professor Charles Horton Cooley, one of the founders of American sociology; and the term has now become so standardized, and in such general use by sociologists, that even beginners ought to become acquainted with it. The primary groups are those that depend upon intimate, face-to-face association. Cooley designated the family, the community, and the play group of children as the three primary groups. Their importance lies in the facts (a) that they have existed everywhere among all peoples from the very beginning, (b) that they are caused by the innate social traits of human nature, and (c) that they are fundamentally important units of society. As the community is the second of the primary groups its discussion naturally follows that of the family.

Definition of a community. In ordinary conversation the word community has a variety of meanings. Different sociologists use it differently. It may mean a whole city, or even a state, for instance. But in this book it is necessary to assign to the word a very definite and technical meaning. Not that other usages are wrong; but that we here have something very definite to discuss, for which we must needs find a definite name. The reader should therefore discard for the present all the usual uses of the word, and hold the present meaning clearly in mind; otherwise confusion of thought will result. In this book the word community will be used to mean a group of families, few enough for all to be well acquainted with one another, living together as neighbors in a small local area. The very word *community* implies that the neighbors *communicate* with one another,

and that they have interests in *common*. Their communication is face to face, by word of mouth; most of them would recognize each other even in the dark by the sound of their voices; they have shaken hands and know whether each other's palms are soft or calloused; and everybody understands everybody else's disposition and temperament thoroughly. If people live close together, as in large cities, but do not have much of anything to do with one another, they do not constitute a community in the present meaning of the word.

Examples of community life. Let us turn to legendary fiction for our first picture of community life. Germelshausen (according to Gerstaecker's charming novelette) is a little German village of the Middle Ages, submerged under a swamp. Once every century it miraculously emerges for a single day, during which day its erstwhile life goes on as usual. On one such day it was visited accidentally and quite unawares by a wandering young artist. He found all the usual activities of the village in process: the church bell rings, a funeral occurs, the shops are open, the peasants are at work in the field, and there is a village dance in the evening. To make a story out of it, Gerstaecker has the artist fall in love with a pretty village maiden. Everywhere the artist goes with the girl, she greets all the children and adults familiarly. But just before the bell rings for midnight, she hustles him outside the village, and herself returns to it. At the fateful stroke of twelve the village miraculously disappears again, leaving nothing in sight but the swamp. In the morning the bewildered artist shows a hunter a picture he had made of the village maiden, and asks him whether such a person lives in the vicinity. What a tantalizing glimpse into a medieval community! But no real community is ever quite so completely shut off from other communities.

At the time this book is being revised (1929) there is

running in one of the magazines a most fascinating serial descriptive of the conflict between white settlers and the Indians in Ohio and Kentucky at about the time of the Revolutionary War. The hero of the story had, when a child, been captured by the Indians and reared in one of their villages in the then wilderness of Ohio. The reader infers that there could hardly have been more than twenty-five or thirty families in the village. The work of the adults and the games of the boys are described in some detail. Frequent reference is made to the council in which all the men sat around in a circle, and discussed the problems of peace and war. Thus the reader gets a glimpse of a community of savages.

Soon after the Spanish-American War, Professor E. A. Jenks and his wife spent a summer at Bontoc, an Igorot pueblo in northern Luzon. Bontoc was at that time a village of natives, living as their ancestors had lived for generations, almost untouched by the influences of outside civilization. They kept pigs, chickens, and dogs; raised camotes and rice; made baskets and pottery; and built huts of hewn wood. But they also depended partly upon hunting and fishing for their food supply. Their mode of living, in other words, was halfway between primitive and civilized. Their relations with distant villages were largely hostile; though there was some exchange of commodities. Dr. Jenks describes the burial ceremonies, the games of the boys; the courtship practices of the young people, and the teamwork of their industry. In short his book is a most fascinating description of a community—as that word is defined in this chapter.

Those readers of this book who happen to be living in a village of a thousand people or less—or even in a slightly larger one—have an example right at hand of a community, in the present sense of the word. The people meet at the post office and the stores, at church and lodge meetings, at auctions and funerals, and at Fourth of July celebrations.

The children meet at school. Almost everybody has, at one time or another, been in most of the houses of the village. Everybody, in short, is personally acquainted with almost everybody else; and that is what makes it a community. Why, even the dogs are recognized, as to who their owners are, and what kind of dispositions they have. And it should be added that the farmers round about, who live near enough to be included in this circle of mutual acquaintance, are members of the community.

If the reader resides in a city he will find it more necessary to draw upon his imagination to get the idea of a community. The chances are that his parents can help him, by describing their "old home towns." It is hoped, however, that before the chapter is finished even the city reader will be able to visualize the community of which he himself is a member. In fact the central task of this chapter is to show up the problems of community life in our modern urbanized society.

The community is primitive and universal. It is safe to assume that the very first human beings that ever existed upon this planet lived in communities. The anthropoid apes do; so do all of the most primitive peoples now living. These two facts point to the assumption that the community group, like the family, is older than the human species itself. The term *horde*, frequently used in accounts of primitive peoples, is applied to groups of persons, perhaps as few as fifty, who camp and wander about together, foraging for food. All accounts of savage or barbarous peoples describe them as living in villages, tribes, or other small groups. All civilized peoples live in communities. Hermits are the rare exception, and they are usually abnormal persons or else fanatics.

The instincts the cause of the community group. Human nature itself is the psychic force that produces communities. Innate in every normal human being are the instincts of sociability, sympathy, justice, loyalty, and leadership-and-

following. Sociability prompts people to associate face to face, communicate together, and participate in mutual enterprises. Sympathy is the tendency to feel for each other's sufferings and to try to help each other. Justice is the impulse that leads one to assert his own rights and to recognize the rights of others. Loyalty names the human tendency to take pride in one's group and make sacrifices for it. Leadership-and-following needs no explanation. It is natural for every person to assert himself at times as a leader, and at other times to follow a leader, sometimes even to the extent of hero-worship. These instincts or inborn tendencies together make up a large part of the we-feeling, and are the chief psychic cause of community life.

Geographic influences. The forms and activities of community life vary, of course, for different reasons. Geographical causes affect them both directly and indirectly. Cliff-dwelling communities imply cliffs; the prehistoric lake-dwellers required a lake; arctic communities are different from those in the tropics. The size of a community in primitive societies depends upon the abundance of food or other resources in the locality. Geographic conditions affect community life indirectly by predetermining industries. Thus we have rural communities, mining villages, seaport towns, tourist resorts, and so forth.

Technic influences. In primitive times the character of communities must have depended chiefly upon geographic conditions. But as society has grown more mature, technic and social causes have relatively increasing influence upon community life. *Technic* is an adjective that will be used repeatedly throughout this text. It applies to all mechanical inventions, and it connotes the knowledge of how to use them. It includes also all the material instruments of civilization, such as buildings, roads, canals, cultivated fields, etc. In the Stone Age, twenty-five or fifty thousand years ago, the men of Europe had invented spears and fishhooks

as part of their technic equipment. These inventions must have enabled much larger groups of people to live together in one place than could have subsisted together in still more primitive times when men lived on what they could collect without tools or weapons. The invention of the steam engine has revolutionized our technic equipment, and together with related inventions, such as electric street-cars, telephones, and sanitary devices, has transformed modern civilized nations from rural and village communities to great urban aggregations. These are but illustrations of the innumerable ways that technic causes modify communities.

Social influences. Social causes have quite as much influence on community life as geographic or technic causes. Slavery, for example, is a social institution. Wherever it exists it is itself a cause affecting all other institutions. Community life in the Old South was markedly affected by it. Religion is a social entity, and two communities may differ sharply because they have different religions. The same may be said of art and the uses made of it. A feud that has become fixed in the customs of a community, or any other bad moral custom, may affect community life profoundly. If a community is to live a wholesome, satisfying life, it is of the utmost importance that it have good moral customs and wholesome interests; otherwise there will be strife, unhappiness, suffering, and a high death rate. The distribution of wealth also is a social arrangement. If a few families are very rich, as e.g. the medieval landlord, while all the rest are abjectly poor, the we-feeling is far less satisfactory than where all are on a similar level of comfort and culture.

The problems of community life in modern urbanized society hinge, therefore, upon the control of technic and social influences, particularly the latter. We shall return to this shortly.

Functions of the community group: A. Happiness. The

community group has several functions. One of its functions is to make people happy by gratifying their instinctive desire for friendly association. Without a natural community life a normal human being is like a fish out of water. We just naturally like to have intimate friends and neighbors; and natural association with them is one of the most fundamental and wholesome satisfactions of human existence. In villages neighbors like to chat and gossip over the garden fence, to meet at the post office or barber shop and pass the time of day with well-known acquaintances, to congregate at lawn-sociables, lodges, Sunday-schools, and picnics. And this is really quite as elemental a need of human nature as the need for food or physical activity. Accordingly, when one experiences membership in a group of neighbors who enjoy one another's company without self-consciousness, he is experiencing one of the fundamental good things of life. This *wholesome friendship of neighbors* is a thing that can be neither bought nor sold; wealth cannot procure it, poverty need not wholly deprive one of it. And what can be of greater worth?

Sophisticated city dwellers sometimes ridicule such experiences as "small-town stuff"; but their psychology is mistaken. To be sure, such experiences are too often blemished by pernicious back-biting, petty quarrels, and degrading amusements; but to disparage neighborly association itself because it is sometimes blemished, is quite as illogical as to disparage the family because some people miss the art of happy, wholesome family life.

B. Coöperation. Another object of community grouping is to secure the strength that comes from group action. The primitive horde was a protection to its members; isolated, each would have fallen so easy a victim to predatory animals or human enemies that the species could not have survived at all. In community life throughout the historic period there has been a division of labor—one man plying one trade

and another another—and coöperation in the maintenance of churches, irrigation systems, protection, and what not. Modern conditions have multiplied occasions for such coöperation; modern civilization would be impossible without it. The water supply, the food supply, sewerage, lighting, roads, sanitation, fire and police protection, schools, churches, theatres, libraries, art museums, symphonies, etc., are all coöperative enterprises. Isolated individuals could not supply themselves with these things; community coöperation is necessary.

C. A school of the social virtues. This leads up to the third function of the community group. It is a school of those virtues which hold society together. Sympathy is instinctive; it may be stifled, in which case the lack of it becomes a vice; or it may be stimulated and habituated, in which case it becomes a virtue. It may be consciously approved and eagerly cultivated, in which case sympathy becomes an ideal. The same is true of justice, loyalty, sociability, leadership-and-following. The germs of these virtues are in human nature, as we have seen, but they can germinate and grow only in local community life. In isolation these ideals cannot be conceived, nor these virtues achieved; nor can they be if the relations between neighbors are unfriendly, antagonistic, suspicious, or immoral. Next to the family, the community is the school of moral education. And this is of the utmost importance, for without these virtues nothing can succeed.

In modern complex society we now have all sorts of relations with people whom we never meet face to face because they live in another county, another state, or another nation. Communities have dealings with other communities, states with other states, nations with other nations. Unless there are good-will, sympathy, justice, and loyalty between these larger units there will be friction and bloody conflict. These virtues, which can germinate only locally, reason may give a

universal application to such wider relations. To give these virtues and ideals such wider application is one of the functions of education. It can be accomplished chiefly through geography, history, and literature. But of course this rational superstructure of the we-feeling is impossible unless the foundations are laid in community life.

D. To furnish local substance for larger groups. Just as an organism is an aggregation of cells, so a great state or national society is made up of communities. The larger groups have come into existence gradually through the union, sometimes voluntarily, but oftener by force, of local communities. If the cells are healthy the whole organism is likely to be sound; but if the cells are unsound the whole organism is bound to be diseased. The local unit is a vital organ. Local self-government is necessary to the success of democracy; a fact that has been recognized since the days of Jefferson and Adams. Local participation in the control and support of schools is necessary to a successful educational system, otherwise the schools might drift away from the needs of the people, or the people might lose interest in the schools. The same is true of churches; unless each local church is a dynamo of religious interest, the general church organization becomes a sheer burden of formal, useless religiosity. It matters not how many great national organizations we may have to promote this or that reform (as e.g. the country-life movement), unless the local people rally around local leaders to do things locally nothing important will be accomplished.

However, there lurks a serious danger in this sacred old doctrine of local self-government. That doctrine was propounded before the coming of modern transportation, mail service, telegraph, and telephone. As a result of these modern means of transportation and communication strange things have happened to local communities; and were Adams and Jefferson to return to earth now they would radically

revise their doctrines of local self-government. To this we shall shortly return.

E. A mould of personality. But community association has a far deeper—though less visible—effect than any yet described. It, like the family, is one of the moulds in which the individual becomes a human person. Almost everything human has to be learned; and we learn mostly by communication with other human beings. Much of that learning is through sheer unconscious imitation, for which the most intimate association affords us opportunity. In complete isolation, as we have seen, the human being could never become really human. And who has not observed cases of persons becoming queer through being deprived of normal associations? Since the fundamentals of personality come to the child during the first five or ten years through face-to-face association, it follows that normal personality cannot develop except in the primary groups. Imagine a child trying to get the mental substance of a normal personality through telephones, printed pages, and pictures alone, without ever seeing a real human face, hearing a human voice directly, or touching a human hand. Only in the direct contacts of the primary groups can one become himself. The completest selfhood is usually achieved through the most complete identification of the individual with his group. To make us into normal human beings is therefore one of the elemental functions of the community. This is the A B C of sociology.

Summary. From all of these considerations the reader may infer the normality and importance of community life. Every individual, therefore, should plan as a part of his philosophy and program of existence, to arrange for himself as normal a community life as possible—and for his children. Moreover, a wise and just society should seek to organize itself so as to provide a normal community life for all its members. This is one of the things we have to struggle for in our modern complex society; and we are

far too apt, in the false wisdom of our modern sophistication, to overlook the fact that it is well worth all the effort it may cost.

The special problems of village communities. The village deserves more special attention than it has received in the sociological literature of the past. This, it is beginning to get, because the village itself is coming to self-consciousness. The village might have a fair measure of the advantages of both the open country and the city, with a minimum of the disadvantages of either. It is near enough to nature, so that with a little attention and effort it might be charmingly beautiful. Neighborly relations are easily natural and wholesome, unless the people become infected with the disease of citified sophistication. On the other hand, there are enough people so that with a little well-directed coöperative effort good schools, good churches, good music, and other cultural resources, good streets, good sanitation, and good markets could be had. It is a noticeable fact that villages all over America actually are making conspicuous improvement in almost all these matters. And this improvement has come largely out of the villages themselves; the local people have produced their own leadership and made their own improvement. That is one of the hopeful signs of the times. However, there is much unfinished work to be done.

Special problems of rural communities. Isolation is the typical obstacle to community life in rural communities, at least in those rural communities where the farms are large and families are far apart.

The loneliness of farm people is often pathetic. Overworked women often remain at home for months at a time; without seeing anyone but the members of their own families. Persons who have visited rural schools on the prairies have frequently remarked upon the way the children stand around during recess—they have never learned to play! Such isolation makes people socially awkward and lacking in self-

confidence. It also tends to impoverish their minds. Telephones, radios, automobiles, mail delivery, and improved roads are overcoming these obstacles to a considerable degree. The availability of these means of sociability depends, of course, upon the prosperity of the farmers.

In some rural communities the difficulty is largely a matter of custom and habit. The neighbors have simply gotten into the habit of staying at home and working. Or they have developed bad social practices, such as going to town and merely loafing aimlessly about; or indulging, when they do get together, in unwholesome recreations. What such a community needs is young, imaginative leadership, that will start something interesting and wholesome, and get the neighbors out of their ruts. Sometimes the difficulty is due to differences of nationality or religion; in which case the only remedy is sympathy, tact, patience, and a long-time program upon the part of the leaders. Now that the automobile has enlarged the natural radius of the village there is an urgent need and open opportunity to draw the adjacent farmers into the social life of the village. Here is a challenge to potential leadership for the educated young people of most American villages.

Handicaps of small communities. In a previous paragraph mention was made of coöperation as one of the functions of the community. However, many of the most desirable coöperative enterprises are beyond the capacity of isolated little communities. A community small enough so that all its members can know each other personally can seldom command sufficient funds to provide itself with all the good things of modern civilization. That is why better fire protection, better churches and schools, better theatres and libraries, better artistic and musical facilities are available in cities than in small villages. Thus, many of the best things of modern civilization can be gotten only through *coöperation among many communities*. Other examples are mail service, transportation, police protection, the care of health, electric

light and power, and good roads and education. To get these things communities must coöperate with other communities through the State and Federal Governments.

Special problems of urban communities. The reader will often encounter the word community applied to such cities as Minneapolis, Chicago, or New York; and the dictionary approves that use of the word. But such a city is not a community in the technical sense of this chapter. It is really a complex of many communities. It is as if some Cyclops were to encircle with his giant hands a region one hundred miles square and squeeze its little communities together into an area ten miles square. There would be as many communities as before, but they would dovetail and overlap. Functionally, a community is a group of neighbors *who neighbor together*. A person's neighbors are the persons he neighbors with. In a village community there are gardens, lawns, and vacant lots between a person and his neighbors; in a city there are numerous other houses packed with persons; but those other persons are not his neighbors, because he does not neighbor with them. His neighbors are only the persons, scattered wherever they may be throughout the city, whom he neighbors with. In a city each person has his own community. Let a city dweller take a map of his city and put a red dot at every address where he has an intimate friend, and a green dot wherever he has an acquaintance. A map so marked would be a map of *his* community. A city is really as many communities as there are persons; but the communities overlap as they do not in less crowded areas.

Many writers and reformers have sought to vitalize community life in large cities by trying to induce all the people who reside close together in the same block or precinct to neighbor together; but this is a misconception of the community. The community is essentially a functional, not a geographical, unit. The way to vitalize community life in a city is to make it easy for everybody to neighbor with the

people they like, wherever throughout the city they may happen to be located.

Poverty as an obstacle to community life in cities. Now it is to be observed that persons with reasonable incomes can have all the community life they need, even in cities, if they will but make a little effort to get it. They can go to distant parts of the city to see their friends. They can have parties at their own homes; or they can hire halls in which to have their parties. They can join clubs that maintain club-houses for purposes of sociability. They can even drive into the country to picnic or play golf with their friends.

Not so with the poor. They cannot afford to belong to clubs. Their homes are too small, too crowded, and too uninviting to be suitable places for pleasant parties. They cannot hire a hall. They can patronize only the cheapest places of amusement. They can hardly afford the carfare necessary to go to distant parts of the city, much less to the country. They can only swarm the streets of the slums. Doubtless they experience many pleasing friendships in spite of such limitations; but there is not much chance to cultivate wholesome and humanizing community interests. Especially is there little chance for play among the children, for proper courtship among the young people, or for ceremony among the adults. Juvenile crime is one of the consequences.

The "Near North Side." The break-down of community life in our modern industrial cities has been vividly presented in two recent surveys. In his *Gold Coast and the Slum*, Professor Zorbaugh describes conditions in the Near North Side of Chicago. There are several parallel strips running north and south. Nearest the lake front is the most fashionable residential section of the city. No real community life exists among these people, so completely absorbed are they with the rivalries of fashionable "society." Next back of them is the rooming-house section; occupied mostly by unmarried people. Each person is virtually nameless and un-

attached; lonely, and a law unto himself—a person without a community. Farther west are several strips of slum, differing from each other chiefly on account of the nationality of the people. Poverty is so extreme that family life is seriously handicapped; nobody takes any interest in local affairs. In such urban sections community life has completely broken down; vice and crime of all sorts are rampant; churches have almost ceased to function; nobody takes any interest in local affairs. Such a region is naturally, as a result, the happy hunting ground of the corrupt politician.

“Middletown.” The Lynds, in their survey of a typical Middle-West, middle-sized city called “Middletown” very pointedly describe the gradual break-down of community life. The population is gradually crystallizing into cliques and clans and classes. People interviewed frequently testified that they didn’t have much to do with their neighbors; it was usually safest not to. It is evident from this survey that wholesome community life in America is gradually disintegrating and passing away; and that the reason for it is the rapid change from rural and semi-rural life to modern industrialism. The “long arm of the job” is reaching into every family and dictating the program of every life; while commercialized amusements, and the pressure of fastidious wants are breaking down the habit of sociability. The fundamental remedies for these defects are, first, to “pass prosperity around,” as Roosevelt expressed it; and, second, to set our hearts less on what the advertisers are so furiously stampeding us into wanting, but more on art and friendship.

Cultivating sociability. For all except the very poor the vitalizing of community life is a matter of individual insight and effort. Each person must make it a part of his own philosophy and program of life to cultivate neighborly associations, and gather about himself a circle of intimate friends. And not for ulterior motives, either; but for the sheer satisfaction of one’s social instincts. Nor is it desirable

that one's friendships be limited to one's vocational associates or social class. One's personality is enriched as one widens the range of his friendships.

The rise in recent years of the so-called service clubs, such as the Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, Optimists, and others, is to be accounted for, in part at least, by the instinctive desire for community association. In these clubs busy business men meet once a week at a simple noon meal. They joke and sing together, listen to a talk, usually on some local, public enterprise, and *call each other by their first names*. Thus they satisfy their desire to feel like neighbors, despite the complexities of modern life and the divisiveness of their vocations. This does far more *good* than all the "good" they do! Such service is performed in many villages and cities by the lodges. It has always been an important and legitimate function of the church.

However, there is some danger of overdoing these associations, important as they are. Sociability is not the only human need; and one should give his personality a balanced ration. "Nothing in excess" is an ancient Greek adage that summed up the wisdom of an admirable civilization. Our world tends to become overloaded with organizations; and some people are afflicted with the disease of "jointitis." There is such a thing as too much association. Every normal person needs some privacy for thinking by himself, especially in contact with nature. Intelligent minds need quiet leisure for cultivating the acquaintance of the world's *great* minds. Thus, overstimulation by too many people and their too trivial activities tends to rob a city dweller of the quiet and retirement he needs in which to think out his *own* philosophy of life. Otherwise one's mind is liable to become superficial, and his thoughts echoic. This is said to be the typical fault of the modern urban mind.

The need for wholesome community interests. When neighbors meet, whether by twos, small groups, or larger

companies, it is never to sit or stand still and just look at each other. They always proceed to *do* something together. And the quality of their community life depends largely upon what they find to do; that is to say, upon their community interests. Therefore the formula for improving community life is to develop community interests that are wholesome and refining.

Community life is too often positively degrading for lack of wholesome interests. If the only thing that neighbors can think of to do when they get together is to gossip about the faults of those of their neighbors who do not happen to be present, their community activities deserve the epithet of "small-town stuff." (As a matter of fact, however, such gossiping is no more likely to happen in small towns than in big ones.) If neighbors get together to drink, fight, and carouse, or if commercialized dancing (not infrequently bad) is the common interest, or if superstitions, ignorance-breeding religion is what they give their attention to, then community life will be damaging instead of beneficial to the personalities of its members.

In some communities social activities are indulged in that are positively divisive. The bane of almost every village is the small clique of snobbish persons who try to be socially superior and exclusive. It is natural and desirable that persons should try to excel, but they should seek to excel in some really constructive achievement. Exclusive clubs and social cliques are even more ludicrous and pernicious in villages than in cities. They are destructive of a wholesome we-feeling. Differences are sometimes generated artificially by the unbridled tendency to quarrel. It is a disgrace for any person to be unable to get along with his neighbors. Religion at its best has done a great deal to tone up community life by teaching that one ought to live "in love and fellowship with his neighbors."

The problem of the immigrant. The special problem of

community life in America is the presence among us of so many immigrants. They naturally tend to collect in groups by themselves, and so get their community life from one another. This hinders their assimilation into American institutions. If they are to be *among* us we want them to become of us as speedily as practicable. We want to draw them into our own community life.

Several suggestions for their assimilation may be offered. First, immigration should be rigorously restricted, just as it is in the present (1930) laws. The demands of large employers for cheap immigrant labor should not be too readily listened to. Especially should Oriental laborers be excluded, because they are so very different in race and culture. Second, the Federal Government should develop an employment agency for distributing immigrants intelligently to various parts of the country where they are most needed. Third, they should be given a fair opportunity to become prosperous, so that they will feel well-treated and appreciative of our institutions. This is a problem of wages, and will be discussed in a later chapter. Fourth, their children should be kept in our schools till they are at least sixteen years of age; eighteen would perhaps be better. Schools in which foreign languages are used are a major obstacle to assimilation; the English language should be used as the principal medium of instruction in all elementary and secondary schools.

Such a program of Americanization will prove fairly effective in the long run. Immigrants assimilate in a generation or two if they are given a reasonable opportunity to become prosperous and if their children are kept in the public schools. Our experience with the Scandinavian, German, and Irish immigrants of the past shows that this is true; it should not prove otherwise with the newer immigration. But artificial, short-run Americanization is a fatuous illusion.

The play group of children. The play group is the chil-

dren's community. Its functions are much the same for children as the functions of the community are for adults. The interferences and obstacles are much the same. The importance of play is even greater than that of adult sociability because of the formative nature of childhood. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that childhood and youth have a normal play life. Sociology and educational theory are recognizing this more and more. Any society in which the normal, wholesome play of children and young people is interfered with is, therefore, a sick society. One of the serious aspects of child labor is that it deprives childhood of its natural right and necessity for play. For boys to play together in gangs is perfectly natural; but under bad conditions, whether in city, village, or country, gangs of boys are liable to degenerate into bands of young criminals. A community is shortsighted indeed if it fails to provide them with good places to play, wholesome things to play with, and wise, kindly supervision. The Y. M. C. A., the Boy Scouts, and some other agencies have been active in trying to provide for the needs. Similar provision is being made for girls. Playgrounds are being furnished by philanthropy and at public expense in many cities, and playground supervision is becoming a profession. Even some villages and rural communities are attacking the problem. But there is still need everywhere for much constructive work along this line. But unsupervised play is likely to be harmful. Fighting, bullying, gross selfishness, and other anti-social traits are liable to be developed in some, unless play is wisely supervised; while the weaker members of the group are likely to be so terrorized and repressed that they will become sullen, tricky, or lacking in self-confidence.

Before closing this chapter on the local community it is important to point out a revolutionary change that is coming over modern society. While the community as such is not passing away, and never will, it is becoming *relatively*

much less important in the total social life. Primary, face to face, association is giving place to secondary association; that is, to association depending on indirect and artificial communication at a distance. This is due to the new means of communication such as fast mail, telephone, telegraph, and radio. It is also due to the new means of transportation such as steam trains and automobiles.

In the old-fashioned community one's neighbors were seldom more than four or five miles away; but with telephones and automobiles one can easily neighbor with people who live twenty-five or fifty miles away. This has a tendency to dilute the neighborliness of small local communities, and disintegrate the community as such. More of the people's interests are far away, instead of merely local.

Also, it is easier to do business at a distance than it used to be. A man can now manage a string of stores or offices stretching fifty or a hundred miles along a line of road. Hence business is less usually organized locally. Instead, the local store belongs to a chain of stores, and the local bank is a branch office of some big city bank; many of the people are employed by the local branch of some nation-sized corporation; and most of what is produced locally is shipped away to market, while most of what is consumed locally is shipped in.

One of the results is that many of the problems of life have quite outgrown the powers of the local government. The local government cannot regulate railroad rates, nor control the nation-sized corporations that do most of the local business. It cannot protect itself against epidemics of disease; and its local policemen are unequal to the menace of automobile-driving bandits. The local communities cannot be depended upon to build their local sections of the through highways that are needed by automobile traffic; and in many local communities the local taxes are not sufficient to provide such schools as the American standards

require. Many such matters have to be taken over, therefore, by the state and federal governments, instead of being left to the local units.

We often hear the old slogan that local self-government is the vital organ of democracy. But this slogan was coined before the invention of railroads and automobiles, telephones, telegraphs, and radios; and no longer applies to present conditions except in part. It is seldom safe to think by such old slogans, as the changes of the times have usually rendered them misleading and dangerous half-truths. It is very important for our modern publics to realize that as the units of society and of industry become large instead of merely local, we are forced to depend more and more upon the larger units of government and less upon the local.

PROBLEMS

1. Show how geographic and technic influences have affected the conditions of your own local community. Also social influences, such as religion, schools, popular amusements, etc.

2. Make a study of your local community as to its resources and liabilities for a wholesome, satisfying community life. Discuss.

3. Are there certain dominating personalities in your local community? How do they affect the life of the community as a whole?

4. Enumerate (a) the material improvements in your community within your own memory. (b) The cultural. (c) The moral. Put each list on the blackboard.

5. Illustrate concretely how urban congestion interferes with community life. If the class is in a city school it will be profitable to inquire whether real community life actually exists in your part of the city. Is your part of the city a tangle of overlapping communities?

6. List the members of the community to which you belong, arranging them as to degree of intimacy. Locate these persons with different-colored tacks on a map of your city. (For city classes only.)

7. Why do foreigners collect in settlements; and how could this be prevented?

8. What are the significant facts with regard to foreigners in your community? Are they being assimilated?

9. How can foreigners be assimilated into American community life? Read everything you can find in your reference library on this question. There are several interesting biographies of immigrants, by Riis, Steiner, and others.

10. What is a social survey of a community (see your reference library)? What good would such a survey do your community?

11. What provisions are there in your community for the play life of children and young people? Do you consider them wholesome and adequate?

12. Let some member of the class look up the facts and make a report on the use that was made of recreations in the army during the late war.

13. Discuss the use made of play, games, and "social participation" in modern education.

14. Gather information about the actual use of music as a means of community recreation.

15. Study the use made of games in the education of the ancient Athenian youth. Also in the "Great Public Schools" of England. Draw inferences.

16. Find out all you can about the National Community Center Association.

17. Furnish concrete illustrations of the principle that the community is the mould of personality.

18. Can you learn of any particular village or rural community where something special has been done along the line of community life? (For village and rural classes.)

19. Let some member of the class report on Zorbaugh's *Gold Coast and the Slum*.

20. What bearing has the substitute of secondary for primary relations on such problems as the support of education, the maintenance of roads, the control of industry, and the modernization of the tax system?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

COOLEY, CHARLES H., *Social Organization*.

This book contains Cooley's classic treatment of primary groups.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book III, Chapters I and IV.

A discussion of the community.

ELMER, M. C., *Technique of Social Surveys*. University Printing Company, Minneapolis.

A partial survey of the local community, or of some aspect of the community life, would do more to render the study of this chapter concrete and vivid than any other class exercise. Dr Elmer's book is the manual to use for the guidance of such work.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapters III, IV, and V.

Chapter III discusses geographical conditions as a factor in social life; Chapter IV is on rural sociology; Chapter V is on the social problem of city life.

LYND, ROBERT S. and HELEN M., *Middletown*. Harcourt, Brace and Company.

A concrete, objective survey of a typical, middle-sized, Middle West American city. Greatly admired for its scientific method and fascinating interest. Frequently quoted in this book.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters VII and LII.

Chapter VII is on geographical factors; Chapter LII is on recreation centers.

ZORBAUGH, HARVEY W., *The Gold Coast and the Slum*. University of Chicago Press.

A scientific survey of the Near North Side in Chicago. A very interesting account of a community in disintegration.

CHAPTER VIII

INDUSTRY

The instinctive basis of industry. If one has a vivid imagination he can picture to himself the industrial activities of the earliest and most primitive people that ever lived upon the earth. It is safe to assume that they were hungry—all living creatures do have the food need to contend with—and it must have kept them on the hunt most of the time, looking for something that they could eat. And the effort to find or make food has ever since been one of the driving motives of industry. If the first human beings lived in a warm climate they must have felt the need for shelter more than the need for clothing, for primitive shelter must have been wanted as a refuge from wild animals quite as much as a protection from the weather. Without tools it must have involved no little work to build, out of the materials the jungle furnished, a shelter that would meet these needs. The need for clothing doubtless came later, as men migrated into colder climates, or as the glacial ice sheet described in the geologies advanced from the north and spread itself over their habitat. To this day clothing and shelter are large and perennial objects of industry. Weapons of defense and of the chase must have been an early need also. They were, perhaps, the first tools. Man is still making tools, but now on an enormous scale. And ornaments too: we find them among the relics of all ancient and prehistoric peoples. To this day much of our industrial energy is devoted to making ornaments of various kinds. In fact, the needs of man are many and various: carts, automobiles, and ships; books, lights, and roads; flowers, medicines, and amusements; musical instruments, signet rings, and poetry; theologies, governments, and colleges; and so forth and so on, to infinity.

All these needs arise directly or indirectly out of the innate nature of man; and to satisfy them is the function of industry.

Geographic factors. Industry has always been profoundly influenced by geographic conditions. In tropical climates primitive industry consisted largely in gathering the fruits, nuts, and roots that grew wild in abundance. By rivers, lakes, or oceans it consisted more largely in procuring fish. When the ice sheet came down over Europe the scarcity of vegetable food must have compelled men to become hunters of wild animals. Fertile valleys, like the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus, and the Whang invited agriculture. Rome's ultimatum to Carthage to move back ten miles from the sea was a death sentence, because her industry was maritime. England's insular position has made her a seafaring people, and her deposits of coal have been conducive to manufacture. When her coal is exhausted her industries will collapse—unless she can invent some new kind of power, which will undoubtedly happen. As civilization advances industry becomes *relatively* less dependent upon geographical conditions: we grub out the forests of the Middle West and plant corn; we connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and sail across the isthmus that separated them; we transport all sorts of products from anywhere to everywhere; we drain malarial marshes and make them productive fields; we protect ourselves from the cold of winter, and make ourselves comfortable in the torrid parts of the earth. Still we shall never be independent of geography.

Technic and social causes in social development. How technic and social causes affect industry can best be seen by a study of the various stages of industrial development from the earliest times until now. The development of industry has been gradual, although at some periods it has progressed more rapidly than at others. Some advanced peoples have climbed up by one route, and some by another; some have

skipped certain stages; some peoples have climbed only part way up; and others are still at or near the foot of the ladder. While industrial development has by no means been the same everywhere, there are, nevertheless, three outstanding terraces which represent the past of civilized nations with a fair degree of accuracy. They are: (1) the hunting-fishing, (2) the agriculture-handicraft, and (3) the machinofacture.

The hunting-fishing stage. The hunting-fishing stage was caused by certain technic inventions such as fishhooks, stone-pointed spears, stone sledge hammers, bows and arrows, etc. When such tools as these were invented, or perhaps at first discovered by a happy accident, their use was of course imitated. Imitation is a social fact; so is the common feeling of need which such implements met. Protection against wild beasts, and a dependable supply of food made life in large groups possible. And with large groups came elaborate rules to regulate living together, and large coöperative enterprises, not only in hunting, but in building, moving, and other activities.

The agriculture-handicraft stage. By the agriculture-handicraft stage is meant that stage of industrial society in which the land is regularly farmed and the various crafts are plied. It involves more or less trade and commerce, and a relatively settled society. Practically all the historic nations have lived upon this level, from the early Babylonians and Egyptians to the Europeans and Americans of the eighteenth century. History is for the most part an account of agriculture-handicraft society; prehistoric society, for reasons presently to be mentioned, was on the hunting-fishing level.

The technic cause of the change. The technic cause that lifted industry from the hunting-fishing to the agriculture-handicraft level was the domestication of plants and animals. In some societies the domestication of plants may have been accompanied with little or no domestication of animals, as with some tribes of American Indians. In some societies

animals alone were domesticated. The result of such an arrangement would be a pastoral or nomadic society. The fact that the word daughter in all the Indo-European languages comes from an old Aryan word meaning milkmaid is one of the evidences that the original Aryan peoples were pastoral. When a people has extensively domesticated both plants and animals, and adapted their social arrangements accordingly, they have risen to the agriculture-handicraft level.

Effect upon the industrial organization. This change had a profound effect upon all phases of the common life. It necessitated an entirely different organization of industrial society. The rules of the industrial game became entirely different from those of the hunting-fishing game because the game itself had become a new game. The change gave rise to the private ownership of land. Among a hunting people a tribe may claim a neck of the woods as against another tribe; but no member of the tribe has private preserves as against his fellow-tribesmen. Private ownership of the spot on which the tepee stands would be unusual, because the tribe will move presently. But a farmer must own the patch of land he tills. He has cleared it, and he keeps the wild animals away from it. He must have a private claim upon it which the community respects and unites in guaranteeing him. In the early stages of this transition to agriculture the cultivated fields were often owned in common; but as agricultural societies developed, communal ownership usually gave way to individual, because it worked better. Thus arose the institution of private property in land.

Agriculture gave rise to slavery. Hunters usually slew their captives; but farmers discovered that they could make them more than pay for their keep. Thus began an important social institution. With farming came division of labor—some devoting their time to the various crafts; and with handicrafts came commerce. Commerce gave rise to

rules regulating it; and eventually to money. And so on, until an industrial system grew up as different from the hunting-fishing system as that of the white settlers of the colonies was different from that of the Indians.

Social effects. These industrial changes caused a long train of social changes also. Farmers, wishing, unlike hunters, to remain in one place, built permanent houses of wood, brick, or stone. Likewise their neighbors, the craftsmen. Thus villages grew up; then cities. Cities grew to states. Population multiplied, because agriculture can support more people than hunting can. Villages and cities required more complex government than did a wandering tribe. As the people acquired permanent houses, so did the gods; but a heathen god who resided in a pretentious temple presently became a wholly different kind of god than one that had moved about with a camp. Besides, he protected a wholly different sort of people, and so the god himself changed to fit his new function.

This change to the settled type of agriculture affected the status of women also, reducing them to an artificial inferiority somewhat akin to slavery. This was due in part to the practice of wife purchase, which was analogous to slavery itself. This new status of women tended to modify family life. Furthermore, farming is more conducive to a separate home for each family than hunting is, because hunters or nomads tend to group the families of brothers together in a horde, or tribe. Also the moral code was modified to meet new conditions; for example, it now became trespass to hunt wild game in your neighbor's fields, or it was forbidden to carry weapons. Permanent records were now possible, as they had not been before, because there were permanent places to keep them. This is why at the dawn of any people's history the historian finds them just settling down to an agricultural life with legends of hunting life in the background—records can not go back farther than that.

Permanent buildings where records can be kept also favor the growth of art and literature.

Effect upon human nature. Even human nature itself must have been modified by the great change. Or to speak in more accurate biological terms, agriculture favored the selection and survival of a different sort of temperament than hunting did. Hunting favors the wild, venturesome spirit, given to violent, but spasmodic activity. But agriculture demands steady, patient, foresighted toil. The two types are as different as the red Indian and the typical white farmer. The hunter's temperament seems to be so thoroughly bred into the Indian's bone (the other type having been weeded out by a long process of selection) that he never made a good slave and is little inclined to settle down as a farmer. Exactly the opposite kind of a selection has been going on for centuries with the peoples who have developed into successful farmers and craftsmen. The kind who could not hold their noses to the grindstone of hard, monotonous toil would tend to get themselves killed off or starved out; while those who could do so tended to survive and leave offspring. So that while the spasmodic temperament remains, as we may guess, recessive, in our stock, and shows up from time to time, the general run of persons in civilized societies are the steady, persistent sort.

Resulting conflicts. And, moreover, the change gave rise to conflicting interests, and hence to an unending succession of squabbles, fights, and wars between those who wished to use the land as farmers, and those who were still disposed to be nomads or hunters. When our Western prairies were fenced in by ranchers, the old pastures of the cattle rangers were cut into, and there has always been more or less bad blood between cowboys and farmers. The story of Cain and Abel in the Bible suggests this same struggle as it lay in the background of Hebrew history. Abel was a herdsman and Cain a tiller of fields. The whole history of civilized

man, from the invasion of Babylonia by Semitic nomads under Sargon about 2750 B. C., and of Egypt by the Hyksos or shepherd kings about 2100 B. C., to the massacre of General Custer and his little army in eastern Montana in 1876, is a long series of fights and conflicts between settled agricultural peoples and the nomads or hunters that surrounded them.

There is no more stirring epic in world history than the conquest, within scarcely more than a century, of this greatest agricultural basin in the world, between the Appalachian and the Rocky Mountains, and its subjugation to the plow. It was one long fight between the vanguard of the advancing settlers and the rearguard of the retiring savages: a century-long conflict between two great culture systems, the hunting and the agricultural.

The machinofacture stage. The change from the agriculture-handicraft to the machinofacture régime was brought about by a series of mechanical inventions and their application to industry. The typical invention that dramatically symbolizes all the rest is the steam engine, though the electric dynamo and the gasoline motor are scarcely less important. Back of all these, of course, are chemistry and physics, and accompanying them are the biological sciences. Just as our remote ancestors domesticated plants and animals, so have we recently domesticated, so to speak, other resources and powers of nature vastly more potent. And just as that earlier industrial change lifted mankind to a new and entirely different form of society, so these recent industrial changes are lifting us again to another new and utterly different social order. It is of the utmost importance to appreciate this analogy. Not otherwise can we understand the industrial problems of the present crisis. The new machinofacture régime that has just now been ushered in will be as different from the agriculture-handicraft régime of historic times as that was different from the old hunting-

fishing regime of prehistoric savages. Society has recently shifted to a higher gear. The changes, the conflicts, and the industrial unrest of the present time are the shock and jar incident to the shifting of the gears.

Capitalism. The new industrial institution as it now stands is sometimes referred to as capitalism. Capital, as the term is used in economics, means all the material things used in industry: namely, buildings, machines of all sorts, railroads and rolling stock, the improvement on land and in mines, and so forth. Capitalism is the name applied to the new machinofacture system of industry; and it connotes the two characteristic features of the new system: first, the enormous use of capital, and second, the control of industry by capitalists. We are now living under the régime of capitalism.

Capitalism is a new thing under the sun inasmuch as the ratio of tools to worker is so enormously greater than it ever was before. Formerly each worker used a few simple hand-tools, supplemented by the muscle power of a draft animal or or two. At present the worker uses ponderous machines, driven by steam or electric power. And since the tool counts for so much more *relatively*, and the worker for so much less, the tool owner has a new advantage as compared with the worker. The change is so great as to be revolutionary.

Analogous changes in industrial organization. The change from agriculture-handicraft to machinofacture is causing great changes in the organization of industry analogous to those caused by the change from hunting-fishing to agriculture-handicraft—and changes equally great. Already we can see these changes in process of occurring. Slavery has passed away already; partly, it is true, before the pressure of new moral ideals, but mostly because it did not fit in with the new machinofacture régime. The keenest social and economic thoughts in the old South before the Civil War were already pointing out that slavery was uneconomi-

cal, putting the South at a disadvantage in competition with other sections that used free labor. The relation of wage-earner to employer is different also from what it used to be under the old régime, for reasons that will be explained in the next chapter. Already the new régime has changed the form of business organization. Whereas formerly individual ownership or a partnership were the usual thing, and the corporation the rather rare exception, now the corporation is the rule, and individual or partnership concerns the exception in large-scale, machinofacture industry. The aggregations of capital required for modern business are so large that only the corporate organization serves the purpose. As for the ownership of property, who knows but that flying machines may give rise to private property rights in the air; and the suggestion is not unusual among conservative-minded persons that certain great resources and industries should become public property; especially those that seem predestined to become natural monopolies, such as timber, coal, water power, and railroads. The fundamental cause of their apparent drift toward monopoly is to be found in the use of power machinery on a large scale; and if monopoly should prove inevitable, public monopoly is obviously preferable to private. And as for the legal rules of the industrial game, of course, the new game is so utterly different from the old one that new rules are gradually being devised where the old ones fail to fit the case.

Analogous social changes. And again, the recent industrial change is initiating a long series of social changes. Naturally! Steam and electricity can penetrate the social system no less deeply than cattle and wheat. As the earlier change gave rise to houses of wood and stone, so the later change is giving rise to steel skyscrapers. As the earlier change produced villages and towns, so the later change is producing vast cities on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, it is filling the world as a whole with population as

never before, due (a) to our new mastery over diseases, and (b) to our new ability to transport food to distant places. It is also radically modifying the responsibilities, and hence the functions, of government. As the old régime culminated in states and empires; so the new must culminate in some sort of world state. As the agriculture-handicraft civilization gave mankind security from wild beasts, protection from the weather, and relative immunity from famine, so the machinofacture régime promises to give us protection from bacteria and immunity from illiteracy.

The new régime is creating a radically different status for woman, due chiefly to the opportunity it gives her for independent jobs away from home. The moral code also is changing to meet the new situation. Of this, two examples must suffice. It is now right for woman to do many things unthought of in the old days; it is now wrong for railroads to offer cheaper rates to large shippers than to small. In the intellectual realm the scientific method is coming into its own, since the new régime is due to science. Even the Deity is becoming a larger concept in our minds, since now as never before we realize that His function is to preside over an orderly, rational universe, to unite all humanity in a universal brotherhood, and to move the whole creation along step by step toward "one far-off divine event."

Analogous change in human nature. The new machinofacture régime will undoubtedly select a new type of human nature for survival. It is already apparent that a more coöperative type of human nature will be required to make the new régime work. The old regime was one of small individual farms, small individual shops, small individual carts, and small individual ships. Naturally it was an every-fellow-for-himself, competitive game. Villages were the rule, in which every family kept its own cow, found its own light, fuel, and transportation, and put out its own fire.

Cities are now the rule, in which pure milk, sanitation, public-service utilities, police and fire protection, and what not, are of necessity coöperative enterprises. As cities learned to coöperate with cities in the formation of states and empires, so states and empires will have to coöperate together in a universal world-federation. In short, the new regime requires vastly more coöperation than did the old. In a society that calls for so much coöperation the selfish, every-fellow-for-himself type of man will gradually be weeded out, and only the coöperative and their descendants will eventually survive.

A plausible argument that that weeding-out process is going on rapidly before our very eyes can be drawn from certain current tendencies. Many women prefer to remain unmarried than to marry husbands with small incomes. Many couples remain childless or have but one or two children because they prefer luxuries to large families. It is argued that these are the selfish elements of the population, eliminating themselves. The kind that prefer many sociable housemates to selfish luxuries are producing offspring, and their kind will survive. A more plausible argument is based on the fact that at the bottom of the social ladder is an army of jobless, homeless, childless men, many of whom are failures industrially because they cannot get along with employers and fellow-workers. It is argued that these are the quarrelsome and uncoöperative, eliminating themselves. The kind that can get along with their employers and fellow-workers are holding their jobs, supporting families, and reproducing their kind. While these particular illustrations of the principle should be taken with a grain of salt, the principle may well be sound, in part, at least. In the long run the new régime will undoubtedly effect the sort of sifting for survival suggested by the illustrations. Eventually the coöperative will inherit the earth.

Analogous conflicts. It is hardly to be expected that such

a transition could be made without conflicting interests. In fact, the conflict of interests is upon us already. The old rules and regulations of the agriculture-handicraft régime are already proving inadequate to take care of the new machinofacture situation. The new wine is bursting the old bottles. That is the explanation of the present world-wide conflict between capital on one hand and labor on the other; and it partly explains also the causes of the Great World War. The resulting problems are so important that the whole of the next three chapters will be devoted to their discussion.

The functions of industry: To furnish goods and services.

The function of industry, as already stated, is to provide men, women, and children with the goods and services they need. As industry has developed, more and more of the needs of man have been met, with an ever more regular and dependable supply of goods. In the lower stages famine and freezing were not unusual; and the refinements of life were beyond hope—indeed, they could not even be imagined. When a surplus began to be accumulated, men were wont to gorge themselves with food, have more clothes than they could wear, or bigger houses than they could make use of, overlooking the needs of their minds and hearts. A human being needs a balanced ration; enough of the right kind of food, but no more; enough of the right kind of clothing, but no more; enough of the right kind of shelter, but no more; and besides that, wherewithal to satisfy his sense of beauty, his curiosity to inquire, his hunger for harmonious sounds, and his craving for contact with nature, not to mention protection from disease and temptation. It is the function of industry to furnish people with a balanced ration: variety and harmony, as the economists say.

Not to a few but to all. The function of industry is to furnish a balanced ration to *all* the members of society. It is the theory of both Christianity and democracy that one

person's needs are as important as another's. To be sure, men's needs differ. All need food—one a different kind than another. All need clothing—one a pair of overalls, perhaps, and another a waiter's regalia. All need housing: warm, sanitary, and beautiful. One man may need music, while another feels no such need. One of low intelligence may have little need of books, while to another they furnish "the joy of the intellectual life." But there is no inherent reason why one man's need for books should be sacrificed to another's need for music. No sound reason can be given why one child should shiver in rags and a hovel so that another may have more clothes and a bigger house than he can make use of.

In certain periods of Roman history the "plebes of the city" lived crowded together in big, fire-trap tenements, and went hungry except when free grain was distributed, in order that the nobles might live in marble-pillared houses, and indulge in the most costly, extravagant, and useless luxuries. There is no reasonable justification for such an arrangement; the only explanation is that the Romans had drifted into a monstrous maladjustment that they lacked the intelligence and the conscience to rectify. And this, by the way, was the principal cause of Rome's decline. It was a poor arrangement in medieval times that the people in the palace could, even on rare and exceptional occasions, order underfed peasants into the fields to hunt snails and wild strawberries for palace table delicacies. The great economists of the last century have all agreed that there should be luxuries for none till there are necessities for all.

Industry has not yet arrived at the goal of its development so long as a few gorge themselves with the mints and sauces, while the many "rise empty from the feast of life." How to "pass prosperity around" is civilization's greatest unsolved problem.

Work is a means of self-expression. Industry has a second-

ary function that is getting more emphasis as the world grows wiser. That function is to gratify each person's constructive, artistic, and altruistic instincts. One of the satisfactions of life is to construct or perform something that shows one's talents, or to do something for others that wins their gratitude. The joy of working for the sake of love or for the sake of art is one of the ultimate goods of life. It does not have to be explained in terms of something else, since it is an end in itself. Happy indeed is the man who has found a work in life that satisfies all these cravings of his spirit. With wages enough to live in comfort and self-respect, he would not trade such work for a dull and useless drudgery, even if it paid him millions. Many pursue great gain not so much because they desire the wealth itself, as because they want to show what they can achieve. It is an unripe industrial régime that deprives the majority of its workers of these two satisfactions, and reduces them to joyless drudges waiting for the whistle to blow and pay-day to come. It will be a happier world that manages to assign to each his "work of love and art." And it will be a far more productive industry; for a mere drudge is an "unprofitable servant."

The principle of change. The foregoing summary should open the eyes of the reader to the principle of industrial change. The fact that industry has passed through so many changes in the past should create the expectation that it will continue to change in the future. Old systems have passed away: slavery, for example, which was a peculiar organization of the labor supply; and feudalism, which was a peculiar organization of land ownership. Fundamental changes are occurring under our very eyes. The government is encouraging coöperative marketing among farmers, as a substitute for the old competitive, middle-man system. Small, local, individually owned firms are giving place to great nation-sized corporations, of which the chain store is

an example. All sorts of experiments are being tried out here and there: profit sharing, labor representation in management, and even government ownership of this, that, and the other. Why be alarmed at such experiments? They are but examples of the universal law of change. It is one of the marks of the educated mind to see things in process; only the unenlightened worships things-as-they-are.

Furthermore, industrial change is fraught with conflict. It has been so in the past; it is so now; and doubtless it always will be so. One has only to open his eyes to see such conflict all about him. Small local merchants, for example are being driven to the wall by the chain stores. In such conflicts arguments pro and con are often nothing but weapons of defense; and deserve to be recognized as such. What modern society needs is an enlightened public that can see both sides of such conflicts, and discover which side promises the greatest welfare to *all* the people. For public opinion is the natural arbitrator of conflict and director of change. If public opinion is enlightened it should succeed in getting desirable instead of undesirable changes, and getting them without violence.

PROBLEMS

1. Construct a rectangular chart on the blackboard. At the top label the three vertical columns for each of the three great industrial stages. At the left label the horizontal lines with the names of the various institutions. Fill out each of the intersection squares with the appropriate characterization.

2. Review your general history for illustrations of the conflicts between agriculture-handicraft peoples, and their neighbors who were still nomads or hunters.

3. Is the American Indian of a different temperament than the Anglo-Saxon? Why?

4. Review the Industrial Revolution in your school histories.

5. How has the Industrial Revolution affected industrial relations?

6. Explain the underlying cause of the labor-capital controversy, from the historical standpoint.

7. Enumerate the various social consequences of the Industrial Revolution.

8. Has the Industrial Revolution had any bearing on the problem of intemperance?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CHEYNEY, E. P., *Industrial and Social History of England*. The Macmillan Company.

A standard text; it furnishes an invaluable background to the subject-matter of this chapter.

COMAN, KATHARINE, *Industrial History of the United States*. The Macmillan Company.

A standard text on the subject, and a suggestive supplement to this chapter, and to the usual political history.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book I, Chapters VII, VIII.

An account of the Industrial Revolution and its social effects.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter L.

On industry.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapter XXVI.

On the present industrial organization.

CHAPTER IX

INDUSTRY (*Continued*)

The criteria of judgment. The functions of industry as discussed in the last chapter, furnish the standard by which any industrial system, past, present, or future, is to be judged. Take the feudal system of the Middle Ages, for example, with its ownership of land by a few nobles, and its organization of the labor supply as serfs. Did it furnish the goods and services that the people needed; and not merely to a part of the people, but to all of them? Did the workers find self-realization in their work; or were they mere drudges, without joy, pride, leisure, culture, and hope? From this standpoint let us appraise the new machine-facture industry by which we moderns live.

Advantages of modern industry: Enormous productivity. The outstanding advantage of modern industry is its capacity for producing goods and services in such enormous quantities and variety. "The average capital equipment of the modern producer is easily a hundred-fold larger than that of the medieval workman." The inference is that modern industry is at least one hundred times as productive per man. Perhaps it is. Certainly our needs are better met. We now have an abundant, dependable food supply, including a great variety of delicacies from all parts of the earth; also fruits and fresh meats without regard to the season. Houses are warmed in winter, while numerous devices mitigate the heat of summer. The traditions that come down to us of how our grandmothers patched old clothes, and made quilts out of scraps, and sewed up children for the winter in a single suit of underclothes, suggest that we have much more clothing than used to be customary. Similar traditions would suggest that we furnish ourselves more house

room and better houses than our great-great-grandparents did. At any rate we have the so-called modern conveniences. We travel more. The number of miles the average modern man travels in a lifetime as compared with the travel mileage of two hundred years ago if we knew the figures, would doubtless amaze us. Our numerous passenger trains are filled, and our streets and roads swarm with automobiles. Our homes, public buildings, city and village streets, and even our country roads while being traversed, are now brilliantly lighted by night, whereas their darkness was formerly almost unbroken. We have roads, parks, amusement, newspapers, books, pictures, communication, medical service, and education out of all comparison to those of a hundred and fifty years ago—almost out of all comparison, indeed, with even thirty years ago. In fact, there seems to be almost no limit to the quantity of goods per capita that modern machine industry can produce. The modern problem seems to be to find a market for the goods produced. And the increased productivity of industry is measured not alone by the quantity of goods and services consumed per capita, but also by the enormous increase of population which the new productivity has itself made possible.

However, there seems to be one exception to this principle of increased production, and that is in the food supply. The total food supply has been increased, to be sure, by the addition of acreage; but food *per acre* has not been materially increased by machinery. So far as the results of machinery are concerned, there is a radical *difference* between manufacturing and farming, which is too often overlooked. In both manufacturing and farming, machinery increases the production *per man*; but machinery does not increase the product of farming *per acre*. Just as many potatoes can be raised *per acre* with a hoe as with machinery. Now the food producing acres of this country, and of the world, indeed, are strictly limited by geographical conditions. Only a

narrow fringe can be added by draining swamps and irrigating deserts. Hence there is a definite limit to the quantity of food that can be produced—however limitless the possibilities of manufacturing may be. This fact has an obvious bearing on the quantity of population that can be maintained upon the earth. We shall return to this problem in the next chapter.

And by no means the least important aspect of the system's efficiency is the surplus which it has enabled us to accumulate. So long as the people of a nation are living from hand to mouth there is not much ground for optimism. Their existence is a struggle, more or less hopeless. But when a large surplus accumulates, as in our age, the attitude of the people toward existence changes. They take hope, because the means appear to be available for accomplishing great things. This spirit of exultation characterized Europe and America, before the World War. A better day for the world seemed just ahead because the world was getting rich enough to afford better things. The wealth-producing capacity of the new age was one of the causes for this, and an important one. Then Europe destroyed its surplus through war. With the lapse of years, and the recovery of industry, hope is reviving, especially in America. Whether these hopes will be realized will depend upon whether or not we make good use of our surplus, or use it to destroy ourselves. The use of the surplus is one of the most important problems of civilization. But at any rate the machinofacture system is capable of producing an enormous surplus.

Relative freedom of the workers. Slavery is gone. The agriculture-handicraft regime brought it in; and it has passed away with the passing of that regime. Undoubtedly there is a causal connection. Slave labor lacks motive for the initiative and intelligence necessary to most of the jobs of modern industry. And while the invention of the cotton gin did increase the demand for slave labor on the cotton

plantations, and while there are many jobs in modern factories that reduce the workers to mere automatons, still the fact does remain that on the average the new industry requires a new type of attentiveness which the slave system could not motivate.

It is quite customary to underestimate the stimulating influence of modern industry upon the minds of the workers. To captains of industry, and to those who have even minor parts in the management, the game is exceedingly exhilarating. The vast dimensions of the enterprises they are employed in, the enormous power of the machinery, the assembling of materials from distant sources, the production for world markets, the complex organization under which they work, and the number of their fellow-workmen employed must appeal more or less to the imaginations even of the humblest workers. The stultifying effect of working with machinery has been overstated. Very many jobs in which men manage machines demand mechanical skill and technical training of a high order, and the alert attention of keen intellects.

Large labor organizations are necessitated by the conditions of modern large-scale industry. In mining, transportation, and most manufacturing the employer is usually a large corporation; one isolated worker is helpless in bargaining with such a mammoth employer; his only means of presenting his own interests forcibly is by uniting with all his fellow-workers in collective bargaining. Hence the labor union, with its national federations and even international relations. Now, membership in such an organization is a sort of education to the worker. It gives him practice in discussing and deciding upon the coöperative programs of his union. It broadens his outlook, and makes him think of large social matters. Many laboring men are better informed in the fields of economics than the average college graduate. The labor movement has produced some of the

great personalities of the present time. This mental stimulation of the workers is a by-product of capitalism.

Modern industrialism is, furthermore, one of the causes for the growth of popular education. A century and a quarter ago there was almost no attempt to educate the masses. Today universal elementary education is the rule, and secondary education is coming rapidly. The rise of democracy, and the extension of knowledge are usually assigned as causes for this development. And they are the chief causes. But industrialism has had something to do with it. During the "great educational awakening" of the second third of the nineteenth century labor organizations were overtly active in demanding and securing free, tax-supported schools. Recently employers have been looking to the schools for trained workers; while organized labor looks askance to mere vocational training because that alone is not good enough for them. Thus the causal relation between machinofacture industry and the rise of popular education, while indirect, is none the less real.

The very unrest of the laboring class is a hopeful sign. Inert and stolid they no longer remain. "The man with the hoe has broken the silence of the centuries." Something has awakened the masses. It is partly the new democracy, but it is partly, also, the new machines; they have created a new world in which it is no longer possible for men to remain stolid and inert.

Larger international relations. One thing more that must be set down to the credit of the new type of industry is that it has forced upon us a new type of international relations. This has been caused by steam transportation, especially at sea, and by electric communication. Foreign countries are now close together; messages can be exchanged in a few hours, and goods in a few weeks. It has also been caused by the new need for world markets as an outlet for surplus production. In ancient days the Mediterranean Sea

furnished as large a world as men could do business in. The Rhine, the Danube, the Euphrates, and the deserts were the natural limits of the Roman Empire. China was not unknown; but it was like another world. The mariner's compass enlarged the world at the close of the Middle Ages; but still remote parts remained very remote indeed. But now all the nations of the world are bound together in intimate relationship. Distance is no consideration. China, Japan, India, Germany, France, and the six great English-speaking democracies are all members of one great world society. Steam and electricity have done what Alexander and Caesar aspired to do: they have united the world; but on a far larger scale than they ever dreamed of.

Faults of the system: A. Waste. Our modern industrial regime is productive in spite of enormous wastefulness. We have long flattered ourselves about its productiveness; but we are only beginning to open our eyes to its wastefulness. We have wasted the fertility of our virgin soil; we have used our timber resources wastefully, and almost entirely neglected reforestation; we mine and use coal in such ways as to waste no small proportion of it; we let our water power go to waste; and we waste our labor resources by unemployment. Competitive advertising uses up enormous amounts of goods and energy. It is necessary to profits under a competitive organization; but unnecessary to production under a co-operative organization. The Federated American Engineering Societies presented figures to prove that in many industries the average plants fell far below the best plants in efficiency. This inefficiency, of course, involves waste. Our prevalent practice of manufacturing flimsy, shoddy goods for sale, instead of substantial, honest goods for wear, wastes incalculable quantities of labor. It is probable that modern industry wastes as much as it produces; and most of this waste is due to the fact that profit rather than production is the driving motive.

B. Capitalization thwarts the constructive impulses of workers. A third shortcoming of the machinofacture system is that it deprives too many people of the second function of industry as discussed on page 132. As a rule the average unskilled private in the great army of industry, especially in the large-scale industries, has little or no opportunity for self-expression in his work. There are two reasons for this. One is the modern division of labor, which means that many processes are divided into parts, each worker doing but a part of the whole process. Instead of making a whole shoe, for example, the worker merely tends a machine that makes but a small part of the shoe. As a rule such a worker is speeded up to a standard rate upon fear of losing his job.

The second reason is that the worker in large-scale industry as a rule has nothing whatever to say about the management of the business or the conditions under which he works. The reason for this, of course, is that management goes with ownership. The worker has no more voice in industry than the subjects of an autocracy had in government. He is industrially disfranchised. As a mere wage-earner he is but a cog in a great industrial machine; and, as a rule, he has no hope of becoming anything better. To have a little shop of his own, into the management of which he can put his own brains and personality, is utterly out of the question for the great majority under the machinofacture system. Under such circumstances there is little chance for the worker to take pride in his workmanship, and less for him to enjoy the appreciation of the consumer. His work is neither a work of love nor of art. He feels himself a mere drudge; a cog in the wheel. His only motive is his pay check. For a man to think of regarding such a life-work as a career in which he can express his personality by his achievement is only a humiliation and a grief. A lifelong experience of that kind is exceedingly depressing. That millions of workers find nothing more than that in

their daily work is one of the unsolved problems of industry at the present stage of its development. For all but inferior minds this is a serious deprivation.

C. It fosters materialism. Another fault, to date, of the machinofacture regime is that it overstresses the wealth-getting motive in life; more so, without a doubt, than was the case with the agriculture-handieraft system. There are two reasons for this. First, the little, old-fashioned shop was closely associated with home and neighbors. Employees and customers were always acquaintances and often friends. The personal relation played a large part in business. There were other interests besides moneymaking. In the modern large-scale industries, on the other hand, one's work is remote from home and neighbors; employees are personally unknown; customers are usually never seen. Business is business; the personal relation is absent; industry has but one motive, namely profits. The corporation is soulless. Hence, the most convincing way for a business man to display his personality to his friends and associates is through his achievement as a money-getter. He is, therefore, very apt to neglect other things of equal value, such as family life, neighborly relations, general culture, and spiritual experiences. On the part of the humbler workers the pay check is often the only motive, as has just been explained.

Second, the people who have wealth usually like to display it, especially since it is regarded as the most convincing symbol of achievement. And just because it is so regarded others are tempted to pretend that they possess more wealth than they really do. Hence almost everybody lives under the strain of keeping up more or less of this pretense. Often the finer values of life are sacrificed to this. This mental epidemic of everybody trying to be aristocratic is a hindrance to democracy.

D. It menaces international peace. A fifth fault of modern capitalism is that it tends to cause war. Capitalists are

always branching out, expanding into new fields to find new opportunities for investment and profits. This naturally brings them into competition with other capitalists. National laws are such that this competition is worked out according to rules. But international law fails to umpire it. Hence capitalists of one great nation pushing into new fields in competition with capitalists from other great nations are pretty sure of coming to blows eventually. Such competition between British and German capitalism was one of the underlying causes of the Great World War. The same cause is a permanent menace to the peace of the whole Far East. Modern capitalists are the successors of medieval princes, so far as fomenting ambitious wars is concerned.

E. Maldistribution of wealth. Finally, modern manufacture capitalism fails to distribute its products equitably among the whole population. It makes a few extremely rich, beyond anything that was ever imagined before; while a surprising percentage are depressed with almost hopeless poverty. As wealth is power, the few rich tend to combine for the control of all the activities of society; while the masses share all too little, some of them not at all, in the enormous new wealth of the new regime.

The just sharing of property and income is, and always has been, one of the unsolved problems of human society; and it remains unsolved as industry becomes more productive. Among the savages of the hunting-fishing regime there was not much difference between the rich and poor; all were poor together. But with agriculture, per capita wealth in real estate and personal property increased. However, most of the property fell into the hands of the few, while the majority remained in relative poverty. Thus the gap between rich and poor was widened. The manufacture regime has widened this gap still further. The propertyless classes are better off than they have ever been before; but they share *less than proportionately* in the new

wealth that modern industry produces—far less! They are less prosperous than they have a right to expect, considering the enormous productiveness of modern industry. Dire poverty still exists to a surprising degree. Despite the enormous increase of production the problem of passing prosperity around, to use Roosevelt's phrase, has not yet been solved.

Statistics of distribution. Numerous statistical studies of the distribution of wealth have been made in recent years. One of the best known and generally accredited studies is that by W. I. King, published in 1915. He based his conclusions chiefly on records of the probate courts in Wisconsin and Massachusetts, assuming them to be representative of the country as a whole. These records showed the number of persons who had died leaving estates, and the value of these estates. He reached the conclusion that 2 per cent of the people own 60 per cent of the wealth and receive 20 per cent of the income; 33 per cent of the people own 34 per cent of the wealth and receive 40 per cent of the income; and 65 per cent of the people own 6 per cent of the wealth and receive 40 per cent of the income. These findings correspond very closely with those of several other accredited studies. Both King and Spahr make the assertion that one per cent of the people own approximately half of the wealth of the country.

In 1921 a study entitled *The Income in the United States* was published under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Three paragraphs may serve to summarize the findings. It should be remembered that \$2,000 in 1918 had about the same purchasing power as \$1,000 in 1910.


“In 1918, the year for which the best data are available, about 86 per cent of persons gainfully employed had incomes of less than \$2,000 per annum, and about 14 per cent had incomes exceeding that sum.”

"Data regarding the detailed distribution of personal incomes are scanty and difficult to systematize; but the best approximation this Bureau has been able to make indicates that in 1918, the most prosperous one per cent of the income-receivers had nearly 14 per cent of the total income, the most prosperous 5 per cent of the income-receivers had nearly 26 per cent of the total, the most prosperous 10 per cent of the income-receivers had nearly 35 per cent of the total, and the most prosperous 20 per cent of the income-receivers had about 47 per cent of the total income.

"It should be noted that when we start from the top of the income scale, we must go down to people receiving \$8,000 per annum in order to include one per cent of the income-receivers. Similarly, to include 5 per cent of the income-receivers, we have to descend to incomes of \$3,200-\$3,300. To include 10 per cent, we must take in part of the \$2,300-\$2,400 class; and to include 20 per cent we must include part of the \$1,700-\$1,800 class."

The accompanying chart presents these facts graphically, except that 3 1/3% of all income getters, and 22% of the total income, are not shown on the chart. The chart shows no incomes above \$4000. To show incomes larger than \$4000, including the 152 persons then having incomes upwards of one million dollars, the chart would have to be extended four hundred feet to the right. The page is too narrow.

Its faults are temporary and transitional. The imperfections of machinofacture capitalism can easily be exaggerated, however. It is true that the masses are poor; but they are not so poor as the medieval peasants nor the Roman plebs. It is true that wage-earners are cogs in a machine; but they are not slaves. It is true that capitalists are the successors of the princes so far as provoking war is concerned; but the princes provoked wars for similar motives in earlier centuries. The world is not growing worse; it is growing better.



But it is not growing better as fast as it might. It is not that the poor are poorer than they used to be, but that they are poorer than there is any need of their being in such a rich age. It is not that their injustices are worse than formerly, but that democracy has taught the masses to be resentful of all injustices. It is not that the working class is drudging harder than before, but that schools have suggested leisure for culture and research. Owing to the rise of democracy and the growth of Christian ideals, maladjustments are resented much more than they ever were before. The faults of machinofacture industry are intolerable just because machinofacture industry has made them at last unnecessary and inconsistent.

The trusteeship of wealth. If the faults of modern capitalism are to be remedied the rules of the industrial game must be modified. Our chief difficulty is that we are using old rules in a new game. Some of the rules handed down from the old agriculture-handicraft regime do not fit the new machinofacture regime at all. The traditional rights and privileges of private ownership constitute the most important example. In the olden days when there was no great amount of property (except in land) for anybody to own, and when too large a business was unwieldy, there was no great objection to unlimited private ownership of wealth. As applied to land, however, it always did work badly, since it made near-slaves out of the actual tillers of the soil—except in the United States, where there was abundant new land, and the new rule of virtually giving it to the family that would till it. But now that there is so much property to own, and in many lines of business no limit to the size of the firm that can be operated to advantage, there is danger that a few may accumulate too great wealth; or rather that the ownership of wealth be too much concentrated in the hands of a few. Ownership of great wealth means power to control the life-interests of the propertyless. Democracy will

not suffer, therefore, from such changes in the rules of the game as will make excessive wealth more difficult for the very few, and moderate prosperity easier for the laboring masses. In the next chapter certain measures will be mentioned that progressive nations are adopting in order to secure a better distribution of wealth.

Socialism: a dangerous remedy. This is perhaps as logical a place as any to say a few words about socialism, a subject that has attracted much attention, some of which has been more or less hysterical. Socialism is somewhat difficult to define, partly because the term has various shades of meaning; and partly because ignorant people insist upon abusing the term altogether. Strictly speaking, it means government ownership of all property that is used as a means of production; and implies the government management of all business. Socialism is offered as a cure-all for the ills of society.

But science has no use for cure-alls. The result of such an experiment, if we plunged into it suddenly and by wholesale, would undoubtedly be wholesale disorder, followed later by a reactionary system of organized compulsion. If there is any virtue in government ownership we should venture into it cautiously, and move forward step by step, only so fast as we can make it work. However, the mere word "socialistic" is no argument against such ventures. They should be argued on their intrinsic merits.

Socialism will never be headed off by arguments, however, but only by reforms. The faults of capitalism have a tendency to make its victims willing to venture almost anything for relief. Paradoxical as it may seem, those who believe themselves to be the most bitter enemies of socialism are the very people who are doing the most to cause its growth; namely those incorrigible capitalists who blindly refuse to permit any reforms whatsoever.

[The voice of labor in the control of industry. Under the

old régime the owner of a business had unquestioned right to "run his own business." True, certain obligations in the interest of the public were imposed by law; but the employed laborers were without voice. That was a just and useful rule in the olden days. Two forces protected it from abuse. First, competition of the owner with other small business men; and second, the owner's personal, neighborly relations with employees and consumers. But now that competition is so restricted in large fields of machinofacture industry and relations are almost wholly impersonal, the old rule works badly. It gives the owners of large-scale business too much advantage over both workers and consumers.

The remedy is to be found in changing the rules to fit the new game. Some device must be invented to give both workers and consumers a voice with owners in the management of large-scale industries. The right of the public to have a voice in the management of the railroads has long been recognized. The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887 to represent the interests of the public. It has authority to fix freight rates. The public, as consumers, should have a similar voice in all large-scale industries, such as coal, steel, packing, and others. So also should the laborers. There would seem to be quite as much reason why men should have a collective voice in managing the industry by which they live as in managing the government under which they live. The latter was opposed by the princes; the former is likely to be opposed by the capitalists. But it will doubtless come eventually; indeed, considerable beginnings have already been made, such as shop committees, collective bargaining with representatives of labor unions, profit-sharing, and so forth. Economists and progressive leaders of both labor and capital see in this principle of joint management the way out of the present difficulties. Such an arrangement would

tend to give laborers a somewhat larger share in the rich products of modern industry. It would also increase their motive for putting their minds and hearts into their work, so that their work itself would be a satisfaction to them. It would also, in all probability, go a long way toward reducing the wastefulness of industry, by increasing the production, and decreasing the profits, motive. To work out the details of such an arrangement in practice will require constructive planning and conservative experimenting for years to come.

The retort is sometimes heard: If an owner hires a man to spade his garden, would the owner expect to take orders from the man? Which shows that the speaker does not see the point. A garden is not like mining, manufacturing, or transportation; it is essentially different. Such a person is still thinking machinofacture problems in terms of agriculture-handicraft ideas.

The game is a new game. Perhaps it should be repeated, for the sake of emphasis, that the fundamental changes in the rules of the industrial game are needed just because the game itself is so fundamentally changed. We need to put obstacles in the way of the accumulation of too great wealth precisely because machinofacture industry has so vastly extended the possible limits of the wealth to be owned. The worker's voice in the management of large-scale industry is merely to restore the equivalent of what he has lost by the great change. In the old, small-shop industry even an apprentice might make suggestions; as journeyman he had a right to speak, and above all he expected confidently to become a master mechanic and have a shop of his own. But not so in modern railroading, mining, and manufacturing. Each worker is but a cog in the machine, he has no say about wages, hiring, and firing, nor conditions of work. It is the exception if he ever becomes anything more than a mere wage-earner. Likewise, the new doctrine and policy with

respect to wages is a result of the new industrial game. Formerly the problem was to *produce* enough. But the new machinofacture technique has made it possible to increase production almost without limits; so that the new problem is how to get enough *consumed* to keep the wheels of industry in motion. To this new problem increasing wages is the solution.

The industrial institution, a system of mental entities.

It seems desirable at this point to repeat the central proposition of sociology, namely, that social relations are mental interactions. An institution is a prevalent set of ideas, approvals, and habits; a customary way of thinking together, feeling together, and acting together. An institution has its existence, therefore, in men's minds. The social processes by which we make our living constitute the industrial institution. Like all other institutions it is made of mind-stuff. It consists, first, of a prevalent technique, and second, of the prevalent rules of the game. By technique we mean the knowledge of how to perform the industrial processes. By the rules of the industrial game we mean such prevalent beliefs as the belief, for example, that owners should manage their own property, and that wages should be determined by the competition of the market. Both the technique and the rules can exist, obviously, nowhere else but in men's minds. Nothing that exists in men's minds can remain changeless. Therefore all institutions are in process of flux; nothing ever is but always is becoming.

Accordingly the change in the industrial institution from age to age is also a change in men's minds. Men think new thoughts, and their new ideas take bodily form in new tools. The new technique of a new industrial stage is quite as real and important as the new implements. And along with the new technique goes a new set of positions for the players on the team, a new program of activities, a new set of relationships. Thus slavery was a customary plan. It was

invented, it was practiced, it was believed in; then it was criticized, attacked, and finally abandoned. The wage system is another game with the same old cards but an entirely different set of rules. Private property is a plan men have had in their thoughts and habits for many centuries; a few people have the idea that public property would be a better plan, but the new idea has not gotten into the habits of the people as yet, and perhaps never will. A corporation is a different plan than a partnership: in the former it is mutually agreed that each investor shares losses only to the amount of his investment; in the latter, to the whole amount of his private fortune. The corporation had to be thought out when business enterprises grew to such large proportions during the nineteenth century. The laws that govern industrial relations and the rights that different persons enjoy, are mutual agreements among all of us, beliefs and habits to which we all conform, and which we all join in compelling the unwilling to keep step with. And all these mental contents inevitably change. A thousand years ago the industrial institution was far different from what it is today. The technique was different; the rules of the game were different. The industrial institution of a thousand years hence will doubtless have changed almost beyond recognition. There will be a new technique and new rules of the game. Nothing industrial can ever stay put. We can never return to normalcy; we shall arrive at normalcy only by proceeding to it.

We must change our minds. It follows that in our industrial life the problem is to secure the prevalence of new ideas, ideas that will make industry perform its functions better. The rank and file of us need to have our minds changed about industry. The following are some ideas that are not now prevalent, but that ought to become so. First, that since the rules of the game are bound to change anyway, our best brains ought therefore to be devoted to devising the best

new rules possible. Second, that the prosperity of a society is to be gauged by the prosperity not of "business," but of the laboring classes at the bottom. The industries were made for man, not man for the industries. Third, that the object of business activity is not profits, but production. Profit-getting often actually interferes with production; profit-getters that produce nothing are mere parasites. Fourth, that there are undreamed-of possibilities of learning and achieving in the common men of toil. Our greatest undeveloped industrial resource is the technique the masses might acquire, and the coöperative plans they might conceive and execute.

PROBLEMS

1. Elaborate and illustrate in concrete detail the increased productivity of modern industry. Note, not the new tools and equipment for producing, but the new products (goods and services) for use.

2. Enumerate a long list of jobs of the kind that did not exist a century ago that interest and stimulate the intellect. Some that have the opposite effect.

3. How does membership in a labor union tend to stimulate the intellect? What subjects do union men need to be informed about? What do these men read?

4. Discuss the union man's loyalty to his group and to the cause, and point out the spiritual significance of such loyalty. The answers to these two questions should be sought through conversation with men of this type. It might be desirable to secure an address before the class by an intelligent labor-union man.

5. What would probably be George Washington's attitude toward "entangling alliances" if he were alive today? Why?

6. Why were we drawn into the World War?

7. By what means and devices is the public represented in the control of industry?

8. By what means and devices does labor exercise a voice in the control of industry?

9. Enumerate industries that are still on the old small-shop, hand-tool basis, so that control by investors only is still satisfactory in them.

10. Collect a classified bibliography on the subject of waste.

11. Let some member of the class review Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, especially the chapter on fashions.
12. Show how the oil resources of Mexico have tempted the United States to find an excuse for interference with that country.
13. Show how economic motives helped to cause the World War.
14. Review the causes of the Punic Wars.
15. Delegate some member of the class to write an essay on the history of the income tax.
16. Another on the incidence of the same.
17. Debate government ownership of railroads. Of coal mines. Of other utilities and industries.
18. Look up what John D. Rockefeller, Jr., has written on the subject of labor representation in industrial management.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book IV, Chapters VIII, IX.

On the reconstruction of the modern economic order.

ELLWOOD, C. A., *The Social Problem*, Chapter IV.

The social faults of our economic system, and how they can be remedied. Ellwood is an ardent opponent of socialism.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapters VII-XII.

A discussion of the maldistribution of wealth, including causes and remedies. Economics theory from the sociological standpoint.

MITCHELL, W. C., and Others, *The Income in the United States*. Harcourt, Brace & Company.

A statistical summary of the facts relative to the distribution of wealth. Published in 1921 by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON UNEMPLOYMENT, *Recent Economic Changes* (1929). McGraw-Hill Book Co.

A two-volume work. Offers the most recent objective information about the productivity of industry and the distribution of wealth.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter XXXVIII.

Shows the damage that comes from commercializing various human relations.

CHAPTER X

POVERTY

In the last chapter the subject of poverty was introduced, in connection with the maldistribution of wealth; but it is a subject of sufficient social importance to merit further discussion. A chapter will therefore be devoted to it.

Poverty is the great unsolved problem of civilization. Despite the fact that machinery, technology, and applied science now render industry incomparably more productive per worker than ever before, despite the enormous new natural resources that are now at man's disposal, despite the phenomenal increase of prosperity and per capita wealth that have resulted—despite all these an enormous amount of poverty still remains, like an incurable malady on the face of civilization. It seems anomalous.

It is often carelessly remarked that the rich are growing richer and the poor are growing poorer. This is not true. It is true that the rich are growing richer; but it is not true that the poor are growing poorer. As a matter of fact, the laboring classes have never, anywhere, been so well provided for as in America during the decade just closing (1921-30). But, even so, they have been far less well provided for than the American prosperity of that decade would lead us to expect. The laboring classes are sharing *less than proportionately* in the new prosperity of the new age. In spite of that prosperity, millions are in relative destitution and misery. Indeed, in those very industrial centers where industry appears to be most productive, there the evidences of poverty are often most apparent. Thus poverty remains a puzzling contradiction in the structure of our modern industrial system. There is no subject, therefore, on which public opinion is in deeper need of more en-

lightment, if the puzzle is ever to be solved. Let us, then, consider some of the facts involved in the problem.

The Amount of Poverty. Robert Hunter, in *Poverty*, (1905), announced the conclusion that 10,000,000 persons in the United States were in poverty. For nine industrial states he placed the estimate at twenty per cent. He defined poverty as inability "to obtain those necessities which will permit persons to maintain a state of physical efficiency." They may get a bare subsistence; only the most miserable of them are starving or dependent upon charity, but they are on the verge of distress. His estimate of 10,000,000 he regarded as conservative; and his conclusions have never been refuted. They are generally accepted by sociologists.

Streightoff¹ reached the conclusion after elaborate statistical studies based upon the actual budgets of families "that the standard of living must be low until the income reaches \$700;" but that "the number of adult males who receives less than \$600 a year for their labor is 5,000,000." This would represent a population of approximately 20,000,000. He adds that the United States Bureau of Labor had placed (1905) the resources of 41.52 per cent of normal families below \$600, and of 21 per cent below \$500. Hunter's estimates are similar. (These incomes must be interpreted in terms of the index numbers on page 176.)

In 1923 Professor J. L. Gillen, of the University of Wisconsin, summarized the foregoing and all other available data, thus bringing our knowledge down to that date. He reached the conclusion that from twenty to forty per cent of the American people are in poverty, and that from five to eight per cent are actual recipients of charity.

The period since the World War, especially from 1922-1929, has been a period of very unusual prosperity for the United States. Never has industry been so productive per capita. And yet a surprising amount of poverty has per-

¹ *The Standard of Living*, pp. 27, 65, 67, 68.

sisted throughout the period. In a typical Middle-Western industrial city a cross section study of family incomes was made¹ in 1924. Twenty-five per cent of the families were found to have total family earnings of \$1200 or less, at a time when \$1900 was estimated to be the "minimum of comfort" budget for a family of five. Fifty-two per cent of all the families investigated actually had five or more members each; and three out of every four of such families actually had total earnings below \$1900.

In a single year recently, 100,000 families applied for relief in twenty-eight cities having a total population of 22,000,000.² Assuming, first, five persons to a family, and, second, the same ratio for the rest of the population of the country, these figures would suggest that almost one-fifth of the population applied for relief of one kind or another. Community fund organizations in 330 principal cities in the United States raised a total of almost \$72,000,000 during the fiscal year 1928-29.³ A typical city of half a million raised over two dollars per capita annually during the three year period, 1927, 1928, and 1929. From such figures two facts appear: first, that the amount of charity is not definitely known, but, second, that the total is surprising. Unquestionably "we" are a prosperous nation; but, obviously, we are not *all* prosperous.

The amount of unemployment. It is not generally recognized that there is normally an oversupply of labor; but such nevertheless is the fact. The Bureau of Labor made an exhaustive investigation in New York State over a period of seven years, from 1902 to 1908 inclusive, and found that among organized workers the average unemployment was about 16 per cent. It must have been more among the unorganized unskilled workers. Hunter made the assertion "that over 2,000,000 male wage-earners in the United States

¹ See *Middletown*, Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, p. 85.

² J. M. Rubinow, in *The Social Service Review*, Sept., 1929, p. 368.

³ News item, *Minneapolis Journal*, Oct. 10, 1929.

were unemployed from four to six months during the year 1900," and that "about 30 per cent of the workers in the industrial states are employed only a part of each year."

The surplusage of labor has recently been given authoritative restatement by the Commission on Waste in Industry of the Federated Society of American Engineers. According to their report not even the war demand took up absolutely all the unemployment. During the years 1917-1918, we withdrew approximately 3,000,000 workers from industry and put them into military service. Besides that, we did all the war work involved in building ships, making munitions, and so forth. And yet, according to unquestioned authorities, we carried on all the ordinary industries as usual. Some of this extra wartime supply of labor was made up of women, old men, and school boys, but by no means all of it. We merely took up the slack, so that nearly all our available labor supply was busy for once. The enormous amount of extra work we were able to accomplish shows the enormous amount of labor that ordinarily is unemployed. In normal times much of the natural labor supply is idle; hence a Ricardian wage scale, and poverty.

During the period of depression immediately following the war, unemployment has been variously estimated at from three to five millions. In 1922 the Secretary of Labor published the following statement: "But we have made the startling discovery that normal in America means that approximately a million and a half workmen are detached from any pay roll." The period of seven years just prior to this writing (1929) is recognized as one of phenomenal prosperity; and yet, "throughout the whole period it is *surprising* to find a persistent and large volume of unemployment, even in the very active years, 1920, 1923, and 1926."¹

¹ *Recent Economic Changes*, by the Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment (1929). McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York.

ESTIMATED VOLUME OF UNEMPLOYMENT¹

1920	1,401,000,000	1924	2,315,000,000
1921	4,270,000,000	1925	1,775,000,000
1922	3,441,000,000	1926	1,669,000,000
1923	1,502,000,000	1927	2,055,000,000

The effects of poverty. Not only is poverty the direct cause of incalculable suffering and grief, but it is the *jinx* at the center of almost every social problem in modern life. Not that it is the sole cause, but it is always an important factor. If the family is in disintegration, it is most often due to the poverty that takes mothers to work away from home, forces young people into unsuitable jobs before they are old enough, and renders adequate housing impossible. Family life is still usually wholesome among middle class families with fairly good incomes. If community life is failing in industrial places like Middletown, and in urban sections like the Near North Side in Chicago,² it is primarily because the people are poor. Professor M. C. Elmer made a spot map of St. Paul, after a careful survey, showing that juvenile crime is greatest in those wards where the people are poorest, but negligible in those wards where the people are prosperous enough to maintain good homes and good neighborhood recreations for the young. Similar spot maps have often been made for various cities, connecting death rates, especially infant mortality rates, with poverty. The poverty spots in our great cities are the spots where gang politics are most disgraceful. Poverty is one of the chief reasons for young people dropping out of school before they should. And so on. If the problem of modern poverty could be solved, the battle for a better world would be more than half won!

Causes of poverty: personal. The faults, defects, and

¹ *Recent Economic Changes*, by the Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment (1929). McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York.

² *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, by Harvey W. Zorbaugh.

weaknesses of individuals are often conspicuous factors in poverty. Sickness, deformity, stupidity, ignorance, lack of vocational training, lack of ambition, too large families, quarrelsomeness, laziness, intemperance, the vices, wastefulness, and so forth, are often causes of poverty. Indeed, persons with these faults and handicaps are very likely to be poor, unless bolstered up by well-to-do friends and relatives. But on the other hand, these handicaps are sometimes the *results* of poverty. Thus poverty becomes a vicious circle.

The popular belief is that the faults and weaknesses of individuals are the sole and only causes of poverty; the social causes to be discussed shortly usually being ignored entirely. Indeed, in the popular beliefs, it often boils down to this: differences in income are due to difference in intelligence.

In refutation of this myth it is hardly necessary to point out that some are born rich, whereas others are born poor. As a matter of fact the percentage of the rich in America who are born so is increasing.¹ Furthermore, the most superficial observation of life shows that only a few kinds of ability are richly rewarded in wealth. Among these, business ability is the most conspicuous. Technical invention, artistic creation, scholarly research, leadership in reform or statesmanship, are samples of the kinds of ability that often go meagerly rewarded. As for the supposed correlation between ownership and intelligence it is interesting to consider the facts. Psychologists assert that the distribution of intelligence is represented by a normal, bell-shaped curve. The distribution of wealth is graphically presented on page 147. If the reader will draw on the base line of that chart a normal bell-shaped curve of the same elevation, he will be quite startled by the difference between the two curves.

¹ Sorokin, P. *American Millionaires and Multimillionaires*, "Social Forces," May, 1925.

Percentages and personnel. What the personal-causes theory fails quite utterly to explain is the *percentages* of wealth and poverty. Why is the *percentage* of propertyless so high, including as it does some of the more intelligent half of the population? What, if anything, would change the *percentage* of propertyless from say sixty to thirty? The personal-causes theory helps to explain the *personnel* of poverty. If sixty per cent of the people are to be propertyless, the sick, the stupid, and the vicious are pretty sure to sift into that class. They would if the percentage were only thirty. But sickness, stupidity, and vice do not explain why the *percentage* is sixty instead of thirty.

Social causes. The *percentages* of poverty are due to the rules of the industrial game; just as the *percentage* of persons engaged in locomotive engineering, teaching, telephone construction, or what not, is determined by the techniques of industry. The recent introduction of great machines into iron mining has decreased the percentage of persons engaged in that work. Sickness, stupidity, and vice have little or nothing to do with the *percentage* of persons engaged in the low-waged vocations; that is determined by technique and organization of industry: So also is the percentage of the total national income allotted respectively to wages and to profits. We have next, therefore, to consider the *organization* of industry as a source of poverty.

Ricardo's "Iron Law of Wages."¹ Why is it that "laboring man" normally means "poor man"? We hear much exaggerated talk about laboring men going to their work in automobiles; and we have a feeling that there is something

¹ Violent objection is sometimes urged against this appeal to Ricardo. It is insisted that Lassalle, who invented the term "Iron Law of Wages," misinterpreted Ricardo. It is also pointed out that Ricardo himself can be quoted against this "law." That is because he himself did not harmonize his two concepts "necessary profits" and "the natural price of labor." Ricardo's wage theory is in ill repute chiefly, however, because it is based on the Malthusian theories of population, which have also been held in conventional contempt by the various political economists. But the present writer holds with Professor Ross and others, that Malthus is "at par again." There is far more validity in Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages than was dreamed of in the plausible palliatives of nineteenth century political economy.

wrong if he does—that he is really not expected to afford it. As a matter of fact such is seldom true of *unskilled* laborers. As we have seen, their wages are seldom enough to support a family of five. Why is this?

The answer is to be found in the excessive competition among laborers in an overcrowded labor market. Because of this competition the normal tendency is for wages to gravitate to the bare means of subsistence. This principle has been known for a century as Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages. Laborers must sell today's labor today or it is lost. Moreover, if it is not sold the laborer's family goes hungry. A low wage is better than no wage; and if a high is asked some other laborer will underbid. A wage that will buy the bare necessities of life is the minimum limit, and the many who must have work, even at such a wage, set the wage scale for all the rest in their class. And such is the usual condition among unskilled laborers. It follows from the Ricardian law that unskilled labor's share in industry is "a bare subsistence wage." This is one reason why there is so much poverty in this rich land of ours. It is simply the unregulated working out of economic law. The game has no rules to prevent or mitigate it.

The term "a bare subsistence wage" requires a little qualification. The "bare means of subsistence" are different in different countries, due to the habits and customs of the laboring people. They are lower in China than in England, and higher in America than anywhere else in the world. What wages really tend to be depressed to, according to Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages, is the standard of subsistence to which the laboring class in any country are habituated. In other words, the accustomed standard of living is the bedrock to which wages always tend to fall, and to which the industrial system of a country has to adjust itself. We shall return to this also in the next chapter.

The why of unemployment. It is generally believed that

unemployment is due to unemployability. This is a very misleading half truth. While there are always some unemployables, the fundamental cause of unemployment lies more in the nature of the game than in the defects of human nature. It is far nearer the truth to say that unemployment causes unemployability; as nothing demoralizes a man like being out of a job.

There are various causes of unemployment. One is the seasonal nature of some occupations. Wheat harvesting is a good example. What are the harvesters to do when the harvest is finished? Another is the shift of enterprise from place to place. Where did the workers on the Panama Canal find jobs when the canal was completed? Another cause is the introduction of machinery. It is a well-known episode in history that the introduction of power-driven machinery into the English textile industry a century and a quarter ago caused great distress by throwing the hand weavers out of work. Something similar has happened on the Iron Range of northern Minnesota within the last five years. Another cause of unemployment is the so-called business cycle; that is, the historic tendency for business depressions to occur at more or less regular intervals, with periods of increasing and then decreasing prosperity between them. When the depression occurs employers have to retrench or even close down, thus throwing workers out of employment. Such causes as these account for what might be called the differential of unemployment; that is, they explain why there is sometimes more unemployment and sometimes less. But they do not explain why unemployment is never zero. Why there is always an army of unemployed, never less than a million, the student will *not* find explained in any of the standard textbooks in economics.

Can the extremes be mitigated? If the "Iron Law of Wages" and the reserve army of unemployed are the chief causes of poverty, to what extent, and in what ways, can

these causes be removed? Apparently unemployment cannot be wholly abolished. But it might be reduced, perhaps, by a system of government employment agencies that would distribute the mobile labor supply, on the basis of scientifically gathered information, to the places where it happened to be most needed. In the last analysis, the poverty due to unemployment must, of course, be provided for by some sort of charity. This, as we all know, is being done.

As an intermediate between these two measures it would seem advisable that arrangements be made, if practicable, for jobless persons to be drafted for government work at half price. This would leave them as anxious as before to find real jobs, and it would be a saving to the taxpayer in the meantime. A fourth measure for the relief of unemployment is a higher wage scale, enabling laborers to save something for a rainy day. The feasibility of this will be discussed immediately. These four measures would not be very drastic changes in the rules of the game; and they should result in a considerable reduction of unemployment and the resulting poverty.

The new doctrine of wages. But after all, the fundamental cause of poverty is low wages. As we have seen, the wages of an unskilled laboring man are normally less than enough to support an average-size family. And hitherto the necessity of such wages has been taken as a matter of course. But lately a new doctrine of wages has made its appearance among business men; and this new doctrine promises at least a partial solution of the problem of poverty.

Nearly twenty years ago a leading American economist declared that the increasing purchasing power of the laboring classes is the taproot of modern prosperity. In other words, the way to make industry prosperous is to make labor prosperous by paying higher wages; since the increased purchasing power of the laboring class creates a growing market, which in turn stimulates the growth of

industry. The greatest undeveloped market for American goods is the American laboring class.

American industrial experience since the war has furnished startling demonstration of this principle. Formerly it was assumed that if wages rose the costs of production would rise as a result, so that prices of goods would have to rise too. But during the seven year period, 1922-1929, something quite unexpected happened. Wages rose; but this addition to the cost of production was offset by improvements in machinery, technique, and mass production, which lowered the cost of production enough so that prices of goods did not rise. For wages to rise while prices stand still means increased purchasing power for laborers. It

THE TREND OF UNSKILLED WAGES

Year	Wages Per hour ¹	Hours Per week ²	Wages Per week ³	"Real" Wages ⁴
1914	20c	55.6	\$11.12	100%
1915	20			
1916	23			
1917	27			
1918	35			
1919	43	51.2	22.01	103
1920	51	50.0	25.50	118
1921	47	49.7	23.36	124
1922	37	50.0	18.50	101
1923	46	50.0	23.00	123
1924	48	49.8	23.90	126
1925	47	49.9	23.45	122
1926	49	49.8	24.40	129
1927	49	49.6	24.30	130

¹ See *Recent Economic Changes*, vol. II, p. 437.

² Computed.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 444.

⁴ Computed from index numbers, p. 176.

will be observed from the accompanying table that during recent years there has been a twenty to thirty per cent rise in the "real wages" of unskilled laborers; that is, in the amount of actual goods the laborer can purchase with what wages he is able to earn.

As a result, "belief in the economy of high wages has become prevalent among the abler business executives, much as belief in increasing productivity has become prevalent among the abler trade union leaders. To find a market for the wares turned out by mass production and urged on consumers by national advertising, it is potently necessary to have corresponding purchasing power in the hands of consumers. Since studies of the national income have demonstrated that wages constitute by far the largest stream of personal income, it follows that wages per man—or rather, wages per family—must be increased as production is expanded. Perhaps most people would have accepted this argument in the abstract at any time in the last hundred years. But many employers in the past would have retorted with the assertion that high wages undermine the moral stamina of the masses. Today such talk is far less common in the United States. Not only do many business executives admit the general principle that paying high wages is good policy; they are ready to assume what they consider their share of the responsibility for putting the principle into practice."¹

"Moreover, it seems sound to ascribe a part of the gains in technical efficiency, which have been so characteristic of recent years, to the high price of labor. An employee to whom one pays high wages may represent a low labor cost. But if he is to be so efficient as to be cheap he must be provided with good equipment and aided by good management. More horse power and better management per man are needed to secure more production per man; and

¹ *Recent Economic Changes*, p. 866.

more production must be had per man when more wages are paid per man."¹

It seems that just after the war manufacturers expected a fall in the prices they could get for their goods. That is what usually happens after a war. So they tried to lower wages. But various causes prevented their doing that. Nevertheless the prices for goods were lowered, due principally to improved methods of production. With prices lowered more than wages, *wage earners could buy more goods*. In other words, the market for goods was increased by relatively high wages. Thus it was discovered that a high wage scale is a benefit to employers as well as to employees. As a consequence *employers* began to preach the new doctrine of high wages.

This new doctrine of wages would seem to be one of the most hopeful signs of the times. For one thing, it takes the wind out of the sails of the radicals! If employers believe that it is to the interests of all concerned, *including themselves*, to pay as high wages as practicable, they will co-operate in trying to do so; instead of coöperating, as in the past, to keep wages down. And such coöperation is now vastly easier than it would ever have been before, because business is now organized on so large a scale. If a dozen of the greatest employing corporations of the country can get together on such a policy as this, they can doubtless bring it to pass. And with the magic word "gradually," it would seem that the possibilities of human betterment along this line were almost limitless.

The trusteeship of wealth. However, these measures are but one side of the problem. They are designed to add somewhat to the prosperity of the least prosperous. But there is also the problem of putting suitable restrictions on the excessive accumulation of wealth by the very few. The ownership of wealth has always been regarded as a trustee-

¹ *Recent Economic Changes*, p. 886.

ship; that is, the rules of ownership should always aim toward the general good of all. The rights of ownership, and the hope of acquisition, are intended to motivate business actively, and so promote the general good. But enough is enough, and beyond that more is a doubtful motivation. Hence, with the modern growth of enormous fortunes there has grown up of recent decades both the theory and practice of putting new obligations upon the largest fortunes. These are hopeful trends. However, they must be considered with restrained imagination. They will not make millionaires of everybody, as some permit themselves to imagine; but, at most, add only a few dollars annually to the smaller incomes.

Hopeful trends. One of these hopeful trends is in the modern tax system. The tax system may be a potent factor either for the concentration, or for the diffusion, of wealth. Inheritance taxes are coming into general use; they tend to restrict the passing on of unwieldy fortunes from one generation to the next. Also income and profits taxes are gradually supplementing visible property taxes. Nowadays the value of property depends upon what it will earn; hence, book profits, rather than visible property, are the juster basis of modern taxation. Besides, income and profits taxes tend to put the tax burden on those most able to carry it. The public should learn, however, that income taxes are *not* shifted to the ultimate consumer, as popularly supposed. In the third place, the tariff is falling under suspicion as increasing the cost of living for all, including the poor; and that for the special benefit of a limited class, namely the profit makers.

A second trend of modern times that is similarly hopeful, is the regulation of monopolies and near monopolies. The regulation of railroad rates through the Interstate Commerce Commission is a good example, having been in satisfactory use for half a century. Public service utilities, such

as gas, electricity, and street car companies, are similarly regulated in all cities. Some experiments have even been tried in public ownership. The usual practice is, however, for such utilities to be regulated, instead, by the city and state governments, lest they overcharge the people. Such regulation is especially important in the case of corporations that exploit natural resources, such as coal, iron, and water power.

So much for new measures designed to emphasize the trusteeship of wealth and impose restrictions upon its inordinate concentration in the hands of a few. They are hopeful for several reasons. They show that the ideal of trusteeship is keenly felt by all classes; they are working with a fair degree of acceptability in the most progressive nations; and, best of all, they show that the public is not afraid to experiment, albeit cautiously, toward the solution of the problem.

Education. A final remedy for the imperfections of the machinofacture system is an indirect one, namely, the education of the masses. We need a system of industrial education that will equip every youth to do some industrial task skillfully and intelligently, and that will provide trained workers for each and every industrial task. Modern machinofacture industry needs an increasing body of technically educated men, partly because there are so many fields in which science is applied, and partly because so many kinds of work, formerly unskilled, are becoming technical.

But industrial education is not all that is needed. General enlightenment must be made universal. An ignorant populace may have been able to manage a simple agriculture-handicraft régime, but it will never be able to manage the machinofacture régime successfully. The new industry depends too much upon natural science. It also involves too complicated a system of coöperative organization, depending upon the social science for its operation and general informa-

tion. It is safe to predict that an uneducated public will never solve the puzzling problem of how to pass prosperity around.

PROBLEMS

1. Try to find descriptions in your history books of the conditions of the poor in past centuries.
2. Enumerate various things (e.g. education) that are now being done for the poor by the taxpayer.
3. Let some member of the class study *The Gold Coast and the Slum* with a view to observing whether poverty is a causal factor.
4. See if you can find spot maps of the kind mentioned in the chapter.
5. Draw the two distribution curves on the blackboard, and discuss their significance.
6. If you have access to the files of *Social Forces*, read, and discuss in class, the present author's article in the September, 1926, issue.
7. What would happen to wages, profits, and unemployment if everybody had a job?
8. What might change the percentage of the people engaged in plumbing, typesetting, teaching, street-car conducting, blacksmithing, preaching, etc.?
9. What determines the personnel of those (and other) vocations?
10. If there are employment agencies in your vicinity, study their workings.
11. Compare the "bare subsistence wage" in China, Germany, and America. What determines the difference? (Cf. Ch. XI).
12. Study the organized machinery of charity in your own township, village, or city.
13. When Jesus said "The poor ye always have with you," do you think he meant to teach that poverty ought to be reverently accepted as a necessary and beneficent part of the order of things?
14. Enumerate (on the blackboard) as long a list as you can of public measures by which the poverty of the poor might be reduced.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book IV, Chapter V.

A good essay by Professor Jerome Davis.

GILLIN, JOHN L., *Poverty and Dependence* (1921). The Century Company.

An outstanding work on this subject.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapters IX, X, XI, and XII.

LYND, R. S., AND H. M., *Middletown*.

See note in Chapter IX, above.

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CHAPTER XI

THE STANDARD OF LIVING

Definition. The standard of living may be defined as the list of goods and services that a person, family, or class has formed the habit of regarding as necessary, and which they will make sacrifice and practice foresight to maintain. The standard of living of the average laboring man's family is much lower than that of the professional man. Laboring men's families satisfy themselves with rather cheaper housing, inferior clothing, fewer luxurious foods, and less education for their children. Professional people, on the other hand, demand better housing, better clothing, and more luxuries in the way of travel, automobiles, entertainments, etc., as well as extended education for their children.

The element of habit enters very largely into the standard of living. The wants involved become so thoroughly habituated that effort will be made, sacrifice endured, and foresight practiced in order to gratify the wants that habit demands. This effort, sacrifice, and foresight constitute a tremendous motive power in human life, comparable to the lifting power of an incoming tide. Almost this entire chapter will be devoted to describing what this motive force will do. The motive power of the living standard must be constantly borne in mind, as the reader proceeds with the chapter.


Geographic factors. Geographic factors have an obvious influence upon the standard of living. In a tropical climate such as central Africa, for example, little or no clothing is needed, very simple shelter serves the purpose, food consists mostly of the wild products of the jungle, and there is nothing demanded in the way of luxuries. In a frigid climate the standard of living would, of course, have to be very different.

Technic factors. Technic factors affect the standards of living. People living on the agriculture-handicraft level will have an altogether different set of wants than those living on the hunting-fishing level. The inventions of the last century, especially such as are included under the term "modern conveniences," have given us a very different standard of living today from that of our ancestors a century ago. Even the laboring classes now enjoy the use of mechanical conveniences such as running water, electric lights, furnace heat, telephones, etc., that would have been undreamed-of luxuries to the rich in the days of our great-grandparents.

Social factors. Social factors affect the standard of living perhaps even more than do the technic. The standards of different nations differ as a result of the different civilizations in the midst of which they live. The standards differ for different social classes in each society; public opinion sanctions these different standards. It is apt to be regarded as an absurdity for unskilled laborers to expect to enjoy much higher standards than they do enjoy; whereas a rich man would be regarded as quite eccentric if he maintained a poor man's standard. And these prevailing notions as to what the standards ought properly to be are an important influence in keeping them as they are. The poor are poor partly because the rest of us think they must and ought to be.

The effect of education. Not only does the standard of living conform to the civilization and to the social ideals of the group in which one's lot is cast, but it may be deliberately modified through education. It is altogether possible for the public schools to provide such education for the children of the poor as will teach them what the requirements of a decent, wholesome life really are, and will make them unwilling to tolerate the squalor and privations to which their parents before them may have submitted. Instruction in home economics, for example, if properly con-

ducted should have precisely this effect on the daughters of the poor, and especially of our recent immigrants. Various other parts of the school program have a similar effect. As a matter of fact, teachers testify that the schools actually do exercise precisely such an influence. It is not unusual to find young women, especially among the immigrant groups, who do their housekeeping on an entirely different plan than their own mothers do, the change being directly traceable to the influence of the public schools which the young women have recently attended. It seems probable also that the unwholesome, artificial, luxury-consuming standards of certain classes of American society might be modified and reduced to a more wholesome level by instruction on the part of the school and the church.



GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF THE COST OF LIVING

The index numbers. Various studies have been made from time to time of the standard of living of the poor with a view of ascertaining, first, what the minimum income is upon which a laboring man's family can subsist, and second, what proportion of the family's expenditures go for the various necessities: food, clothing, housing, incidentals, etc.

It was estimated in 1919 that \$1,575 was the very least that a laboring man's family of five could subsist upon. In a period of fluctuating prices such as we have passed through during the last ten or fifteen years, it is necessary, if one is to think clearly about a minimum essential wage, to bear in mind the fluctuation in prices.

THE INDEX NUMBERS¹

1913 100	1918 174	1923 173	1928 171
1914 103	1919 191	1924 172	1929 170
1915 105	1920 200	1925 177	1930 ...
1916 118	1921 175	1926 175	1931 ...
1917 142	1922 169	1927 172	1932 ...

There is inserted herewith a table of index numbers from 1913 to 1929, together with a chart (on page 175) presenting the same facts graphically. These index numbers mean that a bill of staple necessities that cost \$100 in 1913, would have cost \$200 in 1920, and \$170 in 1929. In 1903 the minimum necessities for a family of five was estimated at \$700; but the index number for that year was 84. It is an interesting exercise to compare the "real wages" of labor in different years, on the basis of these index numbers. The results of such a computation are presented in the last column of the chart on page 175. It should be noted that what the index numbers really indicate is the purchasing power of the dollar from year to year.

Standard of living as a social cause. The standard of living is not only a result of various social causes, it is itself a cause, and a very important cause indeed in the social life of modern peoples. This is a principle that has received very much less emphasis in sociological literature than it deserves.

¹From Bulletin, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 439, p. 112, and the *Monthly Labor Review*, August, 1929, p. 290. The table can be brought up to date by reference to the *Labor Review*.

The causal relation between standards and wages. The standard of living tends to determine the income, or at least to set the limits below which wages cannot readily be depressed. This principle has already been referred to as "Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages," which may be restated as follows: whatever the standard of living of the laboring classes may be, down to that standard their wages will tend to gravitate. Because of its fundamental importance the reasons for this law may be repeated. In the first place, there is normally an oversupply of labor on the labor market—a fact not generally recognized. This fact may be inferred from the Malthusian doctrine of population, which will presently be stated. It is also attested by the statistical findings set forth in Chapter IX. As a result of this oversupply, competition among unskilled laborers in an oversupplied labor market naturally tends to force wages down to the level of the lowest bidder. Statistical research as to the wage level among laboring people also bears out this inference. Numerous investigations are on record between 1900 and 1930. They never fail to reveal the fact that the wage scale for unskilled labor always falls a little below the lowest figure necessary for the maintenance of a family of five.

Ricardo himself suggested that the way to raise the wages of the laborers is to raise their standard of living. He remarked that in those countries where laborers are contented with the poorest housing and the cheapest food, there their miseries are the greatest; but in countries where their demands are higher their lot is better. All friends of humanity, he added, will therefore wish to see the laboring class become accustomed to the comforts and enjoyments of life, and to make all legitimate efforts to secure the same. This was his manner of saying that one way to raise wages is to drive a wedge under the standard of living of the poor. This would seem like putting the cart before the horse, but the

principle is valid, nevertheless, as Ricardo pointed out. And public opinion must rise to this insight if labor is ever to be given a "square deal" in modern machinofacture industry. The new doctrine of wages, as set forth in the last chapter, would indicate that employers, at least, are actually rising to this insight. Wages have been raised precisely in order to increase the purchasing power (i.e., raise the living standards) of the laboring classes. Of course it cannot fail to be realized that the improved living standards will in turn tend to resist any subsequent lowering of the wage scale.

Education is an important means by which the standards of the rising generation can be raised above the actual standards of the older generation. And if education designed to that end is accompanied by vocational education, so that the productive capacity of prospective workers is at the same time increased, this increased productiveness will eventually render it possible for employers to* pay larger wages. To be sure education is not the only means of improving the status of the poor. We need also such reforms as were suggested in the last chapter. But education of a sensible sort is a more important means of correcting the evils of the new industrial régime than is usually realized even by some social scientists.

Rising standards as a means of escape from human miseries. Among the worst miseries of mankind are poverty, famine, pestilence, and war. The final escape of humanity from these horrors will only be achieved by deliberately raising the standards of living of the masses. In order to make this clear, it will be necessary to review at this point the theories of Malthus, an English economist, who wrote near the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The population theories of Malthus. Malthus taught in his earlier writings that population always tends to increase more rapidly than the food supply. He gave two reasons for this. The first is the imperiousness of the reproductive

impulse, which causes the population to increase, as he said, in geometrical ratio. This is a universal law of nature. All species reproduce in far greater numbers than can possibly survive. It was Malthus' statement of this principle which later suggested to Darwin his idea of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest.

The second reason for the Malthusian law is what is known to economists as a law of diminishing returns. This law may be stated as follows: additional increments of labor applied to a given area of land produce less than proportionate returns. For example, if you double the work on your garden or field, you may possibly double your crop, but it is hardly likely. If you quadruple the work, you will increase the crop but you will not quadruple it. If you put ten times as much work on the field, you will by no means get ten times as large a crop. In other words, the food supply tends, as Malthus pointed out, to increase less rapidly than the labor supply.

Since population (i.e. the labor supply) tends to increase in a geometric ratio, whereas the food supply tends to increase less rapidly, it follows, as Malthus pointed out, that the population normally tends to overreach the food supply. Hence result what he called the "positive checks" on the growth of population, namely: famine, pestilence, and war. In his earlier writings, Malthus left the impression that this tendency is inevitable, and that there can therefore never be any escape for humanity from these "Malthusian bugbears." He modified this conclusion in his later writings, but his later conclusions attracted only slight attention at the time, and we shall postpone reference to them for a moment.

As a result of Malthus' pessimistic theories, political economy was dubbed the "dismal science," and was so regarded during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. Poverty, famine, pestilence, and war were re-

garded as inevitable. If wages were raised and food supply increased, the only result in the long run would be to increase the population, whereupon the poor would compete with one another in the labor market until their wages were depressed again to the starvation level, and the nations would begin again their struggle with one another for a "place in the sun." So ran the theory.

The nineteenth century fallaciously undervalued Malthus. During the last forty years political economists have been disposed to make light of the "Malthusian bugbears"; for reasons that are not well grounded, however, as we shall presently see. The means of escape to which these economists pinned their faith was increased production. With the vast new areas of land being brought under cultivation during the nineteenth century, and with the new scientific technique of agriculture and manufacture, it did seem as if there was no limit to the possibility of increasing food production. But this optimism was shortsighted. The men who indulged in this sort of thinking lived their lives in a short and exceptional period when the food supply was temporarily in excess of the population; due to the enormous new areas of land available for food production. But if they had studied the statistics of population growth in their own times, and taken the trouble to project their imaginations a century or two into the future, they might have foreseen that the world's population was destined eventually to catch up with the world's food supply again, in spite of the increased productivity of modern industry.

There are really two fallacies in the shortsighted optimism of these nineteenth century economists. One is in overlooking the law of diminishing returns. However greatly new land areas and new scientific methods may have promised to increase food production, the fact remains that the law of diminishing returns holds good. By reliance solely upon increasing the production of food, the Malthusian ratio

between food production and population growth can never be abolished, except temporarily. The unrestrained fecundity of the human species is always capable of overtaking the productivity of agriculture—a fact of the most fundamental importance that ought never to be overlooked.

The second fallacy involved was the assumption that if production is increased, the distribution of the additional product will take care of itself. This is the familiar assumption that if *we* are prosperous, *we all* are prosperous. The facts are otherwise! The increased wealth of modern civilization is gradually concentrating into fewer and fewer hands. The percentage of the people who are propertyless is constantly though slowly increasing, and the percentage of those who suffer real poverty is amazingly large. Robert Hunter, as stated elsewhere in this book, declared in 1910 that there were at least ten million people in the United States on the verge of distress. Robert Hunter's estimates have been often ridiculed, but nevertheless they have never been disproved; and there is no reason to believe that conditions have improved to any great extent since that date.

The standard of living determines the birth rate. Groundless as is the hope through increasing production alone to escape the horrors of poverty, famine, disease, and war, the modern world is not without a factual basis of hope. The tendency of the last fifty years suggests that the population may not continue to press upon the food supply so ruthlessly as Malthus predicted in his early writings; but the reason is not the one so naïvely relied upon by some economists, except in part. The reason is chiefly another, namely, the rising standards of living of the masses.

During the last fifty years the birth rate in civilized nations has declined very markedly. Ross states that the "proportion of children under five years of women of child-bearing age shrank 35 per cent between 1860 and 1910. In comparison with 1800, the proportion of children seems to

be about one-half." The birth rate at present in the United States is 22. It was at least twice as high as that a century ago. There has been a similar falling off in the birth rate in all civilized countries; and the more civilized the country the more marked the decline has been.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WIFE¹

(Statistics Based upon Twenty-two Genealogical Records of American Families)

MARRIAGE PERIODS	NUMBER OF WIVES	NUMBER OF CHILDREN	AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WIFE
Previous to 1700. .	276	2,034	7.37
1700-1749. . . .	802	5,478	6.83
1750-1799. . . .	1,966	12,649	6.43
1800-1849. . . .	5,530	27,320	4.94
1850-1869. . . .	3,062	10,630	3.47
1870-1879. . . .	1,086	3,004	2.77
Totals. . . .	12,722	61,115	4.80

The cause of this decline is the rise in the standards of living. Those sections of the population whose standards of living have advanced the most are those among which the birth rate has declined most. In his later writings Malthus himself foresaw, albeit somewhat vaguely, the effect upon the birth rate of rising standards of living, and especially of higher intellectual standards. These influences he called the "preventive checks." According to Malthus himself, therefore, poverty, famine, etc., are to be escaped ultimately by what he called the preventive checks upon the growth of population, and which we now realize to be a rising standard of living.

The standard of living as a means of social salvation. Let us look this tardy insight of Malthus squarely in the face, and give it the emphasis it deserves. It is worthy to rank

¹ From Ross' *Principles of Sociology*, p. 15.

among the greatest generalizations of that great intellectual century, the nineteenth. Ultimate release from the worst miseries to which human flesh is heir can be achieved only by direct and conscious effort on the part of society to raise the standard of living of the underlying strata of the population. We owe this insight to Malthus and Ricardo. This insight was the part of their theories that they themselves discerned but vaguely, and which the nineteenth century missed almost entirely. But with respect to their significance for the future welfare of mankind, they will eventually come to be regarded as among the greatest ideas which that century produced.

The emphasis here cannot be too clear nor insistent. Political economy is not a dismal science, unless one lacks faith utterly in humanitarian ideals, or looks through the wrong end of the Malthusian telescope. The poverty and misery of the masses—and the conflict due to overcrowded populations—are not inevitable. They can be very greatly reduced, indeed, perhaps almost entirely abolished. But not by the mere speeding up of production. The problem must be approached by a flank movement. The attack must be upon the standard of living of the underlying strata of the population. Society must proceed upon the assumption—the faith, indeed—that that is both possible and practicable. Public opinion should insist, first, upon raising the wages and improving the standards of the laboring classes, confident that the enlarged markets that will result (together with more efficient production) will provide the wherewithal for paying higher wages. The experience of the past ten years has created the belief upon the part of business men, as we have seen (p. 165ff.), that such a policy is practicable.

That is the way of social salvation! A wedge must be driven under the standard of living of the poor, with the hammer of public opinion. As the standard of living goes up, the birth rate will go down as a result. Cut-throat

competition among laborers in an oversupplied labor market will thereby be reduced. Wages will rise in consequence—provided immigration is rigorously restricted. At the same time production will increase per capita, because technical training and general intelligence will be included in the higher standard of living. Poverty will thus decline, and eventually disappear almost altogether. And as this social policy becomes world-wide, war, due to the overflow of populations, will cease. It is of the utmost importance for modern democratic societies to acquire faith in this policy of deliberately raising the living standards of the masses, through education and economic reform. From this standpoint, the new doctrine of wages referred to in the last chapter is one of the most promising signs of the times.

A Christian vs. a pagan theory of society. But this policy should be adopted not only for the sake of the poor and miserable. Such a policy is best for all of us. The misery of the masses is a damage to all other classes, and to society as a whole. A strange, indeed perverse, tendency to put the cart before the horse has pervaded almost all the social and economic thinking of the past. Political philosophers from ancient Greece down to nineteenth-century England, have taught that the prosperity of any society depends upon the existence within it of a large mass of ignorant poor. This means, in plain English, that the prosperity of part of the people depends upon the adversity of the rest of the people. And that philosophy still persists as subconscious assumption in the minds of most of us to this very day. But it is not true. It is, indeed, the most destructive fallacy under which modern society staggers—the deceitful fallacy of exploitation.

Such a philosophy of exploitation is distinctly pagan and undemocratic. The Greek philosophers, who first expounded it, were pagans. They lived, moreover, in a caste society. A caste society is one in which the many exist, like cattle,

as a means for the few who regard themselves as ends. Like society, like philosophy. A caste society, to lubricate its own friction, secretes such a philosophy, as the joints in the human skeleton secrete their "joint water." And the extent to which such a philosophy still persists in our own minds may well be taken as a measure of the extent to which we still fall short of being a real Christian democracy.

For this theory is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Christianity and the ideals of democracy. Jesus, and the great Hebrew prophets before him, and the Christian Church through subsequent centuries, have taught that each human being is a child of God, a special object of the Creator's solicitous interest, and of ultimate worth in himself. They also taught that selfishness is the great illusion; whereas good-will and mutual help are best for all concerned. And the aims of democracy are parallel to the Hebrew-Christian ideal. Kant, a philosopher of our budding modern democracy, declared that each individual has a right to be treated as *an end in himself*. Rousseau set forth the principle that every human being has a right to be happy. The writers of our Declaration of Independence plainly had these dicta in mind when they penned the famous words about "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Democracy is a coöperative organization of society the aim of which is to treat every individual as an end in himself, not only for his own sake, but for the sake of all the rest as well.

If we are ever to have a really Christian democratic society we must first have a Christian democratic theory of society. We must recognize in practice the right of the masses to be treated as ends. We must even recognize that the masses will function best as means only when they are permitted to function most freely as ends in themselves. In plain English, the rest of us will get the most out of the laboring classes, not by keeping them poor and ignorant, but by making them all as prosperous, enlightened, cultured,

and happy as possible. The old assumption that a prosperous, cultured laboring class is impossible, and undesirable, must be definitely abandoned. The exact opposite is the real truth, as Malthus and Ricardo vaguely discerned. We must conceive the possibility and desirability of raising the lower classes bodily to a level on which all of them will enjoy freedom from poverty and ignorance; and this not only for their sakes, but for the sake of the rest of us as well. The welfare of the upper classes depends, not upon keeping the masses down, but upon lifting them up. As Roosevelt said, this will not continue to be a good country for *any* of us to live in unless it is a fairly comfortable country for *all* of us to live in. It remains for the twentieth century to discern this new principle clearly; otherwise the successful democracy for which we hope will be postponed until a generation arrives that does discern it.

No class liveth unto itself alone. Let us consider some of the ways in which the welfare of the middle and upper classes would be increased by raising the living standards of the laboring classes. In the first place, they would buy more goods and services. That would increase the market. It is to increase their market that business men advertise, and we read a good deal about developing foreign markets; but the great undeveloped market that we overlook is our own poor. If they bought the goods and services they really need, but now go without, the market would be increased beyond the dreams of advertisers or foreign agents. It is only lately that business men themselves are beginning to recognize this fact, not alone in theory, but in practice also.

The gradually increasing purchasing power of the laboring classes is the very tap root of modern prosperity and progress, says one of our leading economists; and modern business is now coming to recognize the truth of this theory. The principle thus expressed calls for a radical revision of one of the most common takings-for-granted of our political

debates. People usually assume that if "business" is prosperous, *everybody* is prosperous. It is high time to actually *think* about this easy assumption. We have already seen that the distribution of wealth does not just take care of itself automatically; but depends upon the rules of the game. In our political debates we should therefore give more attention to the rules and regulations governing that distribution. Statesmen should show more concern about the tap root of prosperity. In reality, it is the prosperity of the laboring class upon which the prosperity of everybody else depends.

In the second place, ignorance and poverty breed radicalism and social unrest. Usually persons become radicals for two reasons: because they are propertyless, or because they are ignorant. Propertyless persons, especially if they lose hope of acquiring property, are ripe for protest against the existing order of things. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain by revolution. Not arguments but conditions increase or decrease the danger from radicalism. The danger is in direct proportion to the percentage of citizens who are propertyless. Ignorant persons are ready converts to radical schemes, however wild and unreasonable. They are without ability to detect fallacies or to appraise demagogues. Anything sounds good to them if only its promises are tempting. Hence the more ignorance there is the more danger of radical revolution. On the other hand, the nearer to zero we can reduce the poverty and ignorance of the masses, the nearer to zero will we thereby reduce the danger of a violent social upheaval. Blind as most people are to the fact, it is the truth nevertheless that the only way to head off socialism is to raise the standards of living of the lower classes.

How the standards of the poor can be raised. There are various social, economical, and political changes by which the standards of the laboring classes can be raised. Some of the more important were discussed in the last chapter.

Quite as important are the things that are being done for the poor nowadays by the taxpayer, such as health service, sanitation, parks and recreation, and, most important of all, public education. But prerequisite to further reforms along these lines is a change in public opinion. The public must quit assuming that a large body of ignorant poor is necessary and perhaps even desirable. It must begin to believe instead that poverty and ignorance not only can be done away with, but that nothing else would so greatly increase the happiness of the rest of us. The public must put all measures to the following test: How will this affect the standards of the poor? Any public measure that will tend to depress the standards of our hand workers must be recognized as bad for the rest of us; but any measure that will unquestionably improve their standards will be good for all of us in the long run.

The destructiveness of artificial and luxurious standards. The effort which people will make and the foresight which they will practice in order to maintain their standard of living makes the standard of living one of the most powerful motive forces in society, as has been pointed out. To impart to the poor a higher standard of living through education is to supply the motive force without which the masses will never be lifted out of their squalor. But the standard of living has as much power to destroy as it has to uplift. A high standard of living is not necessarily a good standard. It may contain a great many artificial and unwholesome wants. It may include a demand for luxuries and degrading recreations that are harmful rather than beneficial. Moreover, such a standard of living is apt to be extremely expensive. As a matter of fact, a very large proportion of the prosperous families in America do maintain an artificial and more or less unwholesome standard. It is quite as important that these classes should live a simpler life as it is that the lower classes should enjoy a higher standard.

The standard of living a mental entity. From the foregoing it must be obvious that the standard of living is a matter of mental contents and mental interactions. People acquire wants, often by imitation. Most of the conveniences of civilization are unwanted by savages. How can things be wanted when they are not even known of? The habit element in the standard of living was emphasized. One's standard of living is usually acquired from the parental home in which he spends his childhood. Fashions are mental epidemics. People strive to gratify the same artificial wants because their needs are envious.

Not only does one's standard of living depend upon the contents of his own mind, but it is largely controlled by the notions of what it ought to be that prevail in other minds. Most of us feel compelled to dress and furnish our homes in about the style that our associates expect us to. The laboring class is virtually coerced by the prevailing opinion that they ought to be poor; by the prevalence of this opinion they are denied opportunity to escape from poverty—except in the cases of the exceptional few.

It follows that reforms in the standards of living, whether of the poor or of the rich, wait upon changes in the minds of all the people. Different ideas, wants, approvals, and habits must become prevalent.

PROBLEMS

1. Illustrate the element of habit and social custom in the standard of living.

2. Is the wage scale determined in any degree by what the public believes the living standards of laboring people ought to be?

3. What is the index number at present? This can be ascertained from the Monthly Labor Review, a publication of the U. S. Bureau of Labor.

4. Streightoff gives \$700 as a minimum adequate income in 1903. Compute the equivalent for 1900, 1910, 1915, 1920. Discuss your computations. The Interchurch World Movement, in its Survey of the Coal

Strike in 1919, specified \$1,575 as a "minimum of subsistence" income for 1919. How does that compare with Streightoff?

5. Discuss the various possibilities of increasing the food supply for modern populations.

6. Ascertain, if you can, the facts relative to the increase of European populations during the nineteenth century.

7. Give historic instances of wars that have been caused by pressure of surplus populations. Did this cause figure in the World War?

8. Are the living standards of the poor better or worse than they were a century ago?

9. Suppose all well-to-do people lived simply and bought goods for their durability and beauty, but with slight regard for changing fashions; what would be the economic and social effects? This is a topic for imaginative discussion.

10. What if practically all laborers lived in well-painted, all-modern cottages, with nice dooryards, had Brussels rugs and pianos, owned good clothes, sent their children through high school, and kept automobiles?

11. Enumerate (on the blackboard) obstacles in the way of raising the living standards of the laboring classes toward an ideal level. Discuss each, including ways and means of removing it.

12. Estimate in detail the cost of a minimum decent standard of living for a workingman's family of five, including three children. Base your estimates on the actual cost of the actual quantity of commodities actually consumed by actual families. This problem is worthy of very painstaking coöperative class work.

13. Search through such literature as you have access to for scientific estimates of minimum adequate incomes. Note the dates, and translate into terms of the current index number.

14. Point out as many ways as you can think of in which doctors, merchants, farmers, music store keepers, and others would be benefited by higher standards of living for the laboring class. How would your own father be affected?

15. A fruit rancher in Washington complains of the high wages he has to pay for help. What is the other side of the story? Which is the easier for him to see, and why?

16. Why is "gradually" the magic word in wage changes?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chapter XXXIII.

On the Malthusian theory.

ELLWOOD, C. A., *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Chapters IX, X, and XIII.

Discussion of the Malthusian theory, of poverty, and of crime.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapter XV.

A brief discussion of immigration.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter III.

The last word of a leading sociologist on the Malthusian theory.

CHAPTER XII

POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

The origin of the government. It is now the prevailing belief among students of the subject that organized government originated in the war band. In primitive society every outside group was an enemy group. Conflict between groups was the rule. In these conflicts defeat meant extermination. Hence sheer necessity called for an efficient organization of the group for fighting purposes. The natural propensities of human nature, by which some dominate and some submit, naturally threw the natural leaders into leadership. Their audacity, courage, and personal magnetism in fight gave to such, a spontaneous following which amounted to command. Their success gave such leaders a subsequent prestige which amounted to authority; and such authority their admiring and grateful followers united to help them enforce. Eventually this temporary authority became grooved in custom, and thus hardened into a permanent institution. In this way the fighting organization acquired a free hand in regulating the internal affairs of the group in times of peace. Such a hold-over was undoubtedly rendered the more necessary on account of the captives taken in war, especially if they were kept alive as slaves. To hold them in subjugation the military organization would have to be kept in operation after the victory. (Ancient Sparta is an extreme example of a historic state that long remained a strictly military organization for just this reason.) Out of such reasons grew the dominance of the war machine; and this is the way the government originated. This development must have occurred extremely early in the experience of our species on this planet; something of the sort may even have been inherited from our sub-human ancestors.

Rousseau's "Social Contract" theory. Seldom is it useful to ask a student to learn a *false* theory. Usually that is regarded as poor pedagogy, because it tends to confuse the student's mind. But Rousseau's theory of the origin of government is an exception to this general rule. The reason is that, though false, it exerted such an important influence upon American thought at the time of our War of Independence—not to mention its European influence later on. One's education has been neglected who has not learned something about Rousseau's *Social Contract* theory.

According to that theory, government is a sort of contract between the people and their rulers. The people surrender to the rulers certain of their own privileges and liberties, on condition that rulers furnish them with protection and other necessary services. For these services the rulers are allowed certain privileges, luxuries, and honors. But the rulers are obligated by the terms of the contract to render specified services, and not abuse their privileges. It was in such a contract as this that government originated.

The fallacy is in the fact that government originated in no such way as this. The theory implies that there was a time when mankind had no such thing as government, but lived in the innocence of a so-called state of nature. No such condition ever was. Government was not invented; it "grewed" like Topsy. Government has existed in some form or other from the beginning of human experience.

The historic significance of the theory is in the fact that the thinkers of the eighteenth century used it in justification of political revolution. The rulers had broken their contract, they argued; and hence the people were entitled to go back upon their rulers, and change the government. Rousseau's theory furnished a plausible excuse! And it was a time when a plausible excuse for revolution was urgently in request; since "in the course of human events it had become *necessary*" to have a revolution. If the student

will take the trouble to review the Declaration of Independence he will realize that Jefferson had been reading Rousseau's *Social Contract*. That the theory was sociologically unsound did not in the least dull its edge as a weapon of attack upon the vested tyrannies of the time.

Geographic factors. Geographic factors have always influenced the forms of government. The first great empires grew up in the great fertile river valleys. The reason is clear; only in such places were dense populations possible under early conditions of agriculture and transportation. With the rise of dense populations would come a more complex society, and hence the necessity for a more complicated form of government. The inevitable competitions and struggles would naturally result in the eventual supremacy of the strongest.

Island societies have usually enjoyed a certain protection from invasion which enabled them to develop a government peculiar to themselves. English history is the outstanding example. For almost a thousand years England has been immune from invasion; this fact has enabled her to develop her own political institutions practically without interference from the outside. This may well be one of the reasons why democracy has developed faster there than in any of the other great European nations. Also, her insular position has undoubtedly contributed toward making her a maritime people; and that in turn has been an important factor in the development of her imperial policy. Crete in the ancient world, and Japan in the modern, have both been similarly influenced by similar geographical causes.

Throughout the ages the original, instinctive democracy of local self-government has persisted in the Swiss cantons largely because of their inaccessibility in the mountain fastnesses of the Alps. Our Appalachian Mountain ranges are relatively low, narrow, and easy to cross; and behind them lay a vast fertile plain. Our Rocky Mountain ranges,

on the other hand, are lofty, rugged, and wide. Had our forefathers had such a mountain barrier to contend with, our national history would have been very different. Jackson represented the farmers of the West, and he stood for the new kind of democracy that they had developed in the free life of the frontier. Under the different geographical conditions just suggested such a man and such a movement would hardly have appeared.

But these few illustrations must suffice. It is clear that they could be multiplied indefinitely. In fact the geographic theory of history has been somewhat overdone of late years. There is no good reason, however, why a clear recognition of geographic factors should blind one to the technic and social factors.

Technic factors. For the technic factors and their influence on the forms of government are in plain sight. Take new inventions in weapons of war, for instance. Cortez and Pizarro were able to annihilate the ancient governments of Mexico and Peru because the Spaniards had gunpowder. By the invention of a new type of fighting ship at the strategic moment the Romans put the commercial Carthaginians out of the race. The submarine came within an ace of cancelling for England the advantage of her insular position, and converting it into a fatal disadvantage. Had that happened political democracy would perhaps have suffered a five-hundred year setback, while political autocracy might have enjoyed a long reprieve of its death sentence.

A. The expansion of democracies. The Industrial Revolution was a great technical change. It included the new power-driven machinery, and the new means of communication and transportation. Operating as a cause, it has produced numerous and fundamental changes in government. In the first place, it has made possible the success of large-scale democracies.

Political philosophers no more than a century ago used to predict that democratic governments on a large scale could never survive, because populations scattered over wide areas could never act together promptly. Those philosophers used to make out a very plausible case, too. But the invention of the telegraph and the steam railroad has since taken all the pith out of their prediction; because those inventions have made it possible for news to reach great populations almost instantly, and armies to be equipped and mobilized promptly. To assemble, train, and equip an army of three million and a half, and put half of that army in the field across three thousand miles of ocean would have seemed as impossible a hundred years ago as a flight to the moon. It was our new technic resources that made the achievement possible.

B. New tasks of government. The Industrial Revolution has changed the tasks and responsibilities of governments, imposing new duties upon governments that were never dreamt of before. Examples are the regulation of street car, gas, electric light, and telephone services by city governments; and the regulation of railroads, hydro-electric power, and nation-sized corporations by the State and Federal governments. Likewise, the automobile has forced enlarged responsibilities for road building upon governments. Governments with such new responsibilities are different governments, both in function and form.

C. Taxation. Taxation is being gradually reorganized for similar reasons. Before the Industrial Revolution production was largely for family use and local barter. The goods a man had in sight properly represented his taxable wealth, therefore. But machinery, specialization, and railroads have increased exchange incomparably. Now profits are the motive of exchange. Production is at present largely for profits. And often there is no very close relation between a corporation's visible property and its book profits. For

that reason book profits are often a juster basis of taxation than visible property. The modern use of income and profits taxes is a natural consequence, therefore, of the Industrial Revolution.

D. The decay of local units. One of the most important results is the transfer of responsibility from local units to larger units. What can a village council, or the famous New England town meeting, do about such problems as the regulation of railroad rates, the restraint of a nation-sized corporation that is monopolistic, the solution of the Mississippi River flood problem, the mitigation of unemployment, the equalization of educational opportunities throughout the country, the supervision of the hydro-electric development of our water power, and various others? Or even a State government? Such problems are beyond the scope of small local units and can be handled only by the National Government for the simple reason that they are nation-sized problems. Hence the old saying that "local self-government is the vital organ of democracy" has no such force as it had in the days of Madison, Adams, and Jefferson. And to revive the states' rights doctrine is an anachronism!

E. Representation. Again, our new means of communication have done puzzling things to our system of political representation, based, as it is, on *local units*. It is now easy for people of any given *interest* to organize on a state or national scale. Thus, teachers have their national organization; so do bankers, plumbers, farmers, or what not. But in Legislature or Congress such interests have to depend for representation upon men who represent all the other interests, however conflicting, of their district. Thus, do the U. S. Senators from the State of "Osceola" represent the farming interest, or the industrial interest, of that State? As a result of this confusion we have developed the lobby. The lobby consists of the *unofficial* representatives of the *interest*, who try to influence, sometimes corruptly, the offi-

cial representatives of the *local units*; and precisely because the official representatives do not really represent anybody in particular. Thus technical causes have created a vital problem in political organization.

F. New autocrats. The lobby is only one way in which the technical changes of modern times are working against democracy; they also threaten to produce a new kind of autocrat, the great capitalist. Just as the large landholders of the old régime tended to acquire great political power, so do the large capitalists tend to acquire great political power in this new industrial régime. The old kings on horseback have gone the way of all the world; but there looms up a new autocrat behind a desk and a telephone; and his power tends to become political as well as economic. If he should come to dominate the political situation, as did the man on horseback in the past, then the new industrial régime may result in a plutocracy (that is, a government of the people by the rich and for the rich). It will be either that or successful democracy. It is well to realize that industrial progress is in turn creating political problems.

G. The international problem. And, finally, we may mention the new international relations. Steamships are like shuttles weaving all nations together into a web of entangling commercial alliances and rivalries, from which no nation can escape. The electric cable has drawn all nations very close together—Japan is functionally as close to England as France was a century ago. As a result, a war can no longer be kept in its own corner of the earth; it is almost sure to become all but universal. The reason is that commerce with the belligerents is a vital concern to almost every nation. Thus, the international problem has far more magnitude and danger than ever before.

These are but samples of the way technical factors can affect political government; actually are affecting it, indeed. Before one can be a political scientist he must first be some-

thing of a sociologist, so as to understand the causes that are changing society, and hence changing government. Moreover, to understand our own government, its changes and problems, it is important to realize what new causes are operating in present-day society. Many of the old saws and slogans that our fathers thought by are out of date; they were coined before these new technic causes began to take effect.

Social factors. Religion, education, and government: these are three important social activities, among many others. Let us observe how they affect the forms and changes of government. Government affects government. The government of today is caused by the government of yesterday. Government is a growth; it grows out of what it has been in the past. There is no better illustration of this than the English Constitution, which is nothing more than an accumulation of precedents. Our own Constitution was modeled after the political experiences of the mother country. The modern world is indebted to Rome for much of its legal system; and Rome in turn to the remoter past. Neither France at the end of the eighteenth, nor Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, can make too great and sudden a break with her own political past. What is to be must be built on what has been.

The influence of education upon government is well illustrated by the old system in China. The officials of state were all selected by competitive examinations from among the scholars produced by the schools. The schools taught only the ancient Confucian classics, thus saturating the student with the moral, religious, and political lore of the past. The men most thoroughly indoctrinated being selected for official positions, it was really these ancient ideas that governed China. This explains why China could stand still for so many centuries, without going either forward or backward. In western civilization the influence of educa-

tion upon government may be illustrated negatively by the lack of it. Would it have been possible to keep the people under the heel of despotism for so many centuries if they had been liberally educated? Conversely, the rise of democracy makes popular education a necessity; and if democracy is not to fail there must be a far more generous provision for popular education than the world has dreamed of in the past.

Religion has almost always been closely associated with government. In primitive society the sanctions of law are always more or less religious. In ancient Babylonia and Egypt the monarchs were special servants of the gods. Ancient Israel was a theocracy. In the Middle Ages it is quite impossible to draw the line between the history of the state and the history of the church. We flatter ourselves that here in America we have achieved a complete separation of religion and government; but what are the ideals of democracy if they are not the ideals of Christianity: the ideals of human brotherhood and the intrinsic worth of individual lives? And do we imagine that we should be able to succeed as well as we do in running a government based on these ideals if Christianity had not been preparing the soil by teaching those very ideals for two thousand years? And can we doubt that the idea of one God ruling the whole world in justice and righteousness has contributed to our hope for a universal federation of nations by which we can live together in the world as becomes worshippers of the universal Deity?

Each of the other social institutions has its causal effect upon the forms and activities of the state; the industrial organization of society perhaps more than all the rest.

The functions of government: A. Defense. We come now to the functions of government. In primitive society it may well have seemed that the most important function of government was defense. Primitive groups lived in constant danger of extermination by their enemies—not to

mention wild beasts. The struggle for existence must have been terrific. It is easy and pleasant to imagine that primitive life was ideally easy and happy—a kind of Paul-and-Virginia existence. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Life was hard, beyond the powers of the imagination to picture. Almost always and everywhere it was only the most warlike tribes that survived at all. And in primitive warfare the advantage was with the tribe that had the best fighting organization, that is, the best government. All through the historic centuries governments have been “powers;” and to this day our great states are not yet able to lay aside that function.

B. Regulation of personal relations. Personal relations have to be regulated. The game of social life requires rules. There is no human being in existence who can always, under all circumstances, be relied upon to observe the rules voluntarily. And however good human nature may be on the average, there are always a “recalcitrant few” who can confidently be relied upon to disregard the rules utterly. Hence the need of some authority that can compel obedience. This is one of the important functions of government: to preserve order.

If absolutely everybody could always be relied upon to do what he believed to be right, there would still be serious social disorder without government. There must be some way of deciding what the rules ought to be. In other words, there must be a lawmaking agency. To do that is one of the functions of government. But even rules are not enough. When all agree as to what the rules are, disputes will arise under the rules, as in a ball game. An umpire is necessary. The courts are the umpires in the game of civil life. They settle disputes under the rules. If governments did not perform that function there would be constant and destructive friction.

Since society, especially industrial society, has become

more complex as a result of the Industrial Revolution, very many more situations have arisen for which rules have had to be made. Before there were factories there were no rules needed about children working in factories. But when the factories started in England a century and a quarter ago they immediately began employing very young children—even under ten years of age—for twelve to sixteen hours daily. Of course, that had to be ruled out. Again, when the railroads began hauling freight in large quantities, they naturally offered rebates to large shippers. Had it not always been customary to sell anything at a reduction to a customer who bought in large quantities? But presently it began to be seen that railroad rebating gave the big shippers an unfair competitive advantage over the smaller ones. The practice led straight to monopoly. It was by a system of railroad rebates that Mr. Rockefeller built up the Standard Oil monopoly. Of course it became necessary to pass laws forbidding rebates. Innumerable examples could be given of such new situations that the new industrial régime gave rise to and that called for new rules.

Laissez faire. Curiously enough, there had grown up a doctrine about a century ago called the *laissez faire*. This doctrine was to the effect that that government governs best which governs least; that government should interfere in individual affairs as little as possible. Was not each person more interested in his own welfare than any government could possibly be? Well, let each citizen alone, then, and he will look after his own affairs better than the government will or can. So ran the theory. It was a reaction against too much government regulation in previous centuries. Governments were dubbed “paternalistic” that thus interfered in private matters. But, oddly enough, at the very time this *laissez faire* doctrine was growing up as a protest against old abuses, new abuses were growing up because of new industrial conditions that did require government

regulation. New and powerful oppressors appeared, against whom single individuals were utterly helpless, no matter how much interested they might be in their own welfare. The net result was that for a century after the new abuses began *laissez faire* was appealed to by the rich and powerful to prevent governments from making rules that would protect the weak and helpless. The awful word "paternalistic" was hurled at governments if they tried to do so. But that attitude is now blowing over; and governments, under the so-called "police power of the state," are passing laws to protect the weak from the strong, thus partly correcting these modern abuses. The "police power of the state" means the power of the state to pass any law that is needed for the general welfare.

C. The management of coöperative enterprises. Another function of government is to serve as a sort of coöperative business firm through which the people can carry on certain enterprises for their mutual benefit. For example, most city governments have their own municipal waterworks. The city engages in the business of furnishing water for the use of all the citizens. In some cities lighting is a municipal business; in more it is a private business. The most important businesses to be carried on by the government are education and the handling of the mails. Both of these were private businesses in former ages; it is only within the past century that education has been taken over by the government, and even yet there are many private schools, some of them run for profit. There are competent authorities who believe that cities will eventually have to take over the street-car service. Government ownership of railroads has been suggested from time to time by public men. Suggestions are not unusual that coal mines and forest lands should be owned by the government. The socialists go to the extreme of contending, on theoretical grounds, that all means of production should be owned and managed by

the government. How far this business function of the government will be carried nobody can predict. We ought not to be deterred by the mere word "socialistic" from turning a business over to the government, when experience clearly indicates that it would be desirable. On the other hand, such socialistic enterprises ought not to be ventured into unless private management has failed to conserve the general welfare and there is good reason to believe that public management will work better.

Present problems of government. So much for the functions of government. Stated in general terms the aim of government, as of any other institution, is to conserve the welfare of human beings—the greatest good of the greatest number. Whenever government falls short of this aim, something is still imperfect in the government. Such imperfections constitute our unsolved civic problems. The state was made for man, not man for the state. The task of setting monarchy aside and perfecting the forms of democratic government has been the central struggle of western peoples for the last five hundred years, as all students of history well know. And while the focus of interest has now shifted to the economic problem, even the state has not yet arrived at complete perfection, of course. Notwithstanding all the improvements we have made in recent centuries, we naturally have some unsolved problems even yet, some uncompleted developments to finish. It could hardly be otherwise, since the state, like everything else, never is but always is becoming.

A. Making the state responsive to the public will. One of the aspects of this is the problem of securing efficiency in government business. Experts must be employed by the government to perform expert services for the government. The public does not yet realize how many public offices there are that can be filled efficiently only by persons who have had a special technical training for the service. The juryman

is an example. But honesty is quite as essential to efficient service, and really more difficult to secure. Honesty and technical expertness will become increasingly important as we extend the control of government over coal, forests, monopolies, and other quasi-public matters, as we have already done in the case of the railroads.

Numerous changes in the forms of government have been advocated and in some cases enacted in recent decades with this end in view: the commission and city manager type of city government; direct primaries; initiative, referendum, and recall; popular election of judges; popular election of United States Senators; the Australian ballot; etc. This aim may have had something to do with the Woman Suffrage Amendment; though that was probably due chiefly to the sentiment that women are persons on an equality with men.

Comparison of our government with others suggests some defects. Law enforcement seems to be better in Canada than it is with us. Their police are more responsive than ours to the will of the *whole* people; ours are too liable to respond instead to the will of a small local group against which the whole people are anxious to protect themselves. Probably the remedy is to have the officials whose business it is to enforce the state laws appointed by the state executive instead of elected by the local people. Election of such police officers by local people virtually gives each local community the option of obeying the state laws or not, as it pleases.

The practice in England of forcing the Prime Minister and his cabinet to resign at any time and calling for a new election seems better than our system of electing the President for a term of definite length. The British system makes the administration more immediately responsive to the popular will. Our written Constitution is also somewhat less flexible than their body of precedents which serves them as a constitution.

These may serve as samples of the problems now confronting us in our progressive effort to perfect popular government. Many others could be mentioned.

B. The menace of plutocracy. It is of vital importance that government be kept responsive to the will of the people. The outstanding political struggle of the next few decades, perhaps of the next few centuries, will undoubtedly be to prevent democracy from degenerating into plutocracy. The Greek word *demos* meant the people. A democracy is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The Greek word *ploutos* meant wealth. A plutocracy is a government of the people, by the rich, and for the rich. A government may be a democracy in form, but a plutocracy in fact. The visible government may but serve the will of an invisible government; the invisible government being the plutocracy. Any one who intelligently reads between the lines of our own history since the Civil War cannot fail to perceive the excessive influence of great wealth in shaping the policies of our government. Mark Hanna sincerely believed that one of the prime functions of government is to conserve the interests of "business;" and that organized "business" may rightly see to it that that function is performed. This theory may be held in all honesty of intentions so long as one assumes that the interests of "business" are the interests of all the people. But history proves that the assumption is of at least doubtful validity; there is very real danger that "big business" may seek to exploit the people. This theory of the function of government is very liable, therefore, to lead directly to plutocracy. The enormous power of organized great wealth is not to be trusted. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

C. The problem of socialistic enterprises. Another type of problem has already been mentioned, and can therefore be passed by now with a mere notice; that is, the problem of socialistic enterprises on the part of the government.

How far shall we go in for government ownership of this, that, and the other? As has already been stated, this is a problem that will have to be solved gradually, by carefully considered experiments. Any rash attempt to go suddenly into such experiments on a large scale would certainly prove disastrous. On the other hand, mere words like "radical," "Bolshevistic," "un-American," etc., constitute no real arguments in themselves against government ownership in any cases where it seems desirable on its merits. What we need is scientific study of relevant facts, and cautious experiments.

D. The problem of improving the citizenry. The underlying problem of democratic government is the quality of the citizenry itself. It must be admitted that democracy is still an experiment in the modern world. As a matter of historical fact it has often been tried before, on a smaller scale, but never with permanent success. Several prominent English thinkers of the nineteenth century ridiculed the idea of "clutterbuck republics," freely predicting that they would fail when the test came of managing the crowded populations of the twentieth century. Even so prominent an official as the Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, as recently as 1922, expressed in the *Atlantic Monthly* his very frank doubt as to the success of democracy in the modern world. Several very prominent and influential German philosophers of the last fifty years have scoffed openly at both democracy and Christianity, as fatuous systems by which the strong and capable few were to be sacrificed to the weak and brainless multitude. This school of thinkers defined "the people" as that inarticulate mass "der weiss nicht was er will." Quite recently certain hasty inferences from the new science of mental testing have given prevalence to the belief that the average mentality of our citizenry is so low as to show up the hope of self-government as a futile dream.

Nevertheless the faith of young Americans in democracy should not falter for a moment. The young men of each

generation since our independence was declared have given their lives for it, thus attesting their faith. But young citizens should realize, with their eyes wide open, that its success is not something which will come to us for nothing. We must win it. Otherwise our posterity will lose it.

We need to see clearly that its success will not depend primarily upon the form of the government, but upon the quality of the citizenry. So long as the people are ignorant they can always be deceived and misled by a small, well-organized group of men with wealth and brains, who know exactly what they want and how to get it. There are no policies the people can unite upon but sound policies, based upon facts that all the people know to be facts. If the people do not know what the facts are, they are of course as easily scattered as sheep. Popular self-government cannot succeed unless it utilizes the services of experts; but there is no possibility of the public utilizing experts in the field, for example, of public sanitation, if the people are so ignorant of biology as to disbelieve that diseases are caused by bacilli. Lord Brice stated in an American address in 1921 that modern democracies lacked great leaders. It is probably much nearer the truth that the people lack intelligence to discern the greatness of the great men who might be utilized as leaders. The key, therefore, to the success of democracy is popular education, on a scale more generous and liberal than the world has ever dreamed of before. We should be a nation of at least twelfth graders on the average. There should be free and effective vocational training for all. Social problems should constitute the core of the high-school curriculum. Higher education should be easily accessible to all who have brains and character for trustworthy leadership. Unless modern democracies open their eyes to the vital necessity for liberal popular enlightenment, it is altogether possible that the doubts of their success may prove sound. It is only to an educated and enlightened citizenry

that the scoffs of Carlyle, Nietzsche, and the others do not apply.

A high average morality is quite as necessary as a high average enlightenment. There is no activity of government that can be depended upon to work well in the hands of dishonest officials. Dishonesty, graft, and self-seeking are as serious a menace to democracy as ignorance is, perhaps worse. The percentage of honest officials will hardly be higher than the percentage of honest citizens. Honest policies can hardly win among a people who will vote with dishonest motives. Facts instead of buncombe will prevail as political argument, about to the degree that conscientiousness prevails among the people. A citizen often contributes to the general welfare quite as much by simply being an honest man as he does by paying his taxes.

E. The followership of the duller masses. From the beginning of our national history it has been recognized that the success of democracy depends upon the enlightenment of the masses. But the problem seems to become more perplexing as time goes on, despite the growth of public education. Teaching everybody to read seems to have increased, most noticeably, the market for literary trash. The public takes disappointingly little interest in the solid problems of politics. Moreover, fooling the people seems actually to be developing into a new profession, attracting some of the keenest intellects that our universities can produce at the expense of taxpayers and self-sacrificing parents. Accordingly, the public seems to be swept hither and thither by every fad, mental epidemic, or wave of propaganda that comes along. The outlook sometimes looks discouraging.

Of late years this problem has attracted the attention of psychologists and philosophers. They have been inclined to locate the difficulty in the kind of mental habits that young people are brought up to, not only out of school but even in and by the school. Young citizens do not learn to *think for*

themselves. School methods even discourage them from doing so, these critics charge. What, therefore, can be expected of them, when they become adult citizens, other than to parrot whatever opinions are put into their mouths? Hence the masses think they think whatever they are told to think, by those who own a megaphone and have an axe to grind.

The obvious remedy, these philosophers contend, is to teach the people to *think for themselves*. To this end they advocate the project, or problem-solving method in school. They stress the old saw that skepticism is the beginning of wisdom; and, when driven into a corner, will actually contend that it is better to be original than to be right. The fallacy of this any child can see; for what game would be a success if everybody were skeptical of all the rules, and each player had an original idea of his own, quite different from anybody else's, as to how the game ought to be played.

While these philosophers are urging that democracy can be salvaged only by the think-for-yourself formula, psychologists are stressing the fact that people vary in intelligence, after a normal distribution curve (cf. p. 23); and that the lower half, and especially the lowest one-fourth, are not capable of cogent, constructive thinking. From which it has to be inferred that there is little hope in the think-for-yourself slogan so far as the duller masses are concerned. The farther we follow this formula, therefore, the darker the outlook seems to become. Obviously, we seem to need a new light.

Now, such new light is found in the fact that the dull can *imitate* as well as the bright. Hence they can be *right* about as often; provided they are given a chance to echo what is *true*. The social psychology of this principle will be expounded in the final chapter of this book.

And in this insight lies the salvation of democracy, so far as the masses are concerned; not in the think-for-yourself illusion. The *truth* about our political problems, so far as

the truth is known, must be made so prevalent **that** the dull will hardly have a chance to echo anything else. And the more quotable the epigrams in which the truth is coined, the better the truth will circulate among the dull. This is the real task of education in a democracy: to make the truth so prevalent that everybody, even the dullest, will be mouth-ing it.

And right here is the moral issue of modern democracy. "The *truth* shall make you free." With the ballot in their hands, if modern publics are to be exploited and enslaved, they must first be doped and deceived. Fooling the people has accordingly become a gigantic modern enterprise, conducted mostly by our modern would-be plutocrats. Propaganda is their instrument. The struggle is between selfish propagandists who wish to exploit the masses by getting them to echo illusions and so vote against their own interests; and unselfish enlighteners who wish to liberate the masses by getting them to echo the truth and vote accordingly. If the latter succeed democracy will survive.

F. The problem of international relations. The political problem peculiar to the present age is that of international relations. Due to recent improvements in transportation all the nations are pressed into closer relations than was ever possible before. There has for thousands of years been a felt need for articulating *some* nations together. That was really what the historic empire builders were trying to do. But now there is a felt need for articulating *all* nations. There is now a desire, moreover, which is new in the world, and that is to get the nations together on a voluntary basis. Democracy is doubtless responsible for that.

So long as nations exist together side by side there are bound to be occasions for friction; that is inevitable, is it not? It always has been so, and it always will be so. And the more active, ambitious, and aggressive commercial enterprise is, the greater the danger. It is well, by the way, for

us to recognize that this is the chief source of our danger. From these premises it follows that war is inevitable unless some international machinery can be invented and put into successful operation for settling international differences peaceably. Something must do for nations what our Federal government does for the American states.

Development of the federation idea. The development of international relations through the long centuries is instructive in this connection. At first there were only family-clans; and each little clan was at deadly enmity with every neighboring clan. One sees this clearly in the literature descriptive of all primitive tribes now living on the earth: the head-hunters of Borneo, for instance. Then the clans united with other clans to form tribes; whereupon the tribes struggled for existence against other tribes. At the dawn of history, as in Greece, or in the Euphrates area, we see these tribes grown to the size of cities. Then came the effort to unite these cities into a nation. The effort was successful in Babylonia; but it was never permanently successful in Greece. The history of ancient Greece is the history of cities bleeding themselves to death in a never-ending struggle among themselves. Only occasionally, as under Pericles or Alexander, was there a brief promise of success, but it was always short-lived. In Egypt, Babylonia, and Rome there was more success. The history of medieval and modern Europe is a history of ceaseless conflict between nations; and now the struggle threatens to spread to all the world. Never before in all history has there been such a strong desire for some workable principle of unity. There are those who fear that we of this generation have let slip through our fingers the only opportunity that will present itself for centuries.

Can federation come voluntarily? It is an interesting and significant fact that most of the successful federations of the past have been forged of "blood and iron." Voluntary

coöperation of states has been unusual; as a rule they have been pressed together under a steam-roller. The Roman and the German empires are good examples. We started our own federation of states on a voluntary basis; but we held it together permanently only by force. It may be that the world will get a federation of nations in no other way. But that will be a very costly way to get it. Yet if the world does not get it in some way there will certainly be centuries of mutual self-destruction on the part of great nations, just as there were among small states in ancient Greece. The American people could see the cost of going into the League of Nations; but they failed to see the cost of staying out. The cost of going in is our national sovereignty, just as state sovereignty was the cost of coming into the federal union of the American states. For even if an international federation be formed voluntarily it cannot be maintained without sufficient force at its command to coerce any member that undertakes to withdraw its voluntary coöperation. On account of the "recalcitrant few" an international state must be based ultimately upon force the same as a national state.

The state a mental entity. It is appropriate to conclude this chapter as we have concluded several others, by pointing out, in accordance with the central principle of sociology, that the state is a mental entity. It exists nowhere except in men's minds; it exists because of the interaction of men's minds. Capitol buildings, legal libraries, the accoutrements of war, and the insignia of office are not the state; they are but the body of the state, and the body without the spirit is dead. The real difference between American democracy and Prussian autocracy is in the habits, ideals, approvals, and prejudices in the minds of the people. And that is why there is even yet danger of a reaction to monarchy in Germany. The growth of American democracy has been the growth of certain prevalent states of mind.

Political reforms are not effected when they are printed in the laws, but only when they become incorporated into the minds of the people. There can never be international peace so long as a war psychology retains its grip upon us. If there is to be a "new freedom," there must be a new mind and a new heart in the rank and file of the people.

PROBLEMS

1. Make a list of local officials who should be experts. Outline the proper training for each.
2. Discuss (or debate) the merits of the commission form of city government; the city-manager type; direct primaries; initiative, referendum, and recall; and popular election of judges.
3. What can you find out about law-enforcement in Canada?
4. Enumerate a list of reasons why the Eighteenth Amendment is inadequately enforced. What is the remedy?
5. Resolved, That local police officers should be appointed by the state executive.
6. Review American history from 1865 to 1890 with special reference to the rise and influence of an invisible plutocracy.
7. Resolved, That the Supreme Court should be deprived of authority to declare laws unconstitutional.
8. Compare carefully our system of electing Presidents with the British system of selecting Prime Ministers.
9. Read recent articles on Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations idea and his work in promoting it. Discuss its merits in class.
10. Show that the absence of fortifications on the Duluth harbor is a result of psychological causes.
11. Make a short list of great political problems. Then go and stand on a busy street corner and watch the people pass. Judge by their looks how much their judgments would be worth on these problems.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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ROSS, E. A., *Social Control*, Chapter XI.

Shows the limited part that law plays in social control.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapter XXV.

On politics and law.

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A theoretical and practical treatment, by a man of wide scholarship and experience. A classic.

CHAPTER XIII

EDUCATION

The biological basis of education: plasticity of the nervous system. As was pointed out in Chapter III, it is a biological fact that makes education possible. That fact is the plasticity of the human nervous system. If the human nervous system were not plastic, education would not be possible at all. These elementary considerations will bear the emphasis of some repetition here.

It was previously explained (p. 7) that there are certain connections through the nervous system which make it possible for a certain definite sense impression to produce a certain definite muscular action. It was pointed out that in the case of instincts these "permeable pathways" are innate. In the lowest forms of animal life the entire outfit of connections is innate; none are acquired during the lifetime of the creature. Their nervous systems are not plastic at all. All actions are instinctive. Experience counts for nothing. If the instinctive reactions that nature has provided do not fit the situation, the organism perishes. There is no such thing as adaptation to changing or varied conditions.

But the case is entirely different with the higher, and especially with the human, organism. In the higher animals many, in man, most, of the connections are formed after birth. In man they keep forming all through life. You can't teach an old dog new tricks; but you can an old man.

Habit distinguished from instinct. The chief difference between instinct and habit is that the one is innate, whereas the other is acquired. There may not be much conscious thinking in either; in fact, usually there is a little or none. When one sees a missile flying in his direction he instinc-

tively dodges, and thinks afterwards, if at all; and when the letter "a" comes in a word a skillful typist is writing, she strikes the "a" key as a matter of habit, without any thinking at all. But the one is based on an innate connection, while the other connection has been laboriously acquired.

The function of habits. A large part of the education of an individual is the acquisition of habits. The common decencies, courtesies, and customs of social life are matters of habit which children have to acquire. So are all the skills involved in industry, art, and science. Civilization consists very largely of habits, as anyone can picture to his imagination if he will ponder over the habits in all the fields just mentioned of civilized men as compared with savages. The habits of civilization have developed with the passing centuries in order to make possible a fuller and fuller satisfaction of human needs. Young people think of habits as usually bad things; but the fact is that most of our habits are useful habits. They attract our attention but little because they do not get in our way. The number of good habits we have is really amazing; without them we should be utterly helpless in our civilized social environment. The problem of education is to see that our young people are equipped with habits that harmonize with their innate needs, instead of habits that tend to thwart their needs.

Ideas. Ideas are never innate. The ancient philosophers supposed that they were, and both church and state used the belief to fortify their authority; but we now know that all ideas are acquired. The number and variety of ideas that civilized man does acquire, however, are incalculable. Civilization is largely a matter of ideas, or large, organized masses of knowledge; they are the instruments by means of which we are able to get the things we need. Poverty of ideas, not inferiority of brains, is what makes certain people savages. The thinker is the great contributor to human welfare. Man is always seeking those facts by the

use of which he can the better satisfy his needs. Thus knowledge has gradually accumulated, with the result that civilized man is far better able to satisfy his needs than primitive man was. The task of education is to impart to the rising generation the ideas, the facts, the organized knowledge of which civilization consists.

Acquired wants. Man has not only innate needs but acquired wants also. We have an innate need for food; but for the particular kinds of foods that we use in such great variety our wants are acquired, and they differ with different people. The same is true of all the innate needs of human nature, whether physical, intellectual, aesthetic, or religious. Each people needs religion, for example; but the particular kind of religious beliefs and ceremonies that the various peoples have are all acquired wants. The almost infinite variety of acquired wants involved in civilized life has been developed in the age-long effort to satisfy the fundamental, innate needs of human nature.

Relation of acquired wants to innate needs. Innate needs are like the great water mains of a city, while acquired wants are like the taps in the private houses. The taps may be anywhere that the owner's whim suggests; but they must connect with the great main. This simile is intended to suggest that acquired wants should harmonize with the innate needs of human nature, instead of thwarting them. There is, of course, a large element of habit in acquired wants—that is what the word acquired implies. The human nervous system is so plastic that almost any kind of a want can be acquired, however contrary to the real needs of human nature. Some individuals acquire wants that spoil their lives entirely. Artificial and unwholesome wants sometimes become a matter of custom and common practice among a whole people. In the long run such wants will destroy a people, of course. Our acquired taste for luxuries is a case in point. From one point of view the problem of

social life is to habituate in all the people a set of acquired wants that are really in harmony with the real, innate needs of human nature. One of the tasks of education is to impart the wants of civilization to the rising generation. In fact the wants an educational system imparts are really of far more vital importance than the knowledge imparted.

Wants as means. There is a second type of acquired wants not referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, namely, our wants for the tools and technique by means of which we make or get the things we want to use. Thus, if a man wants a log, he necessarily wants an ax; if he wants a surgical operation, he wants instruments, technique, and knowledge of medical science at the disposal of his surgeon. These wants that are means, not ends, make up a large part of what we call civilization. They are the objectives of vocational education. Wants of the other kind are the objectives of cultural education.

The long period of human immaturity. One of the very significant characteristics of human nature is the long period of immaturity. During this period the nervous system is much more plastic than in later life; though it never loses its plasticity entirely. This long period of plastic immaturity makes it possible to impart to the rising generation all the vast mass of acquired habits, ideas, wants, ideals, attitudes, etc., that make up civilization. Thus the life of each generation is enriched by the experiences and achievements of all the past. As civilization becomes richer and more complex the time devoted to education naturally becomes longer.

The curriculum and the culture mass. In Chapter IV, it was pointed out that the social heritage, or culture mass, is acquired by each successive generation through the learning process. To put it the other way around, it is through education, in the broadest sense of that word, that the culture mass is transmitted from generation to generation.

That is the real function of education. Much, indeed most, of the education is "informal," that is, it occurs incidentally, largely through the question-asking and imitation of children. Neither the learner nor the teacher is overtly conscious of the process. No schools are necessary for "informal" education. But in a highly civilized society the culture mass is complex, and some of it is so remote from the interests of children that it becomes necessary for the adult generation to take a day off, as one might say, corner the youngsters, so to speak, and see to it that they learn a lot of things that they are sure to need to know when they get older. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are samples of necessary knowledge that children would hardly pick up "informally." It is in this way that schools grow up.

Naturally, the school program corresponds with the culture mass, as will be illustrated historically in the following pages. The curriculum is made up out of the intellectual resources (cf. pp. 11) of the society in which the schools are operating. In our society, corresponding to the means of communication are reading, writing, English, and foreign languages. Corresponding to the techniques of industry is vocational education. Corresponding to science is the school science, and to the fine arts is art education. Corresponding to beliefs, ideals, mores, and folkways are the so-called "new humanities," that is, the school subjects that treat of human nature and human relationships. Specifically, they are: biology, geography, psychology, sociology, economics, political science (i.e., civics), ethics, philosophy, and history. Since our beliefs, ideals, folkways, and mores are all changing, owing to the industrial, scientific, and democratic revolutions, it follows that "the new humanities" are among our most important school subjects, inasmuch as they contain the new knowledge by which these changes should be guided.

In Chapter V the term "culture lag" was introduced.

In periods of rapid change there are apt to be culture lags in the curriculum; that is, subjects that represent the culture mass of a by-gone age are apt to hang on in the curriculum long after they have ceased to function in the social life. Latin is a good example. It was necessary to the education of European aristocrats five hundred years ago, but it falls outside the practical needs of most young American democrats of today. One of the problems of schooling at the present moment is to make our curriculum parallel the culture mass that we are actually using to operate our present civilization. Too much old stuff is hanging on; and too much of the new knowledge is being omitted which is most needed for effective living in our civilization.

The historical parallelism between culture and schools:

A. In primitive society. To say that a people are primitive is to say that the technique of their industry is very simple, and that they have a very simple set of social customs. Among such a people education is correspondingly simple. Boys learn to hunt and fish chiefly by imitating their fathers. The rudiments of skill are doubtless practiced through play. When the bigger boys begin to take part in the real hunting, fishing, and fighting, their elders no doubt give them pointers. All the simple arts of industry and the simple practices of social usage are acquired in the same way. Among most primitive tribes it is customary to put the young through a sort of initiation ceremony as they enter adulthood. In this they give proof of what they have learned, and also take upon themselves the most solemn vows to keep the rules of the tribe. In these ceremonies the medicine men take a conspicuous part, committing the secrets of the tribe to the young men. These medicine men are the first specialized teachers.

B. Among the ancient Greeks and Hebrews. Among the ancient Hebrews education consisted chiefly in imparting to the children the religious beliefs and laws, inasmuch as

religion was the most characteristic feature of Hebrew life. In Athens boys attended the so-called music school part of the day, and the gymnasium the rest of the day. In the music school they learned to recite the heroic poetry of the Greeks, to play on the lyre, and to compose poetry and music. In the gymnasium they were taught physical grace and the team-work and self-control of games. This was because poetry, music, art, originality, and physical grace were the things most emphasized in Athenian civilization. In Sparta boys were taken from their mothers at the age of about seven, reared with the men in barracks, and put through the hard, rigorous discipline of soldiers. This was because Sparta was a militaristic civilization; soldiering was her dominant interest.

C. In ancient Rome. In early Rome boys were taught the heroic traditions and drilled in the manly virtues that Roman achievement was founded upon. In the declining days of the Roman Empire the sons of the aristocrats devoted themselves chiefly to an insincere study of grammar, rhetoric, and oratory, since these had come to be the means whereby men won their way in Roman politics. Meantime, in the little Christian communities, schools were established in connection with the churches to teach the fundamentals of the Christian faith.

D. In the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages there were three classes of people in society, the soldiers, the priests, and the peasants. There was a special type of education for each. Candidates for the priesthood were taught to read and copy the religious books of the time, and to believe the religious doctrines; candidates for knighthood were put through the training, first of a page and then of a squire, till they were prepared to take the vows of knighthood. The peasants got no book-learning at all—only apprenticeship in their various trades.

E. In periods of change. The effect of civilization upon

education is most clearly shown, however, by the great changes in civilization. When Athenian civilization became more complex, creative, and skeptical, following the repulse of the Persians and during the Periclean Age, the Greek schools took on a similar change. Higher schools were very much more patronized, and a special class of mercenary teachers, who advertised to teach young men to argue either side of any question, and "make the worser seem the better reason," were very much in demand. These teachers sowed the seeds of Greek decay. When Rome during the second and first centuries B. C. expanded from a provincial republic to a cosmopolitan empire, she felt her need of a more cultured and cosmopolitan education for her young men, whereupon she imported the already highly developed educational system of the Greeks, together with many Greek teachers. As the Roman state declined and the Roman church took over more and more the responsibility of ordering the life of the people, the schools of rhetoric died out, while the schools of the church grew in importance, so that for two or three centuries after the fall of Rome the few schools that still existed were all under the auspices of the church. When the ancient culture was revived and new intellectual interests awakened, during the century or two before the discovery of America and the Protestant Revolt, there occurred corresponding changes in schools. Universities sprang up over all western Europe, and were attended in some cases by tens of thousands of students; new secondary schools were established; old curriculums were discarded, the new learning was put in the place of medieval theology; and in some schools methods were adopted similar to those that had been used by the ancient Athenians. When democracy began to grow strong after the opening of the nineteenth century, there developed with it a system of universal elementary education at public expense. "We must educate our new masters," said a member of Parlia-

ment. And with the marvelous development of civilization along all lines at the present time, there is naturally occurring the greatest expansion of popular education that the world has ever seen.

F. In America: colonial times. A closer view of educational changes and development in our country during the last century and a half illustrates the same principle: that the system of education depends upon the system of civilization. In colonial times there was no such thing as a public-school system outside of New England, and even there only the meager beginnings. The curriculum consisted of reading, writing, the catechism, and a very little arithmetic very poorly taught. The school year was only a few weeks in length, and the teachers were more ignorant than we can easily imagine. A few institutions of higher learning got started before the Revolution, but the course was very scant, and only a few clergymen and lawyers attended. There were no professional schools.

G. From the Revolution to the Civil War. During the period between the Revolution and 1830 statesmen began expounding the necessity for popular education, philanthropists contributed to the encouragement of private schools, while some states enacted legislation and made small appropriations for the establishment of public schools. But the growth of public education was slow. Except in New England and up-state New York there was still nothing worthy the name of a public-school system.

But by 1840 a remarkable new element had come into American life: the American people had come to self-consciousness as a nation. The War of 1812 had demonstrated our political independence; soon thereafter Americans had begun installing machines and depending upon themselves instead of upon England for manufactured goods; American shipping had grown likewise; Irving and others had given the United States the beginnings of a

national literature; the Louisiana Purchase had transferred our western boundaries from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains; the wide area between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi River had filled up with population; extensive canal systems had been built and railroad construction was beginning; democratic ideals were being popularized by Westerners like Jackson; religious movements distinctly American—like Methodism—had stirred the people; and reforms like the temperance and the abolition movements were in the air. A great educational awakening was inevitable under such circumstances. Horace Mann is the outstanding figure of that movement. By 1861 a system of free, tax-supported, public, elementary schools had been established in all the Northern states; secondary education had made a great growth, though mostly on a private basis; most of our now famous Eastern colleges had been established; and the professions were being put on a scientific foundation. Had the slavery issue been settled by cool arbitration, as it should have been, instead of by hot fighting, the South would have made similar educational advances within a decade or two.

H. Since the Civil War: technic and social changes. The changes that have occurred in American civilization since the Civil War are too great to be even summarized intelligently in a brief chapter like this. Our population has doubled. Cities have grown in number and size, till we are now an urban instead of a rural people. Our free land has almost all been taken up and we are beginning to feel the overcrowding of older countries. Agriculture has been revolutionized by the introduction of machinery and science. The railroad net has been spread over the entire country. Manufacturing has been put on the modern, large-scale, machinofacture basis, and has grown to enormous proportions. The corporation has become the typical form of business organization; great trusts and combinations of

trusts have appeared, and the control of industry has become centralized to such a degree as to be alarming. The rich are becoming very rich, the percentage of those owning no property is growing, and the middle class is slowly losing its proportionate share of the national wealth. With these changes there is a growing apprehension of "plutocracy." Since the Civil War labor organizations have steadily grown; and the antagonism between capital and labor has grown ever more bitter, till it begins to look like an "irrepressible conflict." Along with these changes has grown up a good deal of radical theory that would have shocked our grandfathers. Much immigration of diverse races has destroyed the like-mindedness of earlier decades, so that we are now a heterogeneous people. The growth of telegraphs, telephones, mail service, and newspapers has made communication easier; the good effect of which is to enable us to act together quickly; the bad effect is that we are subject to mob crazes and deceitful mental epidemics—we are more easily victimized by propaganda. Scientific discovery and the application of science have grown more in the past half century than in many centuries previous. The death rate has been very greatly reduced. America has developed a literature that compares creditably with that of other nations. Religious beliefs have altered; amusements have changed; and the ideals by which we plan our lives are very different from those of our grandfathers. We have developed international relations, especially since the outbreak of the Great War, that render our former isolation no longer possible. And when all these changes and developments are added together they represent an utterly new world for us as compared with that of Lincoln's day. In fact, during the last half century we have completed the transition from the old agriculture-handicraft régime to the new machinofacture régime. We are just coming out into the new super-civilization of the future.

I. Corresponding changes in education. A corresponding development is occurring in education. We were a nation of third-graders on the average in 1870; by 1920 we had become a nation of sixth-graders on the average, with the average constantly rising. Investment in school plants and annual expenditure for maintenance were four times as much in 1915 as in 1890. High-school attendance was seven times as great in 1920 as it had been in 1890. The old-fashioned district school in the open country is rapidly giving place to the modern consolidated school; which means high-school opportunities for rural children as well as for city children. Expenditure for higher education was ten times as great in 1915 as in 1890. The two-year budget for one of our great state universities in 1921-22 was as much as our total expenditure for all higher education in 1880. The elementary curriculum in 1870 consisted only of the three R's, plus a little geography and less history. A list of the subjects and activities that have been added to the high-school program since then would make one wonder what they did do in those days. There were, then, ancient and modern languages, rhetoric and English literature, mathematics, general history, "natural philosophy," and sometimes bookkeeping. At the universities several new professions have been added, and the variety of offerings has spread out like a fan. Methods have changed as much in teaching as in picture-making. Teaching has been made a real profession by the recent development of a rich body of technical and scientific knowledge necessary to its practice. And we are as yet only at the half-way house so far as concerns the development of new schools for a new age.

Educational aims. In *Joan and Peter* (an interesting piece of fiction well worth reading in this connection) H. G. Wells has one of his characters inquire, with some disgust and dismay: "What are the schools up to anyway?" High school students are wont to wonder, and sometimes to in-

quire, what use there is in taking this, that, or the other subject. In this case teachers are often put to it for an answer, often satisfying themselves, if not their pupils, with the old bromides, and sometimes quite failing to "sell" the most useful subjects to their pupils. Even parents often wonder what it is all about, schools being so different than in their own youth, and not infrequently having to stifle their own skepticisms with the supposition that everything must be all right, even if so "modern" that they can't understand it. Scarcely anything, therefore, is more important than to get our thinking cleared up on the subject of educational aims.

The "cultural" aim. Culture is an overworked word. In sociology it carries the meaning explained in this book. In education it has so many and such diverse meanings that one is tempted to drop it from his pedagogical vocabulary altogether, in the interests of clear thinking.

In school-house talk, the word "culture" usually refers to the old-fashioned subjects, which carry a sort of traditional prestige. When used in this sense the word should be written in quotation marks: "culture." "Conventional" would better express the meaning in mind. Parents sometimes want their children to wear an education as a sort of badge that will admit them to a more exclusive social set. The more exclusive the school to which such parents can send their children the better they are suited. As for the subjects such pupils study, it is not a question of the utility of the subjects, if only the subjects are those that an educated person is supposed to know. Some subjects that are relatively of little use, such as Latin, French, geometry, and certain English classics, hold their place in the curriculum largely because they serve the wearers as badges of having been educated according to the conventionalities of select society. Of course this aim is seldom frankly admitted, any more than the real motives for any fashion are

frankly admitted. However, it should be frankly recognized as an unworthy aim in a democracy. Schools which cater to it should fall under suspicion of rendering a dis-service to society.

In a democracy true culture should be a resource of all the people. Real culture is any possession of the mind by which life can be enriched. The person who can put art and science into his everyday work, who knows how to beautify the common things that he uses, who has abundant resources for wholesome recreation, and especially who understands the signs of the times in which he lives, is the truly cultured person. And the education which gives that sort of culture to all the people is of very great social value indeed. Without real culture there is no real civilization. Democracy can never be a real success till education imparts culture to all the members of society. Cultural democracy is essential to the permanent success of political democracy. But intellectual snobbery is not culture!

The disciplinary aim. The so-called disciplinary value of education ought to be mentioned if only for the purpose of warning students against it. The term camouflages an unconscious deceit. The old idea, handed down to us from Plato, that the mind can like a muscle be strengthened by exercise, is almost wholly fallacious. The mind can be strengthened only by acquiring useful knowledge, habits, and feelings. Any subject well taught and efficiently studied has just as much discipline in it—whatever that may mean—as any other subject equally well studied and taught. To select subjects for their alleged “disciplinary value” has been proven by educational psychology to be almost pure illusion. The argument is out of date; to use it is evidence that one has not revised his educational theories in the light of recent knowledge. It is the traditional reason given for traditional subjects that have ceased to be useful enough, in comparison with newer subjects, to justify their place

in the curriculum. The word is now a stumbling block. The only question of importance about any school subject, then, is its intrinsic utility.

The vocational objective. This objective needs no explanation; but it does require a few comments. Some of the elementary subjects have vocational value, especially reading, writing, and arithmetic. The high school ought to give some attention to preparing young people to earn their living. There are those who contend, and rightly so from the standpoint of democratic ideals, that vocational training suited to his needs and abilities ought to be furnished to every youth by our school system. Few persons, however, have thought through to its final conclusion the difficulty involved in such a proposition.

The usual trouble with our thinking is that we look for dollars-and-cents values in subjects where it is not to be found, and miss the values that are to be found in them. Students often conclude that a given subject is worthless because there is nothing in it that will help them earn their living; and to its other values they are blind. And too often their teachers fail to show them the real value of such subjects. We not only have to earn a living, but we also have to live a life; and we need education quite as much for the second as for the first. We need education quite as much for our leisure as for our working hours. American materialism consists mostly in failure to realize that fact. We imagine that if we have money everything else in life will take care of itself. If we were really educated we would realize that that is not so. There are other aims of education beside the vocational.

The institutions as objectives. The institutions of society (cf. p. 11) are the objectives of education. That is to say, the purpose of education is to get us ready to take our parts in the team work of the institutions. And not merely in the industrial institution, but in all the rest.

A. The family. We need education for worthy family life. If the new type of housekeeping described in Chapter VI is to be practiced, there is no end to the knowledge of art, science and the "new humanities" that the modern housekeeper can make use of. Knowledge is not to show off with, but to live by; and *culture* (not "culture") should begin at home. Our civilization will be fine and satisfying about in proportion as art, science, and the "new humanities" are used in family life; for no society can rise higher than the culture of its mothers.

Moreover, two boys need *similar* culture for worthy family life, no matter how different their vocations may be. The poor woman needs just as much real culture as does the rich woman, for the maintenance of a fine family life. In fact she needs it more, for what culture there is in her home life she herself will have to make; whereas the rich woman can buy the fashionable substitutes for culture.

B. The community. It makes all the difference in the world in the wholesomeness and desirability of neighborly relations what kind of interests the neighbors have to entertain themselves with when they get together for sociability. In some cases there is nothing but horse play, buffoonery, or even debauchery. In other cases there is a fine use of music, dramatics, and literary discussions. In the Danish Folk High Schools young people in their later teens, *who expect nothing other than always to be farmers*, study literature, music, art, history, philosophy, and what not. The effect is to enrich not only their family life, but their community associations. It takes Millet's "Man with the Hoe" and makes him sharer in the cultural treasures of the race. Danes have been heard to say that such schooling "makes them feel like human beings." Education is not to show off with, nor a means of escaping work. It is to *live* by! Rightly understood and properly used it can add as much to the joy of life as wealth or liberty or love. Neighborly relations

among educated people are less apt to be demoralizing, and far more satisfying, than among the ignorant and uncultured.

C. The state. In order to vote intelligently on public issues, and even to contribute one's share to a sound public opinion it is necessary to know a good deal about civics, economics, sociology, history, and other kindred subjects. And the people of a democracy need a generous supply of that kind of information, because there are so many social problems now up for solution; and upon their correct solution depends the welfare of the future. It is to be hoped that the reading of this book will have awakened the reader's mind to many such problems.

D. The school. In a few years the readers of this book will be called upon to vote, directly or indirectly, on various questions of school policy. Some of these questions will be issues at district elections, some will be issues in state politics, and some will be national issues. What is the school doing to prepare you for such responsibilities? What have you learned about the history of American education? What do you know about the heroes of educational progress in America, and what principles they stood for? What have you been taught about the economic principles involved in the tax system by which schools are supported? What do you know about our schools in comparison with those of other nations? If your schooling has neglected to instruct you on such matters it has neglected an important objective of education; namely, to prepare you to be intelligent patrons and supporters of public education, and advocates of educational progress.

And so on throughout the list of institutions. The aim of education is to furnish the young with the intellectual resources that will enable them to live like civilized men in the midst of the institutions of a civilized society.

Another function of education is to predetermine the institutions of the future. More than that, education is the

instrument by which the adults now living predetermine the institutions and civilization of the future. Education is the steering gear of society. The social life of tomorrow will depend to a great extent upon what we put into the school program of today. If rural children have one-room schools, with a barren course in reading, writing, and arithmetic, the rural people will become an ignorant, exploited peasantry. But if the rural schools include a high-school course, in which scientific agriculture, agricultural economics, and cultural subjects are taught, the rural people will become prosperous, enlightened, and cultured. If the education of girls is definitely planned to make them appreciate the social importance of the family, and to equip them with the sciences, arts, and technique to put their house-keeping on a quasi-professional level, the homes of the future will become much more efficient and cultured than otherwise. If all boys and girls are given vocational training of a practical sort, the industries of tomorrow will become much more efficient than they can possibly become if boys and girls are pushed out into the world's work without vocational preparation. If young people are taught enough economics, sociology, and civics to help them understand the problems that will have to be settled at the polls during the next fifty years, the government will become a very different institution from what it would become if the young people were brought up in utter ignorance of all these things. In fact, there is not an institution or social activity of the future but can be predetermined by the education of today, if we only have the wisdom to lay out the right educational program.

The social problems of education. The social problem in the case of education is to make education perform its functions completely, instead of partially. Its objectives must be fully achieved. No one would claim that our educational system does that, great as have been its improve-

ments and extensions within the last fifty years. It still falls short. The curriculum will have to be still further changed. The health of school children must be looked after adequately instead of partially. Provisions for the vocational education of all must be completed. This is perhaps the greatest of all our educational problems, because the equipment will be expensive, the administration will be complicated, and, if some students of the subject are right, it cannot be done in the regular high schools, but will have to be taken care of in special vocational schools closely connected with the industries themselves. Studies adapted to civic training, particularly civics, economics, sociology, and history, will have to be given adequate place in the curriculum. As for the cultural aim, the problem is to get rid of the subjects that impart only a false culture, and select the ones that have real culture in them.

In almost every chapter of this book we have taken occasion to observe the central sociological fact that social life is a matter of mental interactions, and that institutions consist of prevailing ways of thinking, feeling, and willing. Institutional changes are nothing less nor more, therefore, than changes in the prevailing habituated states of mind. To change the prevailing beliefs about religion, for example, is to change the religious institution. The institutions of the future will depend upon the beliefs, ideals, and habits now being inculcated into the minds of the rising generation. If Americans become habitually law-abiding, our democratic government will work fairly well; but if the habit of disregarding the law becomes prevalent, government will break down. Now, here is a social machine, the school, whose very business it is to put knowledge of its own selection into all young intellects, and to mould habits and ideals according to its own deliberate purposes. Obviously, therefore, the school can in large measure make the institutions of the future what it pleases. Since institutions

consist essentially of prevailing states of mind, it follows necessarily that the school is the steering gear of a democratic society.

The school is the steering gear of democracy. Perhaps the way to discern the social problem of education most clearly is to inquire, first, what the institutions and social activities of the future ought to be, and second, what kind of education will best fit the young people to take part in such activities and institutions. What kind of education will help society to reduce disease? Social workers tell us that disease can be prevented not by medicine and surgery, but only by education. They say the same thing about crime. Many wise persons are seriously questioning the utility of jails and prisons, especially as they are now managed. What is the kind of education that will prevent young persons, including even those of poor brains and bad heredity, from growing into criminals? Philanthropists and charity workers are beginning to despair of getting rid of poverty except through education. Is it not perfectly plain that many men are incompetent and poverty-stricken because their moral and vocational education was neglected in youth? Is not such neglect on the part of society quite inexcusable? What is the type of education that will qualify each individual to do some useful work in the world and do it well? Rather, what are the types? For the type will have to differ for all the different grades of intelligence, as well as for all the different kinds of work. Education is the chief item in the solution of the negro problem. What sort of education is it that will put the negro on his feet as a useful, happy, acceptable member of American society? Likewise it is the schools that must assimilate our immigrants. What sort of education should our girls receive to qualify them to maintain ideal homes in the future? What is the solution to the problem of moral education? We must find it and apply it, or society may suffer serious damage.

And so on, throughout the list of social activities: what is the education that will make them effective in the coming generations? That is the social problem of education. It is clear that the schools of tomorrow, if they are to perform all these functions, will be very different from the schools of today; very different indeed! Our problem is to make them what they need to be.

The need of universal, liberal education. It is clear that education will not perform its functions successfully for the new age if only a part of the children go to school, or if very many of them go to school only a short time. There must be generous education for all children. It must be adapted to the various capacities of the various grades of intellect; but all must be constrained to receive education in proportion to their ability. We ought soon to become a nation of twelfth graders on the average. All our young people—except perhaps the dullest ten per cent—ought to be kept in school till high-school graduation. Educational opportunities ought to be uniform the country over. It is not fair to the citizens, nor safe for democracy, for children in favored cities and states to have good schools, while children in rural districts and backward states have only poor schools.

New schools for a new age. In Chapter VIII an effort was made to show the student what a profound change in our civilization has been effected by the Industrial Revolution. It is really a new, democratic, scientific, machinofacture super-civilization upon which we are entering. In this chapter it has been pointed out that the educational system must correspond with the civilization. The inference is inevitable, namely, that we must produce an educational system as different from that of a century or so ago as our new super-civilization is destined to be different from the old handicraft civilization of an earlier day. *Otherwise the new super-civilization will not work successfully.* It must be

clear to any intelligent student that the great educational development of the last century has brought us only half-way up the hill. We must keep education developing at the same rate for another century. By that time we may have consummated an adequate system. There is probably nothing more important than this for our public to understand.

PROBLEMS

1. Illustrate the value of habits. Present to your imagination the large and important part that habits play in life.

2. Illustrate the difference between innate needs and acquired wants.

3. Which is the more important, the wants or the knowledge that education imparts?

4. In his *Autobiography* Roosevelt states a violent disapproval of academic debating in which students take either side regardless of their convictions. Discuss.

5. Look up the biography of Horace Mann.

6. Let each member of the class question his parents about the kind of schools they attended, and report to the class. Likewise, your grandparents, if possible.

7. Point out the waste involved in the so-called "disciplinary" and "cultural" aims of education.

8. Discuss the value of each of the high-school subjects.

9. What should be the program of required subjects in high schools?

10. It is retorted that no one can tell what the institutions and social activities of the future ought to be. Discuss.

11. Let some class member write an imaginative description of American schools a century hence.

12. In your community what percentage of eighth-grade graduates persevere clear through high school?

13. What percentage of children between fourteen and sixteen are "gainfully employed" instead of being in school?

14. What is the age of compulsory attendance in your state? How well is it enforced?

15. Gather the salient facts about the financial support of schools in your community.

16. Select one (and then another and another) of the institutions listed

in Chapter I, and discuss what a person needs to know in order to take part in it.

17. In the case of each institution consider whether education should be similar for all, or specialized for each. For home making, for example, should two girls be educated differently or similarly?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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ELLWOOD, C. A., *The Social Problem*, Chapter VI.

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FINNEY, ROSS L., *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*.

Of which the present chapter is a brief summary. Many progressive measures are suggested.

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On the significance of education as a cause determining social institutions and activities. A discussion of profound sociological insight.

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Brilliant discussion of education and general enlightenment as factors in social control.

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A thorough and very significant treatise on education as the guiding factor in society. Every educator should read it.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapter XXIII.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter XIII.

Critical toward the present standardized practices.

CHAPTER XIV

MORALITY

The dawn of morality. Whoever has observed animals attentively knows that even among them there is a sort of rudimentary moral code. Dogs learn from their masters that there are certain things they must not do, certain things they must not touch, and certain privileges they may enjoy. Kipling writes about "the law of the pack;" and every farm boy knows that there are compulsion and submission among his father's cattle. One can but wonder what the laws of the group may have been among *Pithecanthropus* and his kind. The Neanderthal breed must have had a much more elaborate moral code than *Pithecanthropus*, since they were so vastly superior in intelligence.

Among all primitive tribes studied by anthropologists a well-developed moral code has always been found. There are certain customs to which a moral value is attached. There are certain taboos, that is, forbidden acts; and there is a system of sanctions, that is, penalties for misbehavior. Obedience is forced upon the individual, first, by the habits he absorbs from his associates during childhood, and second, by the relentless compulsion of his group when necessary. Moral behavior among primitive groups consists in obedience to the group, and the motive is largely fear. And to this day it is the command of the group that enforces the moral law; and fear, in one form or another, is still one of the chief motives for obedience. Ordinarily we take peculiar delight in deceiving ourselves on this point; but we realize that such is the fact when we find ourselves desperately desirous of doing some forbidden act.

We can only conjecture what morality was among the first human beings that ever existed upon the earth. It

must have been somewhat animal-like. The older and stronger members of the group would probably claim some object, and woe betide the unlucky youngster or weakling who ventured to trespass! We can readily imagine that the full-grown males were the terror of the youths; and that the mothers were the earliest advocates of sympathy and justice. Doubtless the youths would learn a list of things they must not do, a list of duties they must perform, and a list of privileges they might enjoy. Even the adult men would not find themselves above the unpleasant reproaches of the mothers. And so our imagination may run on as to the morals of the very first men. We really do not know very much about them, except that they certainly must have had some set of customs, and some sort of enforced regulations, and some sense of responsibility to the group, that served as the beginnings of morality.

Geographical and biological influences. The moral code is modified, at least in its applications, by each of the four classes of social causes. Geographical influences affect it in such ways as the following: in a dry climate rules would regulate the water supply. We catch glimpses of such rules in the references to wells in the Old Testament. In a sterile region like Tibet the moral law allowed a woman to have several husbands. The extreme difficulty of securing subsistence is said to have accounted for this. Some tribes in extremely cold and sterile climates kill their old people, because they are too great a burden upon the tribe. In a climate where nature is generous and food easy to get, laziness is not regarded as wrong.

Biological causes and their effects upon the moral code may be illustrated as follows. Peoples of low mentality have a laxer sex code than do highly intelligent peoples. Taboos have been placed by nearly all peoples upon marriages of close relatives. When peoples of widely different racial stock live in close contact, a set of rules grows up to regulate

their relations, as may be illustrated by the social rules governing relations between negroes and whites.

Technical influences. In the chapter on industry it has already been pointed out how the influences of technical changes have penetrated into the very heart of the moral code. The rules about killing calves will depend altogether upon whether the calves are wild game or domesticated animals. The rules about personal rights in land were very different after plants and animals had been domesticated, than they had been before. The recent technic change from hand-tools to machine-tools is introducing changes into the moral code. For instance, is it right or wrong for organized laborers to picket and boycott? Has the employer the right to hire whomever he pleases; or has the union a right to dictate whom he may hire? Is it right for corporations to "water" their stock and offer "watered" stock for sale on the market? Is it right or wrong for railroads to grant rebates to large shippers? Is it right for the law of supply and demand to regulate the price of wages and conditions of labor, or should they be regulated by artificial means? Is it right or wrong for a man to be director on the boards of several competing concerns? These are new questions about the moral code that have been forced upon us by the Industrial Revolution. They are but samples; there are very many others. Some of them are settled, some are not; but the fact that the questions are new illustrates the fact that technic changes cause changes in the moral code.

Social influences. Social causes affect the moral code. For instance, where the institution of polygamy is practiced the moral code is distorted to correspond to it. Chivalry was a social institution; and so was Puritanism; but each produced peculiar modifications in the moral codes. Slavery had profound effects upon what the people regarded as right and wrong. War calls for different virtues than does peace. It places so much emphasis on courage and good-fellowship

that soldiers are likely to overlook the importance of the virtues essential in peace. Hence returned soldiers sometimes have to relearn the virtues of peace; and a war is apt to be followed by a spasm of degenerate morals. Some very foolish magazine articles appeared during the late war, suggesting that the soldiers had got new light on questions of right or wrong! It was only that war is a social situation which calls for different virtues than does peace; just as it takes a somewhat different set of virtues to make a good policeman than it does to make a good nurse.

Why morals differ in different countries. Since all these causes tend to modify the contents of the moral law it is evident why there are somewhat different moral customs in different countries. Each country has had a different combination of causes operating to form its moral code; consequently each country has a somewhat different moral code.

History of our own moral code. Our own moral code has had its history. Many of the principles upon which it is based are taken from the Bible. Our legal code is founded in part upon Roman law and in part upon the law of Moses, and our ethical ideals on the teachings of Jesus. Back of the law of Moses was the code of Hammurabi, a Babylonian king; the former shows some borrowing from the latter. Back of both is the age-long experience of the race. For at least 100,000 years men have been learning by bitter experience that immoral conduct destroys them, while moral behavior conserves their welfare.

The Greeks and Romans had some influence on the development of our moral heritage. Greek experience showed the value of frankly enjoying beauty, nature, and physical action; while early Roman experience demonstrated the value of rigorous, hardy self-control. Greek decadence, on the other hand, demonstrated that individual judgment and desire is no safe guide in morals, while Roman decadence demonstrated the destructiveness of self-indulgence and the

vices. The medieval church relaid the foundations on new soil, that decadent Greece and Rome had destroyed; but in so doing it placed an undue emphasis upon self-denial for its own sake. This influence is still felt: there are still those who think it virtuous to deny themselves what they wish, whether their self-denial does anybody any good or not.

Chivalry made an important contribution to the growth of western morals. It taught the distinction between love and lust, which the ancient classic world had apparently failed to make. The result in the long run was to exalt woman to a position of dignity and respect in society. This was a very great achievement indeed. Puritanism has had a profound effect upon American morals; its influence was good in the main, strengthening the hold of the Christian code upon us; but it unnecessarily repressed the joys of play, beauty, love, and happiness. The rise of democracy during the last century and a half has increased human sympathy and so mitigated the miseries of criminals and slaves, promoted the cause of the poor, increased the attention given to children, and enforced the rights of women. But, unfortunately, it has also over-emphasized the rights of individuals, and so led, sometimes, to too much self-indulgence.

The conscience code is even now in process of development. As a matter of fact, there never was a time when the mores were in more obvious flux than now. Scepticism, discussion, and debate are rife as to whether the traditional standards of right and wrong should be kept or revised; which means that we shall come out of this period with standards somewhat revised. The causes of this transition are not far to seek; they are in the technical, economic, political, and social changes of the past century. For example, the coming of the automobile has forced us to invent a lot of new rules for the regulation of its use. These are moral rules, because they are methods of collective welfare. But it is hard for us to take them as such; they are so new.

It is hard for one to feel himself a lawbreaker just because he has violated the traffic regulations. It is conjectured that the automobile has, in this way, increased the public disrespect for law. Again, the new equality of women, which has resulted partly from the new opportunities in industry that the Industrial Revolution created, is producing changes in the codes of law, morals, and etiquette. It is no longer impolite to keep one's seat in the street car while ladies are standing; women are even claiming their right to men's vices, smoking, for example; and the laws are being changed so as to give married women reasonable rights to their own property and earnings of which they were formerly denied. These samples may serve to illustrate why "the mores are in flux."

Not all the present changes are for the better: women's claim to men's vices, on the ground of equality, for example. The problem of a period of change like ours is to come out of it at last with a code of morals that is closer to the real needs of human nature. That is to be hoped for; but it is certain that meantime many young moths will singe their wings in the old, old flames.

The conscience code not innate. From the foregoing discussion it ought to be clear that we learn the moral code of the community we are brought up in by being taught it, just as we learn anything else. Knowledge of right and wrong is not stamped upon the mind from birth as some people imagine.

There are no such things as innate ideas, that is, ideas that are stamped upon our minds before birth so that we come into the world knowing them without ever having learned them. Plato taught the doctrine of innate ideas; but he was mistaken. Following Plato, the doctrine was held by philosophers throughout the Middle Ages. One of the ideas that was supposed to have been innate was the idea of the divine right of kings. Behind the alleged innate-

ness of this idea the kings intrenched themselves for generations. What God had stamped upon the mind before birth it would be irreverent, treasonable presumption to question. As a matter of fact the idea was stamped upon children's minds by their elders so early that by the time they were grown they had entirely forgotten ever having learned it. Modern psychology began in the successful attempt of John Locke (1632-1704) to prove that the mind at birth is a "tabula rasa," i.e. a white, unwritten page. Locke's aim, however, was not to found psychology, but to unseat the kings.

The same is true of the conscience code. It is not innate. Most of it we learned so early that we have forgotten the process; nevertheless we learned it. One ought therefore to be modest about saying, as persons often do, with an air of great finality, that his conscience tells him thus and so. By speaking thus one is liable to betray himself as a mere self-righteous bigot blinded by prejudice or desire. The moral code has authority, of course; but not the authority of innate ideas. From the standpoint of social science its authority is attested by the age-long experience of the race.

The function of morality. The function of morality is to promote "the greatest good of the greatest number." Human nature has certain needs that have to be taken care of; morality is for the purpose of taking care of those needs. The rules of the moral code are the rules of human welfare, based on race experience. The effect of behavior upon human welfare attests its rightness or wrongness. It is the behavior that does harm which is branded as immoral; it is the behavior that makes for human welfare which is approved as moral. Certain moral rules work out for the protection of life, and others are for the protection of property. When these rules are commonly disregarded crime becomes rampant, and life and property are no longer safe. Certain moral rules are necessary to the success of

family life; when they are disregarded the family breaks down, as in ancient Rome. Others make government work smoothly; when they are disregarded government becomes a failure. Others, such as diligence, thrift, self-control, and so forth, are absolutely necessary to the success of industry; and when they go by default, as was so generally the case in 1920, industrial troubles ensue. The moral code furnishes the rules of the game of living together; without morality life can be nothing but a failure. History proves that the moral breakdown of any people presages the destruction of their civilization. As an ancient Hebrew proverb has it: "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." It is worse than a reproach, it is the destruction of a people. "The wages of sin is death."

"The mills of the gods grind slowly." It is not always clear which conduct is beneficial and which is damaging. A certain kind of conduct, as for example, dancing to jazz music, or indulging in luxuries, may seem pleasant at the time; but its remote effects in the long run may be damaging. Certain types of behavior do not bear their fruits for centuries, so that the persons who indulge in them may never live to see the results. Examples are slave-selling to the American colonies, exploiting her colonies by ancient Rome, overdoing the matter of self-denial during the Middle Ages and in Puritan New England, securing tariff favors by graft following our Civil War. In such cases it takes sometimes the experience of centuries to appraise results. But in the long run the results tend to become clear, and behavior tends to get branded or approved as it deserves. Again, certain rules may work for the welfare of a small ruling class, but to the detriment of the masses. Eventually the masses will rebel, the issue will be fought out, and rules substituted that are for the mutual good of all. An example would be the rules that made many serfs and a few landlords in Russia. The fundamental principles of the moral

code are attested by their effects in the long run. They have shown by the test of use and time that they really are for the greatest good of the greatest number. Thus the human authority back of the moral law is the age-old experience of the race. Most of the rules of our moral code have long since passed that searching test, and are therefore worthy of our reverence. To defy them is to court individual or national destruction.

Why moral codes are similar the world over. It was noted a moment ago that the codes of different nations differ. But in spite of minor differences there is much similarity. Murder is murder, stealing is stealing, adultery is adultery, lying is lying the world over among peoples of all stages of culture. Among civilized peoples the codes are much more similar than different. We are now prepared to see the reason for this: the needs of human nature are much the same the world over. Food, clothing, and shelter are universal, though they may differ in detail with climate and culture. Friendship, neighborly association, family relations, beauty, worship, are universal needs and will probably differ only in detail when all men everywhere have truly found themselves. And since the function of morals is to meet the needs of human nature it follows that morals must show similarities the world over; and that that general similarity tends to increase as civilization matures. There is another sense, then, in which the authority back of the moral law is the needs of human life; or religiously speaking, the Creator of those needs.

Moral problems. The moral code, like all other social institutions, "never is but always is becoming," because new situations are always arising that call for new applications of old principles. At any stage of development, therefore, the moral life of a people will present some problems, some incompletenesses, so to speak. The social problems naturally attract an undue amount of attention, just as a sore thumb

attracts more of the sufferer's attention than the abounding good health that pervades his whole body. Still problems do exist, and the better they are understood the sooner the necessary adjustments will be completed. A few typical problems of the moral life of modern society will accordingly be discussed.

The criterion of moral adjustments. Each institution has a set of rules regulating its activities. There is a sense, indeed, in which an institution is a set of rules regulating human actions. The Christian sabbath (i.e. Sunday) is an illustration. Sunday is different from other days in the week because of certain rules that govern our activities on that day. Some of these rules we regard as religious, and others as moral, still others are mere matters of custom. It is these peculiar rules that make the sabbath a peculiar institution. Now as conditions change these rules change. The sabbath is a very different institution than it was in New England two centuries ago. Whether it has changed for the better or the worse might be debatable. The test would be its ability to serve human welfare. "The sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath." This is true of all institutions; and this is the test of all moral changes. The problem of moral adjustment is to devise rules that will increase the real welfare of all concerned.

Problems connected with the family: discipline. The rules that govern family life are in process of change, the problem is to change for the better those rules that need changing, without changing those that need no change. Take the rules regulating the discipline of children. The old rules favored rigorous discipline, compulsory obedience, and corporal punishment. There is a growing theory that children ought to follow their own judgment and be guided only by reasoning. While the old-fashioned discipline may have been extreme, it is certain that the new theories are deceptive and dangerous. If one stuffs his head with false

notions about liberty and democracy he can juggle out plausible reasons for soft family discipline; but there is absolutely nothing in racial experience that warrants parents in neglecting to teach their children obedience.

Women's rights. The old rules used to treat women as inferiors. That was entirely unjust. We have gone a long way toward correcting this evil; though wives do not yet have equal property rights before the law with their husbands. But even in the matter of women's rights there is danger of some mistakes. It will probably turn out in the long run that the average woman can find her greatest happiness and largest usefulness in the home. If that conjecture proves correct, it will cause unhappiness and wasted energy for women to fall into the custom of believing otherwise. After a woman has entered into family relations she is certainly in duty bound to discharge her responsibilities efficiently. To evade that duty for selfish, flippant reasons will prove destructive of the best things. A woman's most precious right is her right to adequate protection and support for herself as a mother, and adequate opportunities in the world for her children.

Divorce. Divorce was formerly forbidden (except to kings and aristocrats), but it is now becoming very usual in America; more so than in any other country in the world except Japan. There are doubtless circumstances under which divorce is excusable. In many such cases an intolerable situation might have been avoided if the marriage had been entered into, "not unadvisedly, but reverently, discreetly, and in the fear of God." Too often divorce signifies a mere flippant, selfish, and sometimes sensual disregard of duty. Not a hard life but a soft creed, one writer has declared, is the chief cause of divorce. The welfare of the children in the case should be regarded as far more important than the so-called happiness of the married pair. The prevalence of divorce is considered a menace to our

society. Various remedies are suggested, including uniform divorce laws for all the states. But since experience suggests that in such matters law is a less effective restraint than religion, it would appear that the remedy will be achieved, if at all, only by a change of ideals on the part of the people.

Problems involved in industrial relations. In the field of industrial relations changes are being forced into the code by the new conditions of the machinofacture régime. Instances have already been mentioned. Railroad rebating was considered right fifty years ago; now it is known to be wrong. Various devices for juggling the form and value of corporation securities have also been outlawed. It used to be regarded as moral to employ children and women under any conditions to which they could be induced to agree; it is now regarded as immoral to employ children in certain lines of work, or under a specified age (differing in different states); or women except under certain restrictions. Restrictions are even being placed upon the conditions and hours of employment for men. Many unfair advantages in competition are being outlawed. And in all these matters the new code seems to be growing up in the public sentiment faster than it is in law.

Meaning of rights. This is an appropriate place to say a few words about rights. The word is used in two senses. We speak of natural rights and social (or legal) rights. A natural right is simply a need of man—there may be nothing whatever in social rulings or usage to guarantee it. A social right is a need of man that society is pledged by usage or rulings to guarantee. No man can protect his own rights: if they are protected at all they are protected for him by society.

Why rights change. Social rights change in two ways. First, new rights are added to the list which society undertakes to protect. For example, women now have the right

to vote which they did not formerly enjoy. Second, rights are superseded by larger rights, just as machines are superseded by better machines. The self-rake reaper was a good machine in its day, but it was superseded by the self-binding harvester, because the latter could do all that the former had done and more besides. After the self-binding harvester came into the field a self-rake reaper would only have been in the way. An earlier good would have become an enemy of the later best. In exactly the same way rights change. The divine right of kings is a case in point. When the people had to depend for social order upon the authority of kings, the right of kings to rule was a very useful right to all; but when democratic governments had learned to do all that kings had done, and more too, then the old right of kings became an enemy to the new rights of the people. What had once made for the human welfare now thwarted a better human welfare. To appeal to "rights" is often, therefore, an appeal to ignorance and prejudice only.

The right of freedom of contract. The right of freedom of contract is the most important instance in our day of this principle of obsolescent rights. In the old handicraft régime it was an instrument of human welfare; it prevented the enactment of laws that favored employers, but restricted the liberties of workers. But since the rise of machine-factory industry new and larger rights have had to supersede it. When laws were first proposed regulating the employment of women and children, employers fought in the courts for the children's and women's alleged right of freedom of contract. (Being driven by poverty to take whatever contract was offered, their right was really but a fiction.) A new and larger right, the right of the social group to protect its women and children from damaging labor, has now taken its place. New laws designed to prevent tenement labor, to prevent employees agreeing to assume all risk of injury, forbidding employees joining unions, to prevent employers

screening coal mined by weight before crediting same, to compel payment in cash instead of truck or scrip, to compel payment at regular intervals—new laws to stop all these and many other abuses have been resisted by appeal to the old right of freedom of contract. Too often the resistance has been successful; but as time goes on the courts are recognizing the larger rights. The new right of collective bargaining whereby a decent standard of living can be assured for all workers is being bitterly resisted by appeal to the old right of freedom of contract. In the case of a strike the battle always rages around the right of the strike-breakers to accept the jobs temporarily vacated by the strikers. The employers win if they can maintain for the strike-breakers that ancient right; the unions win if they can enforce the revision of that right. The public should not forget that ancient “rights” are rightly revised with the progress of human rights. Whenever such a revision is in process, the “right” is always the chief obstacle to the *right*.

The right to manage one's own business. For centuries it has been moral law and legal right for the owner of property to control his property. It has long been immoral for any one—even the state, except under a few specified conditions—to interfere with the owner's management of his own investment. But, as pointed out in a previous chapter, under the new conditions of modern, large-scale, machine-facture industry, this old rule tends to work some hardship upon the great mass of working people. It results in nearly all the abuses of modern capitalism. The reasons have already been explained. It used to be regarded as wrong for the common people to interfere in government; but it is now right. It used to be regarded as wrong for employees to interfere in the management of the business that employed them; but it is now evident to those who understand the new conditions that laborers must be given a voice in the management of modern large-scale industry. Just how

to arrange such a readjustment is one of the moral problems of the present age. To solve it will take our best thought and our most honest good-will.

Need of a new code of international relations. In the field of international relations we are desperately in need of a new moral code. The code that regulates the dealings of nation with nation is at least five hundred years behind the code that governs the relations of man with man. Strong nations steal, maraud, and murder with almost as little conscience as individual persons ever did in the least orderly societies. The very crimes of nations are still applauded as the virtue of patriotism. The game of international grab virtually forces every nation to play the game. Offences provoke retaliation, with the result that modern civilization is in very real danger of destroying itself.

The way out is to discard an old "right," and establish a larger right to take its place. Only when there is an authority to which each and every nation must submit, will any nation be safe from the menace of mutual self-destruction. National sovereignty is an old right; it now stands in the way of an immeasurably larger human welfare. It is one of the greatest problems of the age to work out a code of international morals, and to establish an international power able to enforce it.

Permanence of the fundamentals. To the young reader, the problems discussed in the last few pages may hardly have seemed like moral problems. Perhaps he has not been in the habit of regarding them as such. But such they are, nevertheless; and they are more subject to changes to meet the new conditions than are the ordinary rules of personal conduct which young people are in the habit of regarding as moral rules. But even these are the objects of some questioning, not always wise. Perhaps the most serious moral problem of our age is our tendency to tamper with the fundamentals of personal morality. We are wont to remark,

with naïve nonchalance, that this is an age of change; the implication being that whatever is old is out of date, and that all changes are good changes. But this is a mistake. Some items in the moral code do need changing, as we have seen; but there is after all a very real danger in this business of changing the moral code. The danger is that we may change the rules that do not need changing. The temptation to self-indulgence is always strong; the bridle of restraint always feels more or less uncomfortable. In an age when all change masquerades as progress it is the easiest thing in the world to convince oneself that he is being "broadminded," "liberal," and the like, when one is really playing with fire. But the fact is that murder, adultery, theft, graft, lying, gambling, dishonesty, laziness, extravagance, and sensuality are just as destructive as ever they were. With respect to these vices there can be no change in the rules except for the worse. The flippant attitude toward these age-tried fundamentals, so common nowadays, is like throwing the ballast overboard: it invites shipwreck. If we should make that mistake there would be dark ages again. Moral flippancy is fools' progress. We shall be safest as individuals and as a people if we preserve in our hearts a reverent, God-fearing attitude toward the old-fashioned fundamentals of personal morality.

The danger of individual self-guidance. The question is often debated whether the highest morality is to obey the law of one's group, or to think out the right and wrong of things for one's self. It must be admitted that he would be a very superior person who could be trusted to judge for himself as to what is right or wrong. Such persons are rare indeed. In the first place, one life is too short to follow conduct through to its consequences. In the second place, most intellects are too small to note all the effects of any act. And third, human nature can seldom think and wish at the same time. Black looks white, or at least gray, when

one's desires are on the rampage. Hence it is a rash venture indeed to question the authority of the moral law, and trust to one's own judgment entirely, especially under the pressure of a strong desire. Deciding on the as yet undecided applications of the moral code is really a vast coöperative enterprise; each one of us can hardly expect to contribute more than the tiniest peppercorn of originality. While all honor is due the few moral geniuses who do blaze new trails, it will prove safest for society if most of us common people keep pretty reverently to the beaten paths. Unless one is quite sure that he is at once a real philosopher and a true saint! Fifty per cent of the people are of average mentality or less; for them, at least, obedience is the safest rule of life. Probably it is for nearly all of us. Modern society is in some danger from the doctrine that each person may be his own guide in morals. That doctrine is a false inference from a misconceived idea of democracy. That was the very doctrine on which society went to pieces once before; and the Greek sophists were the culprits who promulgated the doctrine. The world ought to be wiser by now.

The social nature of the conscience-feeling. Much speculation has been indulged in by philosophers as to what the conscience-feeling is; but whatever else it may be, to sociologists it clearly is the individual's response to the group judgment. It is our feeling about how our associates feel about us. Our associates have very many ways indeed of showing disapproval, and human nature is extremely sensitive to their approval or disapproval. If a child is the object of his parent's displeasure he feels miserable. If one suspects that his equals regard him as inferior one feels depressed. Nothing brings out the best that is in one like the frank, hearty appreciation of one's group. If one were persistently boycotted by all his neighbors one would be driven to insanity, unless he could escape to some other neighborhood. Excommunication was a powerful weapon of the

medieval church. This sensitiveness to the approval of our group is a vast, pervasive, poignant feeling. It is an awful experience to draw upon one's self the condemnation of one's group. Reformers whose reforms are ahead of the times in which they live, so that they are misunderstood by their contemporaries, must suffer a loneliness of spirit peculiarly hard to bear. Criminals and crooks seek out small, congenial groups of kindred spirits in whose approval they can escape the disapproval of society as a whole. This explains the existence of the so-called underworld.

This instinctive sensitiveness to the approval and disapproval of one's group is probably a unit character of human nature. The conscience-feeling is innate, though the code that this feeling attaches itself to is acquired.

As has so frequently been pointed out, it is always misleading to assume that *an* explanation is *the complete* explanation. The foregoing explanation of the conscience-feeling is undoubtedly true as far as it goes; and it is particularly pertinent to sociology. Religion would doubtless explain the conscience-feeling as the voice of God within the soul. The two explanations are supplementary, not contradictory. And there are very good sociological as well as metaphysical reasons why young people should cherish the religious as well as the sociological view of the matter.

Crime: definition. Only part of the moral code gets written on the statute books. Some acts, usually the most destructive, are forbidden by law. Others are forbidden only by custom and public sentiment; though custom and public sentiment are often quite as effective as law and the police. Crime is the breaking of the law; there seems to be no other definition for the word.

Subjective causes of crime. In the past we have somewhat overworked the doctrine of personal responsibility. That doctrine is half the truth; the half that one should usually apply to himself. But we have somewhat overworked its

application to criminals. Some criminals are made such by their environment; that is the other half of the truth. In modern thought the causes of crime fall into two classes: subjective and objective.

Some persons are born with such low-grade intellects that they are unable to imagine the consequences of their misdeeds. Others seem to be born short with respect to the instinct of sympathy; a few persons even seem to have an insane mania for torture. Persons differ as to their innate sense of responsibility. The impulses of some seem to be much more imperious than the impulses of others. All such persons are born with more tendency to crime than normal persons are; though not all such persons commit crimes; nor do all criminals have weak heredity. Through eugenic measures we can gradually get rid of the worst of such human stock. Some should be confined for life, not because they have committed crimes, but because they are likely to. Only experts in mental and nervous diseases are capable of selecting such persons, however. Some might be prevented from committing crime by education, particularly vocational education especially adapted to their peculiar individual needs.

Objective causes of crime. Society itself tolerates conditions that influence some persons to become criminals. Jails and prisons themselves are often schools of crime. Lax city government encourages crime. Slums and bad housing are a cause of crime: gangs of boys who grow up in slums are in greater danger of becoming criminals than are boys who grow up in wholesome environments. Education that fails to equip with vocational training leaves many of its victims peculiarly tempted to crime. The lack of public employment agencies that can get jobs and jobless men together has a similar effect. Preventable poverty that compels mothers to neglect their children may result in some of them going wrong. Industrial exploitation provokes men

to crime. An industrial depression, or the after-effects of a war, may cause waves of crime. The prevalence of lax ideals about self-control, family discipline, and so forth, or the breakdown of religious faith, may increase the susceptibility of some to crime. The failure of police and courts to catch and punish criminals may encourage crime. And finally newspaper reports making public the success of criminals in getting large booty doubtless have the same effect. There is a sense in which a criminal should make us all blush with shame; society itself is too often the real sinner. The cure for crime is to remove all these objective causes of crime.

Criminal procedure and treatment. Our methods of apprehending, convicting, and punishing criminals are a positive disgrace¹ to civilized society. It takes brains as well as muscle to be a good policeman. The policeman should be a professional person. The knowledge of science, especially applied psychology, necessary to enable a man to do this work well is quite as great as that required to be a good teacher. The "third degree" that police officers put suspects through ruthlessly and shamelessly violates the fundamental rights of American citizens as guaranteed in the Constitution. Police courts often do their work in a shamefully arbitrary, inefficient fashion. The jury is recognized by competent authorities as out of date, as is also the battle of wits between opposing attorneys. The methods of the best juvenile courts point in the right direction. Authorities suggest that competent judges should be specially trained in the sciences of human nature, especially psychology, so that they can make the taking of evidence a matter of genuine scientific research. The common county jail is recognized as a school of crime. As for prisons, there should be much less of the element of punishment in their methods,

¹ See Parmelee, *Anthropology and Sociology in Relation to Criminal Procedure*, Macmillan, 1908.

and much more of the aims and methods of the hospital and the school. A much larger proportion of petty offenders could be let out on parole to their own and society's advantage.

But after all has been said the fact remains that fear of punishment is an indispensable preventive of crime. There is too much sentimentality about punishment. It may be as severe as necessary to protect society; but it should be wisely administered so that it may not be in vain. Certainty of apprehension is the most effective deterrent.

PROBLEMS

1. Produce illustrations of a rudimentary moral code among animals.
2. Read accounts of primitive peoples and note items in their moral code that seem strange to us.
3. Enumerate some practices that would not show their bad effects in a single lifetime.
4. Is a thing right for the person whose conscience approves it? Is it the intent or the result that makes behavior good or bad?
5. Is it a compliment to a person to assert that he means well?
6. Debate each of the questions on page 241.
7. Make a blackboard list of the motives that prompt people to be moral. Discuss each.
8. What is the technical meaning of the term criminal procedure? Criminal treatment?
9. Make a long list (on the blackboard) of abuses in connection with criminal procedure.
10. What are the methods of the juvenile court, and how do they differ from the usual procedure in cases of adult criminals?
11. Debate the abolition of the jury system.
12. Report articles in the best magazines during the last five years on the subject of prisons and prison abuses.
13. Find out what the science of psychology has to contribute to criminal procedure.
14. Debate capital punishment.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

BLACKMAR and GILLIN, *Outlines of Sociology*, Chapter XIV. The Macmillan Company.

On the evolution of ethics.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book IV, Chapter VI.

A chapter on crime and the criminal.

DEWEY and TUFTS, *Ethics*. Henry Holt and Company.

A theory of ethics from the sociological point of view. Best book in the field. In the last part concrete social problems are treated from the ethical standpoint.

GILLIN, J. L., *Criminology and Penology*. The Century Company.

A standard treatise, 1926.

HAYES, E. C., *Sociology and Ethics*. D. Appleton & Company.

A treatise on ethics from the sociological standpoint, by a recognized sociologist.

SUTHERLAND, E. H., *Criminology*. J. B. Lippincott Company.

An authoritative and recent work on the subject.

CHAPTER XV

RELIGION

The origin of religion. Religion is universal. No people has ever been found, however primitive, but that had some kind of natural religion. These natural religions came into existence because man has the kind of brain that he has. He is not satisfied to rest in ignorance of the unknown, nor even of the unknowable. To the dull brains of brutes the unknown and the unknowable are a blank; but to the reason of men they are objects of fear and curiosity, and fields of vivid fancy. If savage men did not know how the world came into existence, they guessed; they exchanged guesses; believed each other's guesses; until they had together built a creation myth. In this way the heathen mythologies, creeds, and religions came into existence.

Needs that man knows no means of satisfying. The unknown thing that tantalizes men most is that unknown something that would satisfy an urgent need, if they only knew what it was. A savage needs some unknown means of capturing fleet, wary, or dangerous game, or he needs some unknown means of warding off diseases or enemies. He accordingly invents magic. Whenever he does happen to capture his game, or recover from his diseases, or overcome his enemies, he concludes that his magic must have worked. The failures he overlooks. And so he comes to believe in his magic.

The various needs of the spirit. Now the human mind normally feels certain higher and more spiritual needs, such as the need for beauty, for knowledge, for approval of associates, for confidence in beliefs, and so forth. It is the unique grandeur of the human spirit that it feels such needs at all. But these needs reach out into the unknown and

the unknowable. To satisfy them the pagan mind postulates magic, myths, beliefs, creeds, and ideals; and these are the very substance out of which pagan religions are made. This may partly explain the way the natural religions began. Full of mistaken guesses though they were, their very existence is nevertheless evidence of man's sublime intellectual superiority over all other living creatures.

Geographical causes of religious changes. Religions, like everything else, have changed from time to time. The same causes—biological, geographical, technic, and social—operate to modify religion that operate to modify all other social institutions. The influence of geographical causes is easily overestimated. While the religious beliefs and ceremonies of a primitive people living in a wooded, mountainous region would doubtless differ from those of a people inhabiting a vast grassy plain, it would be absurd to ascribe the peculiarities of the ancient Greek or Hebrew religion to the topography of Greece or Palestine.

Technic causes. Technic causes have modified religion. A hunting-fishing people, moving about from place to place, would have different ideas of deity from a people settled on farms or in cities. Build for a heathen god a stone temple in which to abide and he will become in the minds of his worshippers a different god than he was when he moved about from place to place with the tribe, and resided in a shrine. Even the ancient Hebrews had a fuller concept of Jehovah after the temple had been built in Jerusalem than when He abode with the Ark of the Covenant.

Our own concept of God has been indirectly affected by recent inventions, however changeless God himself may really be. Christianity has always taught that God is the universal Father of all men; but in former ages few believers really caught the full meaning of their own belief; the Chinese and the Hottentots seemed so outlandish and so far away! But since travel and communication have made

us better acquainted with our fellow-men the world over, the idea seems more real. It is probable that never before has so large a proportion of Christians felt the inconsistency of warring nations praying to the same God for victory. The electric cable and the steamship are largely responsible for this enlargement of our religious concepts.

Social causes. Social causes modify religious ideas, as two or three illustrations will indicate. In the seventh century B.C. most of the Hebrews still believed that Jehovah was their own tribal deity, and that His peculiar function was to protect Jerusalem and the temple. In 586 B.C. the Assyrians captured Jerusalem, destroyed the temple, and carried the captive Jews into exile. This much was a social fact; and this social fact was also a cause of religious changes. It set the exiled Hebrews to asking the most serious questions about their religion. Had their faith been false, and Jehovah a failure? The final result was a larger faith, namely, that Jehovah really is the universal God; that He had assigned to the Jews a peculiar mission in the great world, and that Jehovah would eventually bring the faithful remnant safely back to Jerusalem, there to work out their special mission. They returned from the exile real monotheists. A great social upheaval had helped to enlarge their concept of deity.

Two discoveries—social events—have forced upon Christians a somewhat similar enlargement of their concept of God. When the earth was supposed to be a small flat disk, it was hard to picture the real greatness of God to the imagination. But when men discovered that the earth is a great globe, and at that only a speck in the infinite universe, their concept of God had to be greatly enlarged. It became easier then to picture God to their imaginations in something nearer to His real greatness. Similarly, in our day, scientific discovery has extended the frontiers of time as much as in Galileo's age it extended the frontiers

of space. Whereas we used to suppose that the world was only six thousand years old, we now know that its age is more millions of years than we can imagine. There are even reasons to suppose that man himself may have lived upon this planet for nearly a quarter of a million years already. And this newly discovered expanse of time enlarges our concept of Creative Design, and hence compels our imaginations to grasp a larger measure of God's infinity. The cause is a social fact; namely, the findings of scientific research.

The gradual growth of religion. The natural religions have not merely changed from time to time, they have actually grown from simpler to fuller and more dignified forms. The most primitive form of religion is animism. Animism may be defined as that heathen belief which ascribes a conscious spirit to all animate and inanimate objects. Each tree, spring, animal, star, or what not, has its spirit or soul, according to this belief. One of the most interesting and intimate of all the spirits would be the spirit of the camp. If the reader will search among the strange fancies of his childhood he may perhaps recall experiences that will help him picture this kind of a belief to his imagination. For savages, this animistic fancy filled the world with mysterious and fearful beings. It gave rise to magic, ceremonies, and incantations by which the multitudinous spirits could be placated and managed.

Babylonian polytheism. The ancient Babylonian religion may be taken as a good sample of a somewhat higher stage in the growth of pagan religions. The earliest religion on the prehistoric Babylonian soil had been animistic. But as the Babylonian civilization developed, some of the spirits acquired special importance. This was particularly true of the spirits of the chief cities. Fights between cities came to be regarded as fights between the gods of the respective cities; the victorious god became a sort of overlord of many

cities. In this way Bel, the god of Babylon, acquired a sort of suzerainty over the gods of all the other cities, when the city of Babylon acquired mastery over the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Gradually the other city gods found their rank in the populous pantheon of Babylonia. Soon there grew up and was committed to literary form a complicated cosmology (myths about the form of the universe) and an extremely interesting cosmogony (myths about the origin of the universe). Many of these myths have recently been discovered, deciphered, and translated. In this way considerable light has been thrown upon the Babylonian background of the early Hebrew religion.

The ancient Hebrew religion. The Hebrew race came out of the old Babylonian stock originally. Those familiar with Bible history will recall that Abram migrated from Ur of the Chaldees. As might be expected, therefore, traces of Babylonian influence are clearly seen in the Hebrew religion. For instance, when the laws of Hammurabi were unearthed about thirty-five years ago they were found to contain very striking resemblances to some of the laws of Moses. As the Babylonian laws were the older it is evident that the Hebrews had done some borrowing from them. A flood story not altogether unlike that in the Bible is also found in the old Babylonian mythology.

But whatever the Hebrews may have borrowed from the Babylonians the really vital element of the Hebrew faith was new and unique: an essential revelation! That new and vital element was ethical monotheism; that is, the idea of one, universal God, who is to be worshipped, not by incantations and ceremonies, but by faith and moral behaviour. Whatever the Hebrews borrowed from the Babylonians they made over into harmony with this great, new idea of their own. The flood story in the Babylonian mythology, for example, was only a pointless account of petty gods that swarmed about like flies to smell the smoke of

the sacrifices. But in the Hebrew literature the revised story carried the moral of God's displeasure with unrighteousness. The Babylonian creation myth relates how licentious, quarreling deities split a fish in half, out of one part making the heavens above, and out of the other the earth beneath. In what sublime contrast is the Hebrew concept: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

Historic growth of the Hebrew-Christian religion. The Hebrew religion was not the same at the end of that people's national history as it had been at the beginning. It grew during all that period, so that it became a much fuller revelation than it had been at first. The prophets were, humanly speaking, the great contributors to that growth. Christian theology has always taught that the old Hebrew revelation was a gradual preparation for the new dispensation, in which the old dispensation was consummated.

Since the time of Jesus the Christian religion has grown. Through missionary activity the Christian faith has been spread abroad throughout almost the entire world. There has also been a gradual improvement throughout the centuries in the practice and application of Christian morals; though the world is a long way yet from their perfect practice.

The social functions of religion. In explaining the functions of religion it will be well to distinguish between ethical and non-ethical religions. An ethical religion is one in which moral behavior enters into the worship of the deity. In non-ethical religions the deity is thought of as indifferent to the moral behavior of his worshippers; they worship him instead through incantations, ceremonies, and ascetic practices.

Very little effort will be made here to explain what the social functions of non-ethical religion may be. It seeks to satisfy the needs of human nature; but it seeks for the

most part in vain! Even such religion has, however, some useful by-products: it furnishes a common interest to hold the community together; it stimulates the intellect; and it is sometimes a stepping stone to better things. Sometimes, however, its superstitions and dogmas become an obstacle to the progress of science. The ancient Greeks made such phenomenal contributions to science just because they fearlessly dared to be skeptical; whereas the Babylonians had been standing practically stationary in matters of science for hundreds of years because their religion was so dogmatic and coercive. But for purposes of sociology it is ethical religion that has a really important social function. It was the epochal achievement of the ancient Hebrews to lift religion to the ethical level. "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"

To motivate moral behavior. As a factor in social life the most important function of religion is to motivate moral behavior. Religion is a tremendous motive power in human life. It induces men to go on crusades and pilgrimages; to forfeit love, marriage, and children; to forego the pursuit of wealth and pleasure; to endure isolation, self-torture, and martyrdom; to fight long, bloody wars; or to invest their whole lives in unrequited love and toil. Sometimes it transforms a character suddenly and completely. Now let society attach this motive power to a good moral code, and to the ideals of social service and social justice, and results are achieved for society that can be gotten in no other way. Religion keeps people in their good behaviour when they are alone. The all-seeing Eye beholds them in secret, where the accusing eyes of their fellow-men could never follow them. Religion penetrates to the very citadel of the soul and sets the central motives right, so that human rewards and punishments become less necessary. Hence a people that has lost faith in its religion will be almost certain to

degenerate morally, since there is no sufficient substitute for the religious motive. Western civilization is at present in some danger of such a disaster.

Reason alone is inadequate to motivate morality. Morality is sure to break down when it is placed on a purely rational basis. If one is moral only in so far as he sees reasons for being moral, he is pretty sure to be immoral; since he seldom will see enough reasons to make him restrain his evil impulses. Not that good and sufficient reasons are not there; but that the mind is usually too near-sighted to perceive them. The really big reasons are always too big for the grasp of our little intellects. We can see the reasons on this side of the horizon; but most of the reasons lie beyond the horizon. Doubtless the traders who brought slaves to this country during the seventeenth century saw some of the bad consequences of their cruel business; but only a trifling fraction—we are not at the end of the consequences yet. Doubtless the little coterie of men who touched off the World War in 1914 foresaw some of the consequences; but scarcely a larger fraction of them than a squirrel sees of a mountain. The ancient Romans who grafted in public office, and corrupted family life, and exploited weaker nations by force, doubtless foresaw some of the harm they were doing; but they hardly foresaw the utter collapse of Roman civilization, and a thousand years of social disorder during which the progress that might have been was postponed. It is always so: the harm of evil conduct reverberates to persons remote from the wrongdoer and follows down the generations. It penetrates, moreover, to the innermost recesses of the sinner's soul, poisoning his thoughts and purposes at their very sources. In the place of all these unknown and unknowable reasons for being moral the religious person has a mystical motive. As mystic symbols for infinite reasons his religious motives are sublimely valid; whereas the petty reasons that mere

reason might suggest would be desperately false, because so fractional and inadequate. This is why the morals of a people are safe only so long as they possess a vital religious faith.

Religion contributes satisfying worth to existence. A closely related function of religion is to contribute large meaning and dignified worth to individual lives. It is one of the deep needs of human nature to escape the insignificance of one's little self by becoming identified with some enterprise or cause of vast and noble importance. The surest way to tire of life is to have nothing to think of but one's own, little, personal interests. Now religion furnishes something infinitely great with which the tiny human unit can identify himself. Religion reveals to one the plan of the universe, and offers one the opportunity to be a "laborer together with God" in the working out of that plan. Thus one's own existence acquires a meaning large enough to be satisfying. No individual can live a completely satisfying life unless he identifies himself with some cause or purpose so great that it can be pictured to the imagination only by the symbols of religious faith. Nor can any nation. When a people's religious faith breaks down, their civilization begins to break down with it, because there is no motive left that is sufficient to call forth their best endeavor. In skeptical periods there is a tendency for people to grow tired of life because it seems so insignificant. Religion is therefore one of the most vital factions in social progress.

But religion transcends explanation. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." When it comes to accounting for religion something is sure to be left out of any mere sociological explanation. God; the infinite: these are words too large to be explained. To explain their social function is like putting all the fire and light of the sun into a dew-drop. The purpose of such a chapter is not to make the student

understand religion, but to suggest that it has a social function so very great that his only proper attitude toward it is that of reverence. Religion is something to be experienced, not understood. If it could be understood it would no longer be religion.

Religious problems. The religious situation is problematical at present; and the successful solution of our religious problem is one of the deep needs of the age; for without a vital faith our civilization cannot survive. The following are among the causes of our present religious unrest.

Individualism. The belief prevails in our days as almost never before that each person has a right to seek his own gratification, and do as he pleases without restraint. There are two causes for this prevailing individualism. The first is democracy; or rather, a misconception of democracy. Our modern experiment in democracy has produced an over-emphasis on personal liberty, which tends to make us all self-indulgent, restive of restraint, and irreverent toward authority. The second cause is "the scourge of prosperity." Prosperity disturbs religion by setting our hearts on worldly things. It makes us think about getting and spending. It tempts us with ambition and pleasure, and turns our thoughts away from spiritual interests. It makes us selfish and self-indulgent, and prompts us to smile at piety and faith. In short, it distorts our sense of values.

Science. The recent advances in science have given rise to the alleged "conflict between science and religion." This conflict is imaginary, not real, when we come to understand it. It calls for a larger concept of Deity and Creative Design. Nevertheless it has thrown many minds into distressing confusion, temporarily at least. This confusion is an important part of the present religious problem.

Social justice. The most important problem of religion in our day is that of applying to industrial and international relations those ethical principles which we profess to believe

in as a part of our religious creed. Our industrial organization is frankly based on the pagan principles of self-interest, and struggle; our international diplomacy is almost as distinctly a game of grab and force as was the policy of pagan Rome. If we really do believe in the religious ethics we pretend to believe in we must reorganize our industrial and international relations on the principles of brotherhood and mutual help. Our modern world is on the verge of a breakdown because the pagan principle of dog-eat-dog is bearing its logical fruit.

PROBLEMS

1. Recall the questions you asked in childhood about the unknown and the unknowable. Assemble a list on the blackboard.
2. Read and report accounts of the religious practices of savages.
3. Let some member of the class present an address or paper on "The Life and Times of the Prophet Ezekiel."
4. On "The Conflict Between Science and Religion in the Sixteenth Century."
5. Discuss religion as a means of social control. (See Ross' *Social Control*, Chapters XII and XVI.)
6. Appraise the social effects of Mohammedanism.
7. Should the history of the ancient Hebrews receive more attention in high schools? Why?
8. Specify and discuss the pagan ideals in modern life. (See Ellwood's *The Reconstruction of Religion*. The Macmillan Company.)
9. Gather the facts as to what the churches in your community are doing in the fields of charity, health service, education; recreational activities, and so forth.
10. Find out what the churches are doing in foreign lands along these lines through their missionary agencies.
11. From what you can learn about your grandparents, how do you think their personalities were inspired and their characters bettered by religion?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

BLACKMAR and GILLIN, *Outlines of Sociology*, Chapters XV and XVI.
On the origin and development of religion.

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chapter XVIII.

Showing that religion is social in its nature.

ELLWOOD, C. A., *The Reconstruction of Religion*. The Macmillan Company.

Points out the pagan ideals implicit in our modern so-called Christian civilization. Ellwood believes deeply that the salvation of modern society is in applying the ethical teachings of Jesus to our social organization.

HAYES, E. C., *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chapter XX.

Outlines the historic development of religion.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter XV.

Certain social aspects of religion.

RAUSCHENBUSCH, WALTER, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*. The Macmillan Company.

An extremely trenchant discussion of the application of Christian ethics to the social problems of our day.

ROSS, E. A., *Social Control*, Chapters XII, XVI.

Two brilliant chapters on the social influence of religion.

RYAN, REV. FATHER JOHN A., *Distribution Justice*. The Macmillan Company.

Discusses the moral aspects of land ownership and rent, of private capital and interest, of profits, and of wages. Summarizes the argument of his earlier book, *The Living Wage*. The Macmillan Company.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*.

Religion in relation to other aspects of the social life.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter XII.

CHAPTER XVI

LEISURE, AMUSEMENT, AND ART

The growth of leisure. About 1830 a struggle was being conducted upon the part of organized labor for a ten-hour day, instead of the twelve- or thirteen-hour day, which prior to that time had been the common practice in the newly established textile and shoe factories of New England. In farming communities the practice had been to work "from sun to sun"; and craftsmen under the domestic system had followed the same practice. As for housekeepers, "a woman's work was never done." These long hours were carried over into the factories; but there was something new in the factory system—a feeling of dependence and exploitation, perhaps—which led to a protest, until a ten-hour work day was established as a rather general rule.

During the century the ten-hour day gradually gave place to an eight-hour day. So usual had become the eight-hour day by 1919 that the twelve-hour day in the steel industry became a conspicuous scandal, until it was but recently abolished. By reference to the table on page 166 it will be observed that by 1927 the average hours-per-week for unskilled labor had become 49.6; there having been a gradual decline from 55.6 since 1914. For skilled and highly organized trades the hours were naturally much shorter. Office hours have been correspondingly shortened; and even among farmers there has been a tendency to follow the changing customs of the times to some extent at least. However, "for a large proportion of the working-class wives, each day is a race with time to compass the essentials."¹

In addition to the shortening of working hours the annual vacation is for the most part an institution of the last genera-

¹ *Middletown*, page 311.

tion. However, even yet, the vacation with pay is very uncommon among the workers.¹

This lengthening of leisure time has increased the opportunity to play; and there has naturally followed a corresponding increase in the facilities for amusement, many of them on a commercial basis. To see that recreation is plentiful and wholesome, is therefore one of the outstanding problems of present-day society. "An idle man's brain is the Devil's workshop." A civilization can be gauged by its popular amusements.

The urbanization of life. Quite as important as the shortening of the working day has been the urbanization of life, involving (a) loss of close contacts with nature, and (b) the decline of family and community association. Even rural life has been urbanized, due to the telephone and the automobile. This urbanization of society has given rise to a sort of hectic craving for amusement that people did not feel so keenly when they were in closer association with nature and their neighbors. This modern restlessness is doubtless quite as important a factor as the growth of leisure in the development of amusements and in the problematical aspects of the situation. We shall return to this again.

Leisure-time activities. The Lynds in their remarkable survey of Middletown, in 1924, devote three chapters to the use that was being made of leisure in that city. Assuming that what they observed in that middle-sized, Middle West American city is fairly typical of American society almost everywhere, we can do no better than to summarize their finding.

A. Speech making. Listening to speeches has long been a popular means of amusement for American crowds. No matter what the occasion, if the assembly is prearranged, a formal address is likely to be the order of the day. It matters but little what the speech is about, the people enjoy it if

¹ *Middletown*, page 261.

only the language is sonorous and the oratory appealing. It would appear, however, that speeches are getting shorter; and that, in competition with the movies, it is becoming harder to draw a crowd to a lecture where an admission is charged.

B. Reading. Reading appears to be a growing means of using leisure time. Much popular use is made of books from the public libraries. Probably four-fifths of the library books read are fiction, which means that people enjoy escaping from the boredom of life's drab realities into a world of fancy and the imagination. "In the realms of fiction we can scale the lofty Matterhorn, sail the sleepy Indian Sea, mine glittering gold in the snow-capped mountains of Alaska, or idle along the majestic Amazon."

However, the reading of solid matter is increasing. "During the twenty years between 1903 and 1923, while the population (of Middletown) less than doubled, and the reading of library books in the adult department increased more than four-fold, reading of library books on the useful arts increased sixty-two-fold; on the fine arts, twenty-eight-fold; on philosophy, psychology, etc., twenty-six-fold; on religion, eleven-fold; on sociology, economics, etc., nine-fold; on history, eight-fold; on science, six-fold; on fiction, less than four-fold.

The reading matter that the people buy is for the most part magazines. But here the quality is not so encouraging. The conventional, high-brow magazines have a surprisingly small sale; the magazines that might be called respectable-popular have a large sale; whereas the questionable sort sell twice as many as the second sort.

C. Music. The rising generation is devoting, on the whole, more time to music lessons than did the parental generation of thirty years ago—not to mention the increased musical instruction in the schools. Music ranks high among the home interests of high-school boys and girls, but that interest

largely fades out between high school and active life, especially with the men. Singing societies are less popular than formerly. For the most part people only listen to music; but this they have far more opportunity of doing than formerly, because power-driven machinery is now being substituted for hand tools in the making of music. Actual musical performance is cultivated more as a conventional accomplishment, especially among the women, than as a spontaneous source of pleasure—a “rather self-conscious appendage of their club life.”

D. The graphic arts. Not many people make a hobby out of drawing or painting. High-school clubs devoted to the graphic arts are not uncommon; but the interest seldom carries over into adult life. Women’s fashionable clubs are devoted to a somewhat affected study of art; but such study has little influence upon the art—or lack of it—to be observed in their homes. Furniture and interior decoration are largely determined by the fashions and by advertising.

E. The automobile. The automobile has changed the use of leisure more than any other influence. Nearly half the working-class families in Middletown had automobiles in 1924. Many of them regarded their cars as the only pleasure they had, for which they were willing to sacrifice home ownership, good clothes, and even food. Wherever the reader may reside he has only to observe to realize the extent to which the automobile is a popular means of pleasure. Evenings and Sundays there is everywhere the interminable procession; and summers the hotels and tourist camps throughout the country are crowded with vacationists.

F. Motion pictures. “The motion picture has added new dimensions to Middletown’s leisure. About two and three-fourths times the city’s entire population attended the nine motion picture theatres during July 1923; and four and one-half times, in December. In general, people do not go to the movies to be instructed. Comedy, heart interest, and adven-

ture compose the great bulk of what Middletown enjoys in the movies."

G. The radio. Radios are now owned by nearly or quite as many families as own automobiles; and listening to the radio accounts for a considerable share of leisure. Unlike the motion picture, this form of entertainment tends to keep the people at home, and thus strengthen the family bond.

H. Parties. The old-fashioned, informal neighborliness seems to be dying out. Neighborly calling and family visiting are no longer the general practice. People, especially the working classes, still get acquainted through the church, but not so much as formerly. Lodges, also, are being crowded out by the movies. Parties, at which cards and dancing are the chief amusement, are very common; but they are usually under the auspices of some club or other organization, rather than family affairs; and they are usually held at hotels or public halls rather than at homes.

I. Clubs. One of the outstanding developments of American sociability during the last thirty years is the organization of clubs for all sorts of objectives. There are juvenile clubs, such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Reserves; there are school clubs and church clubs; there are social clubs, chiefly among the women; and there are clubs for mutual mental improvement along all conceivable lines. The intellectual interests of some of these clubs are rather superficial, and some are a mere cloak for aristocratic exclusiveness. Rotary and kindred "service clubs" occupy an important place in the organized program of sociable activities of business and professional men.

J. Parks and beaches. Most American cities have rather elaborate park systems, and in good weather these are utilized for games, picnics, and the sheer pleasure of sitting on the grass. Wherever suitable watering facilities are available beaches are provided; and in hot weather they are thronged almost to capacity.

K. Athletic games and sports. Public or private golf grounds are now to be found almost everywhere; and they are used by men, women, and youths, especially of the business and professional classes. Professional baseball is well patronized in the cities, and amateur baseball flourishes in the villages. College and high-school basket ball draws considerable audiences in the winter time; while during the football season enormous crowds follow the high-school, college, and university games, which are an important part of the autumn program everywhere. And these sports furnish inexhaustable topics of leisure-time conversation.

Commercialized amusements. Each of the recreations mentioned in this summary has its effect upon family life, community life, morals, and religion, all of which will be reserved for class discussion. However, one aspect of the matter cannot be omitted, and that is the effect of the profits motive on commercialized amusements. It has to be recognized that people will pay out their money most readily to have their most instinctive and imperious interests gratified. But the higher tastes, as for fine music and refining art, have to be diligently and laboriously cultivated over long periods of time. Commercially it does not pay to do that. A fine symphony orchestra, for example, is seldom self-supporting; it has to be maintained by public-spirited citizens. Hence commercial amusements, operated for profits only, are almost compelled to cater to the instincts of adventure, fighting, and sex. They can naturally be expected, therefore, to be about as bad as public sentiment will tolerate.

It would seem that movies and the radio ought to be recognized as educational agencies, and transferred to public support and management, like the public schools. In that case they could be used to *cultivate* taste, instead of merely catering to tastes that need no cultivation. Unlike the schools, they need cost the taxpayer nothing.

The fine arts. The creative glory of the human mind is ex-

hibited quite as really in the fine arts as it is in science or in tools and machinery; and art is capable of contributing quite as much to human welfare as science. Science and technology are means; but art is an end in itself; and from now on the level of civilization will be gauged quite as much by art as by any other culture element.

Among the fine arts are included imaginative literature, drama, music, pictures, sculpture, architecture, landscape gardening, beautiful printing, jewelry, the so-called domestic arts, ceremony and good manners, and the niceties of pleasing utterance. In a democracy arts should be democratically conceived. Architecture as art should be thought of as including not only fine temples and great business edifices, but also the beautiful little houses of the common people; landscape art should be thought of as including the efforts of a community to beautify their village, or of a housewife to mitigate the ugliness of an all but hopeless back alley. A patch quilt, beautifully designed with fine needlework, may be cherished not only as a treasured heirloom, but as a work of art.

Art as expression of feeling and ideals. It would be extremely difficult to define art in terms that would satisfy all critics; but in this connection a formal definition is hardly necessary. It is sufficient to say that art must satisfy one or both of two human needs: the craving for beauty, and the desire to express feeling. A work of art does not describe facts; but it expresses how we *feel* about the facts. Thus the artist furnishes one a means of expressing what one cannot express for himself, namely his deepest griefs and disappointments, his highest aspirations and longings, his most nourishing satisfactions and his bitterest thwartings. No craving is more poignant than that for emotional self-expression; no service is more worthy of grateful appreciation, therefore, than the service of the artist.

It follows that one has not really studied the history of

a people until one has caught the spirit of their great art. To sense the satisfaction most appreciated by the ancient Greeks, one must feel the meaning of their graceful statuary and architecture; to appreciate what made life seem significant to Europeans of the fourteenth century one must surrender himself to the majesty and beauty of their great cathedrals. Conversely, to discover what is lacking from the American educational ideal one has but to observe the architecture of the typical high-school buildings: it is "practical" and heavy, but rarely is it beautiful or inspiring.

The value of art. What now can one of the fine arts do for the person who takes it to heart? The answer is that it can add to his happiness. It will be less apt to disappoint him than will wealth or liberty or love. It does more than entertain: it solaces, sustains, and satisfies. And this is particularly true for one who can *do* the art he loves, rather than merely to take it passively. To acquire a fine art requires prodigious effort, but if one is fortunate enough to choose in youth an art for which he has a real affinity, scarcely any youthful effort yields larger returns in later life.

The deadly grind. We hear much to the effect that school ought to prepare young people for the world's work; and so it ought. But that includes not only preparation to *do* it, but preparation to *defend themselves against it*. Shortly it will conscript them, like Spartan youths for a lifelong service in the army. It will bind many of them to the treadmill of a task in which they can take no real pleasure. It will harass them with insulting tyrannies, and worry them with competitions which threaten to defeat them. There will be crises when they will be so weary of the eternal effort and so bored by the merciless routine that many will seem like a veritable curse to them. Some will be overtaken by the ultimate tragedy of failure. Scarcely anything would sur-

prise a high-school class more than to discover the amount of such painful restlessness there is among the hard-working middle-aged men and women of their acquaintance.

Inconsistencies of the "Zeitgeist." It is a fatuous age, topsy-turvy with contradictions. Consider, for example, the philosophy of boosterism. It is supposed that business will be good so long as everybody keeps on believing that business is good; but over-confidence results in over-inflation, followed by an inevitable collapse and business depression. Thus every business man is puzzled to know whether he should "boost" or retrench. Again, consider the standard of living. There is the everlasting pressure of advertising and the example of others. It compels young men to postpone marriage, and girls to hold their jobs after they have married; it drives middle-aged men and mothers frantic to meet the demands it puts upon them and still save a bit for old age. It tears families asunder, because husband and wife, or parents and children, cannot agree as to what the family standard should be. And no standard can be satisfactory, because there are always rivals to outdo it. Or, still again, take women's ambition to get into the gainful occupations and to be economically independent. In the long run, and round-about ways, it lowers the incomes of men, and so lowers their capacity to marry and support wives. Thus women's liberty to work becomes their necessity to support themselves, and thwarts their opportunity for wifehood and motherhood. What chance is there for peace and contentment in a world of such contradictions? There has scarcely ever been an age more charged with discontentment, unhappiness, and despair.

Escape from sordid reality. Under such conditions it helps some, no doubt, to go to the movies, or jump into an automobile and ride to the country. That is better than the bloody spectacles to which the old Romans repaired under similar conditions. There is no surer gauge of prog-

ress than the refinement of amusements. The substitution of the movies for the bloody amphitheatre is a tribute to Christian civilization.

Those whom the spectacles did not satisfy betook themselves to the ascetic, evasive religion of the monasteries and the desert. But that is a phase to which the present age will not be likely to return. Instead, it will do well to seek escape from the sordid realities of life in the fine arts. Fortunate indeed is the modern man whose schooling has given him, not a superficial "culture," but an abiding faith in Beethoven or Franck, in Shakespeare or Conrad, or in some other phase of art. That is a world as real as the world's work, and satisfying beyond the belief of those who have not discovered it.

Education for leisure. All this obviously suggests the importance of education for the worthy use of leisure. Every person who aspires to organize his own life-program according to the rule of reason should put into that program some provision for systematic recreation. He should take music, literature, or some other fine art seriously, to that end. He should habituate himself to a regular and normal sociability, to some systematic provision for pleasing contacts with nature, and to suitable arrangements for something in the line of sports. Parents should give attention to the formation of such habits as a part of the training of their adolescent sons and daughters—especially such as are likely to live in an urban environment. And the schools should teach the fine arts, not as subjects in which credits may be earned, nor as "accomplishments" to show off with, but as real resources for increasing the joy of life. So long as interest in literature and the other fine arts fails to carry over from high-school into adult life we may be sure that school instruction in these fields has been done perfunctorily by teachers who are themselves blind to the value of their subject matter.

Creative artists. And finally there are the possibilities of creative work in the various fields of the fine arts. Our own age very much needs the work of great creators in all branches of art. Young persons who have creative talent in any line of art, and whose spirits thrill with the dominant ideals of the present age, and who are willing to consecrate themselves without reservation to the cause of humanity, may well aspire to lay their artistic talents on the altar. Their work will help rescue the hopes of the age from postponement and disappointment.

PROBLEMS

1. Take a census of the class to ascertain how leisure time is spent.
2. By questioning your parents, work out a comparison of leisure and its uses today and twenty-five years ago.
3. What recreational facilities are furnished by the taxpayers in your own city?
4. Why was so much beauty put into the churches of medieval Europe? Study them with the aid of pictures.
5. Is your schoolhouse beautiful?
6. What kind of art work, if any, did your grandmother do? (See Ruth E. Finley's "Old Patchwork Quilts." Lippincott, 1929.)
7. Let the class exchange experiences as to which of the fine arts each really enjoys; and what sort of satisfaction he does get out of it.
8. Why is it that so many men lose their interest in the various fine arts between school days and middle life?
9. Has your study of literature created in you a love of reading?
10. Let each member of the class make a list of the books that he has read just for pleasure during the past six months. Then let the list be assembled, perhaps on the blackboard, each book being listed, with numbers after it indicating the number of students who have read it. Compare this list with the content of the literature courses previously pursued by the class.
11. Collect the same data on graduates of your school who have been out from three to seven years, especially of those who have not gone on to college.
12. Has any member of the class read a history of art, or a history of music, or biographies of great artists or musicians? If so, report.

13. To what extent does your school encourage creative work in any of the fine arts?

14. Is there any place in America where an aspiring young composer can study under first-class teachers, and among a sympathetic group?

15. Has any real literature been produced in America during the last ten years; and if so, what is it?

16. How has the Industrial Revolution (cf. Chapter VIII), especially the recent extensive introduction of machinery, affected the school's responsibility to educate for the wise use of leisure?

17. Discuss the suggestion on page 280 to the effect that education should serve as a defense against the industrial world.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chapter XLII.

On public recreation and community organization.

DAVIS, BARNES, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book IV, Chapter IV.

A brief treatment of recreation.

FINNEY, ROSS L., *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, Chapter XIV.

On the social function of the fine arts, and the aim of art instruction in the public schools.

LYND, ROBERT S. and HELEN M., *Middletown*.

Part IV is on the use of leisure. This chapter is largely derived from it.

ROSS, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapter LII.

On recreation.

ROSS, E. A., *Social Control*, Chapter XX.

A brilliant chapter on art as a means of social control.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SOCIAL PROCESS

The nature of the social process. On the first page of this book society was spoken of as folks, doing things, together. The time has now come to say something additional about the how of human togetherness, or in other words, about the nature of human associations.

There is the association of sticks or stones in a pile. The association of plants in a cluster is a different kind of association. So is the association of birds or animals in a flock or herd. Human association is different from either of these; it has its own unique and special characteristic. It depends in the first place upon communication. There is communication, to be sure, among animals and birds, but human communication is of a different sort, involving the transmission of ideas. It is conceptual and cognitive out of all comparison to communication among the lower orders. It involves, indeed, an accumulated and inherited body of ideas, namely, the culture mass. The unique characteristic of human association is the communication of a culture mass. Human society differs from association among any of the lower orders in precisely this respect, that it involves the use of a social heritage. It is in and through a culture mass that human beings live and move and have their being. Without it, society is impossible.

The means of communication. Language is, of course, the principal means of human communication. In addition there are facial expressions, gestures, pantomime, and so forth. The human power of speech corresponds objectively to the culture mass, and subjectively to the enormous brain capacity of our species. Speech is the necessary means of both society and personality.

From time to time in the history of human progress, artificial means of communication have been invented. First the art of writing, later printing. Gradually a system of mail service developed. The nineteenth century saw the invention of the telegraph and the telephone. Last of all has come the radio. Each of these new devices for communication has produced profound effects upon social life and organization. As pointed out in Chapter XII, democracy and democratic government on a large geographical scale would never have been possible without the telegraph. And again, as suggested in Chapter VIII, modern organization of industry upon a corporate basis is the direct result of our new means of communication. These are but two illustrations out of many that might be offered. It would be extremely interesting to trace in detail the effect upon social institutions of the various new means of communication as they have developed one after the other.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The place of habits in the social process. If three or four children, strangers to one another, were by chance to come together for a half day's play, they would think of something to do, and proceed to do it. If they came together again the next day, they would in all probability do some of the same things that they had done the day before, and in somewhat the same way. If they gathered similarly for several days one after another, they would in all probability establish certain settled programs of play. Readers of this book can doubtless recall instances of the sort out of their own childhood experiences.

Now the same sort of habituation normally occurs in all kinds of human associations. Something presents itself to be done, and done coöperatively, or by teamwork. Some sort of arrangement is hit upon almost by accident. If it works with a fair degree of success, it is almost certain to

be tried again with slight modifications the next time something similar has to be done. In this way a settled program develops. For example, the settlers in the north woods of Wisconsin and Minnesota have a custom of supplying themselves with fresh meat during the summer by killing occasionally a deer, out of season. They have a sort of philosophy among themselves to the effect that the hardships of pioneer life entitle them, despite the law for the protection of game, to the natural fruits of the forest. Whenever a deer is killed, portions of the venison are passed around to all the neighbors, including even the enemies of the settler who has shot the deer. This custom has undoubtedly grown up in some such way as indicated above. Such long-established, generally-understood, often-practiced arrangements are what the sociologists mean by social organization; and there is nothing more startling in the study of sociology than to realize what an enormous quantity of such social organization there is.

The game of ball is a social organization. There is a set of well-established, generally-understood, often-practiced rules by which the game proceeds, and without which it could not proceed. The same may be said of the game of bridge, or of any other game that people play together. A game is a social organization.

Throughout this book frequent mention has been made of the rules of the game of industry. They are many, and both great and small. It is one of the rules of the game of industry that money may be transferred by the writing of a check. It is another, that the owner of property may control and manage the business, and that his employees and laborers must take instructions from him. The game of industry is far more extensive and elaborate than the game of ball or the game of bridge. In fact, it is a whole system of games, so to speak, organized into one another. Industry is a great social organization. So is morality.

The prevalence of social organization. Almost everything that is done by human beings is done through social organization. Social organization exists everywhere about us. We encounter it at every turn; indeed, we almost never can escape it. There is a social organization for getting into a neighbor's house to do an errand, and another to make sure of finding one's hat when school is out. There is a social organization for providing a bottle of milk on the back porch every morning, and a newspaper on the front porch every evening. There is a social organization for paying one's fare on the railroad train and quite a different one for paying one's fare on the bus or the street car. There is a social organization for providing the families in a community with groceries, but quite a different one for providing them with gasoline. There is a social organization for furnishing the young people of the city with entertainment, and quite a different one for furnishing them with instruction. There is a right way to go about it to get rid of a neighbor's dog that is troublesome, but there is no effective way to rid a neighborhood of sparrows. Ask a lawyer or a banker for advice and he is likely to reply as follows: "The usual procedure in a case like this would be, etc." He means the same thing that a sociologist would mean by saying that there is a social organization. There is a social organization for almost every conceivable thing that human beings have occasion for doing together. A diligent student could write out a list of 10,000 social organizations, all so commonplace and usual that he has hardly noticed them. These social organizations are the structure of society.

Without a social organization it is practically impossible to get any particular thing done. Suppose, for instance, that when a new high-school building is proposed, some progressive-minded high-school students conceive the idea that an American high school ought to be as beautiful as a European cathedral. They wish to call that ideal to the

attention of the community with the view to getting a beautiful instead of an ugly high-school building constructed. How will they go about it? When they have answered that question they will have invented and installed a social organization. Without a social organization nothing will be accomplished. Imagine, for another example, a drowning occurring under a bridge, upon which hundreds of people are standing, but nobody doing anything for lack of any prearrangement. What kind of a social organization should a city have for the purpose of forestalling such tragedies? In Chapter I a list was given of the institutions of society. The reader will please refer to them again. These institutions are the great outstanding social organizations. Each of them is a program of social activities, prearranged through usage, long-established, and well understood by all participants. One's participation in each of them is like his participation in a game of ball or bridge. He is taking part in a moving program of activity. At every juncture he knows what is expected of him, and what to expect of every other participant. The program moves forward with the least possible waste of energy and with the highest degree of efficiency. Thus it should be evident that social organization is one of the most important aspects of the social life.

Social structures are mental entities. At the close of almost every chapter of this book attention has been called to the fact that our social institutions are mental entities. They exist nowhere except in men's minds; and there, only in the form of *mental possessions common to all*. They are in the nature of common habits and common beliefs. They are social organizations. They exist in what is sometimes called "the social mind." Social organizations are changed, therefore, only by changing the contents of the social mind.

The value of customs. By a little clever handling on the part of the teacher almost any class can be maneuvered into the blunder of declaring that habit and custom are bad

things. No greater mistake could be possible in sociology than to condemn customs as bad. Bad habits, to be sure, are a handicap to us; and as bad habits attract far more attention than good habits, we overlook the fact that good habits are absolutely indispensable to efficiency. The same is true of social customs. It is only by custom, that is, by social organization, that we are able to do anything efficiently that we have to do together. Suppose, for instance, that we have no custom of turning to the right in driving vehicles along the street; infinite confusion would result. Suppose there were no organization of the school! Such a school could hardly be imagined, as a matter of fact; nor would it be a school. Suppose the trains had no schedules; suppose we could not depend upon the stores and offices being open or conducting business according to the usual expectations; suppose nobody could be depended upon to do anything according to the rules and schedules of the game; what an utterly impossible world this would shortly become! Let no reader of this book ever make the mistake again of supposing that custom, habit, and social organization are unimportant. They are as important to the life of society as the skeleton is to the body.

Direct and indirect interaction. What has thus far been said about social organization throws into clear light the distinction that is sometimes made between direct and indirect interaction. Direct interaction is that which occurs face to face. Indirect interaction is that which occurs as the result of social organization. For example, if, in the game of ball, a batter strikes the ball, the result will be to immediately set the fielder into an appropriate response. Again, if one takes down the telephone receiver in his home in Minneapolis, and calls the telegraph office, the result is likely to be that a messenger boy is set going on his bicycle in Boston, Baltimore, New Orleans, or San Francisco. This is indirect interaction. Again, as a result of the declaration

of war in the summer of 1914, price changes were set in motion all over the world, as a consequence of which people were made rich or poor almost as if by magic. By such interaction through social organization we influence and are influenced by people quite remote from us in time as well as in space. It may even be said that every person in the world is related to every other person in the world; that we are influenced by all who have lived before us, and exert an influence upon all who shall come after us. Such is the marvel of social interdependence. "No man liveth unto himself alone."

SOCIAL CONTROL

Introduction to the idea of social control. Social control may be defined as the control of the individual, by and for society. Such control is far more prevalent and usual than we are in the habit of imagining. In fact, the less conscious we are of being controlled by society, the more completely is society controlling us. It is those who most feel the constraint of social control, and whom society is having most difficulty in controlling, with whom social control is the least complete and effective.

If one would awaken his imagination to the fact of social control, let him consider, in the inmost privacy of his own personal thought, what was the most wicked and heinous thing he was ever seriously tempted to do, but did not actually commit. Having located the contemplated offense, whatever it may have been, let him ask himself why he did *not* actually commit it. What were the motives and incentives that finally proved sufficient to restrain him. Perhaps it may have been fear of the penalties of the law. Perhaps it may have been his religion. Perhaps it may have been the fear of gossip and the reproof of public opinion. Or perhaps some other consideration. The more fully the reader devotes his meditations to this consideration the more adequate will be his recognition of the restraints under which

he actually lives. If a list could be gotten of such contemplated misdeeds, to the performance of which the one hundred most respected and admired citizens of the community have been subjected, the revelation would be shocking. The fact is, the best of us are subjects of social control; and most fortunate indeed it is that such is the case, for civilization is really but skin-deep; and good behavior by the civilized human animal is, after all, a rather surprising phenomenon.

The need for social control. The need for social control arises out of social organization. If a game, whether of ball, or of bridge, or of industry, or of what not, is to work successfully, its rules must be conformed to, not by some of the participants, but by all of them. Suppose each participant aspired to "think for himself," invent his own rules for the game, and carry them out regardless of the opinions or wishes of the other players. Manifestly the game would be impossible under such circumstances. When the orderly process of the program is clearly necessary as a sheer matter of life and death, as in the case of war, the necessity for control needs no explanation whatsoever; but the necessity for orderliness is no less real, though somewhat less apparent, in the case of family life, political life, industry, or what not. As for the rules of the game, the participants may not take them or leave them as they please. They *must* conform, and if the objective of the social teamwork is of great importance, as in the case of industry, family life, government, or the schools, then conformity to the rules must be enforced, whether the participants like it or not.

Social control in industry. Has the reader ever considered the enormous amount of obedience that is observable in the industrial life? Workers must arrive on their jobs at the expected time every morning; only the rare and unavoidable exceptions occasioned by sickness or other serious causes may be tolerated, and in some cases not even such. Workers must carry out the orders given them, and that with a high

degree of dependability. Often the most galling and obsequious subservience is necessary. Subordinates relieve themselves by blowing off a good deal of bombastic talk but they seldom do anything rebellious. As a rule they obey. It is necessary to industry. The total quantity of such obedience is perfectly amazing when one considers it; and to let one's imagination consider its magnitude at some length is a most enlightening exercise in sociological study.

What, now, is the means of all this control? The answer is: the fear of losing one's job. Nothing in the field of industry is more impressive than the army of hungry job-hunters always at hand to snap up any vacancy which may occur. If one has a job, he must hang onto it with the most careful and even obsequious obedience if he is to keep it. The reserve army of unemployed is the instrument of social control in this case.

Social control in matters of morals. The most obvious means of control in the field of morals is, of course, the law. It is doubtful whether many persons live through a long life without ever experiencing the fear of the law and its penalties, however successfully they may restrain themselves from the misbehavior that would actually bring those penalties down upon their heads. However, if society had to depend exclusively upon the law, every able-bodied man would have to belong to the police force. In other words, social order could not exist unless the law were supplemented by other means of social control. This is why it is that a law cannot be enforced unless it has a very considerable backing of public opinion.

Public opinion as a means of control. This leads us to a consideration of the extent to which we are controlled by public opinion. There is nothing of which we are more afraid than gossip. Human nature is so sensitive to the good-will of others that there is no experience so terrible as to be despised by one's group or utterly cast out from it.

Accordingly, we are very careful not to do such things as we know will draw the disapproval or condemnation of our group. More good behavior is accounted for by this motive than by any other. It might even be said that conscience is our subjective reaction to what we know would be the group's judgment of our behavior. Self-respect is, to a surprising degree, a reflection of the respect that we like to feel ourselves receiving from our group.

Religion as a means of social control. Religion is an important means of keeping us in the straight and narrow path. The advantage of religion over other means of social control lies in the fact that it regulates our secret behavior, which might not be discovered otherwise. For more than a thousand years, during the Middle Ages, religion was to no small degree a substitute for law; and it lifted the barbarians out of their savagery and prepared them for modern civilization. This is one of the most marvelous phenomena of history.

Implicit vs. overt control. The main thing about social control is that the more conscious we are of it the less successful it is. Those persons who are most completely controlled by society imagine themselves to be doing exactly as they please. The most successful social control is the kind that makes us want what society wants us to want. The most interesting aspect of social control is the technique by which society forms our ideals and formulates our habits so that we appear to control ourselves.

Our personalities are the products of the learning process. Our lives depend upon the culture mass which life gives us an opportunity to learn. If we are born in a Chinese environment, we acquire the ideals and behavior patterns of the Chinese morality. If we are reared in a German culture mass, we acquire the German morality. Young people have grown up to believe and practice the strangest things—some, that it is right to enslave their fellow creatures and

make them work for nothing; others, that it is right to kill off their aged parents when they become infirm and helpless; others, that it is creditable to work in school for credits with little or no interest in subject matter for its own sake. Such freaks of the moral life are due to the fact that human beings take the shape of the mould into which they are poured in the process of growing up.

Agencies of moral predetermination. Hero worship, art, religion, and the accidents of pleasant, satisfying associations are among the influences which predetermine our ideals. The process begins at a very early stage of an individual's development and continues throughout his youth, and even on into maturity. In the last analysis it is boiled down to the mores of the society in which he lives. We are so fundamentally imitative in our nature that it is almost impossible for us to rebel seriously against the prevailing mores. Even if we do sometimes defy them, it is usually with a feeling of self-condemnation; which means that of the mores themselves we *do* approve.

Returning to the principle of custom: we almost automatically follow the prevailing customs of the society of which we are a part. Thus, writers often speak of the grooves of custom. The grooves of custom predetermine our behavior almost as effectively as the steel rails determine where the locomotive is to go. Custom is, therefore, the most potent of all means of social control.

The illusion of personal liberty. Scarcely any myth seems to be more pervasive in modern society than the belief in almost complete self-direction. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact is that we achieve a satisfying selfhood only through participating in the organizations of society; and these organizations are obviously a means of social control. Control not only of others but also of ourselves is, therefore, absolutely indispensable to a satisfying life. To obey properly constituted authorities is not a kind

of weak subservience; it is rather an indication of intelligent appreciation of the way the world is put together and of how its machinery is made to work.

We seem to have alighted upon a period in which the discipline of children by the home and the school is apparently believed to be an old-fashioned and discreditable thing. In this connection it is well to consider by what kind of steam-roller humanity has smoothed the long road up which it has climbed to our present stage of civilization. Diatribes against fear are often heard. To be sure, it is unfortunate to be compelled to experience fear unnecessarily; but on the other hand, no normal personality can be developed without the normal experience of fear. The difference between reverence and flippancy is in knowing what to fear. There are some things which sensible persons are bound to fear; and it is well indeed that a young person be taught what things are really fearful. Never to have feared anything is to be a fool. Nothing is better calculated to correct some of the foolish and dangerous aberrations of our age than a study of social control; for it is one of the most necessary elements of human life and progress.

SOCIAL PROGRESS

The law of change and development. At the beginning of the fifth chapter of this book attention was called to the law of change and development. Closely related to this law is the idea of social progress. Throughout the human centuries the culture mass has been growing. It is a far cry from the meagre culture of the Old Stone Age to the complex culture of the present era. This growth in culture is what is meant by progress.

The underlying concept, of course, is that of human welfare. Human life is more comfortable, happy, and generally livable under modern conditions than under primitive. The death rate is lower. There is much less affliction and pain.

Fear is very greatly reduced. The food supply is much more dependable; and so also is protection from the inclemencies of the climate. There is far more opportunity for experiencing the essentially human joys of friendship, art, and love. The idea of the golden age being in some remote past is mythical, and derives its plausibility from our ignorance of the past. To live like the Indians seems romantic to persons who know nothing about how the Indians lived, and what privations, miseries, and dangers they suffered.

The fallacy of pessimism. It sometimes does appear, however, that progress is illusive. Was the progress of Rome, for example, all to the good in view of the slavery, miserable poverty, brutal militarism, and gross immorality that prevailed generally? It would almost seem as if it were Rome's peculiar kind of progress that destroyed her in the end. Critics of modern progress contend, jocosely, that our wives are no happier on oriental rugs than our grandmothers were on rag carpets. Others suggest cynically that we, as human individuals, are victims of the progress machine, to which our personalities are being sacrificed. Also, there are prophets of despair in plenty who contend that our peculiar kind of technical and materialistic progress will, in the end, destroy our civilization, as Rome's peculiar kind of progress destroyed hers. Such pessimism is a little puzzling when we consider how many new things we have to make us safe and happy; such as better medical service; well-lighted houses, streets, and country roads; a balanced diet of food at all seasons of the year; facilities for much easier travel; and new types of recreations of all sorts.

Such considerations bring us to the conclusion that what we have is not progress but *progresses*. We are passing through a period of changes along all lines; but some of these changes are more contributory to human welfare than are others. Moreover, some of our most desirable changes are themselves creating problematical maladjustments; so that

what seems a net gain in human welfare from one point of view has the appearance of a loss when viewed from another point of view. For example, the newfangled means of recreation may be exerting some unfortunate effects upon family life as such. For this reason it is always possible to take a morose and despondent attitude toward the idea of progress. It remains, nevertheless, indubitable to the insight of common sense that our age is one of rapid progress. A larger percentage of the people have a more satisfying life than ever before in the history of the world. There is far less grief and suffering per capita; and far more comfort, health, and the joy of life.

A philosophy of human values. Before it will be possible to escape from such quibbles about progress, it will be necessary to formulate a more definite concept of precisely what we mean by human welfare. If our concepts are hazy as to what is meant by welfare, how can they be clear as to whether we are getting more or less of it? For this and other reasons, it is important to formulate a philosophy of human values.

Such a philosophy is to be found in the list of human institutions presented on page 11. These institutions represent the *ends* of human existence. They have gradually grown up around the fundamental, universal, and perennial needs of human nature; they are the established programs of social activity through which we seek to satisfy those needs. The family, for example, represents the need for the perpetuation of the species, the nurture of the young, and the human craving for affection. The institution of the state represents the need for social safety, including protection against enemies from without and anti-social disturbers within the group. Similarly with each and every one of the institutions mentioned in the list; they all stand for needs of human nature too obvious and manifest to need enumerating here. To live a satisfying life one must participate in every

one of these institutions; and in such a balanced way that his participation in none will interfere with his participation in any other. This, by the way, is a very simple and obvious theory of values which may safely be accepted by the young reader as his philosophy and practice of life. And there is nothing, by the way, which the oncoming generation more deeply needs than a new and sound philosophy of life.

A good society is one that furnishes all its members an opportunity to live such a balanced participation. Social evils consist in the thwarting of such participation, with the deprivation of the corresponding need. The maldistribution of wealth, for example, is an evil because it thwarts the opportunity of many to participate in a satisfying family and community life. Social progress consists in the gradually improving opportunities for all-around participation in the various institutions, thereby affording people an increasing opportunity for all-around, satisfying human existence. The puzzling question about whether progress is progress arises from the fact that certain items of progress do not seem to add much to the satisfaction with which we participate in this, that, or the other institution. Thus, if one can experience a satisfying family life on rag carpets, why put forth an undue effort for oriental rugs? Again, community life, as already pointed out, and the satisfactions thereof, seem to be hindered and, in some cases, actually decreased by our modern improvements in means of communication and by the organization of our modern industrial system. The problem of social progress is to keep all the social institutions functioning up to par, so that there will be no "cultural lag" at any point.

Progress and the intellectual resources. The institutions, as pointed out before, have existed everywhere and always. The family, industrial organization, and government are obviously so. Some of the others existed in a sort of embryonic, undifferentiated form in primitive society. For

example, in primitive society health-preserving activities were conducted in connection with the family; but gradually they were shifted, in part at least, to the church. It is only within recent decades that they have been completely separated from the other institutions, and have set up in business on their own account, so that now the doctors and nurses are as obviously conducting a separate institution as are the clergy or the educators.

The development and improvement of the institutions by which human needs are satisfied must be accounted for by the growth of human knowledge, together with the resulting inventions. The needs underlying the institutions are no different now than in primitive times, and no different then than now; but the processes by which these fundamental, universal needs are satisfied have been changed from age to age as the result of increasing knowledge and inventions. This is very obviously true in the case of the industrial institution and the health-preserving institution. It is all but equally obvious in all the other institutions. New facts are discovered and brought to bear upon the way men try to get the things they want. New technical inventions, like the bow and arrow, the wheel, and the electric light are introduced, with the result that the processes by which we make and get the things we need are radically revised and bettered. New social arrangements also are devised—as, for example, the Macedonian Phalanx, or the corporate organization of industry; with the result that our processes of work, and what not, are revised for the better. It is accordingly possible to distinguish between progress as to *ends*, and progress as to *means*; and progress as to means is wholly a matter of discoveries and inventions—in short, of increasing the intellectual resources of society.

Can progress be made to order. If progress is to be made to order, two essential factors must be provided for. The first is discoveries and inventions. Society must see to it

that discoveries and inventions are constantly forthcoming. At present, society has very definite methods for stimulating discoveries—namely, through the encouragement of research by means of universities, foundations, and the research departments of great business organizations. Artistic, philosophical, and mechanical inventions are usually encouraged by universities and foundations; but mechanical invention is also extensively fostered under the auspices of business concerns that hope to profit by the invention achieved.

Distributive vs. productive scholarship. However, discoveries and inventions result in little or no progress unless they become known to the public generally, so that they can come into general use. For example, the benefits of modern medical science are more or less limited to the diffusion of knowledge concerning them. So long as the general public knows nothing about bacteria, but persists instead in believing in medieval superstitions and old wives' concoctions, epidemics of diphtheria, smallpox, etc., are unlikely to be checked. And the same is true in all fields of human betterment. If progress is to be made to order, the findings of science must be widely distributed among the masses.

The importance of social reorganization. One of the factors of progress and reform most often overlooked is the necessity for social reorganization. With a bad social organization society gets certain bad effects, inevitably, as a matter of cause and effect. Thus the disruption of families is an inevitable aspect of slavery; and waste of advertising, an inevitable by-product of the competitive organization of industry. Such abuses cannot be abolished by preaching goodwill; but only by a reorganization of the rules of the game.

In the well known game of ball called "scrub," the reader has doubtless often observed what happens when a group of boys of different sizes try to play the game together. The big boys get in to bat, and stay there; while the little fellows chase the ball without limit in the field, with practi-

cally no prospects of ever getting in to bat themselves. The inevitable result is that the big boys lord it over and abuse the little fellows; and the little ones finally get discouraged, begin to blubber and grouch, and finally quit the game in a huff. How obviously useless it would be for some benevolent passerby to exhort the boys, big and little, to practice good-will among themselves. On the other hand, what marvels it would work to change the rules of the game to the effect that three safe runs is automatically out. Such a change in the social organization would make the game into a peaceable one, that would furnish fun enough for all.

Precisely the same thing is true of most social reforms. What is needed is a reorganization of the rules of the game; and nothing else will do much good. This is especially true of the two greatest problems of modern civilization—namely, the problem of international relations and the labor-capital controversy.

The cult of progress. The idea of social progress has of late years permeated the modern mind like a veritable religion. The rise of modern democracy, the growth of modern science and invention, and the enormous new resources of the western continent, have combined to suggest to millions of souls the hope that a better day for all mankind is just ahead. Even the teachings of Jesus have been interpreted by some modern theologians so as to make it appear that His faith in the coming of what He called The Kingdom of God upon the earth was the central message of His teachings. Thus has it come to pass that faith in social progress—in the better world that is to be—has become a glorious inspiration to many modern youths—a sort of spiritual refuge to those who find themselves perplexed by the spiritual confusion of the times. And millions of modern men and women have consecrated themselves, body, mind, and soul, to the cause of

helping to make this world a better place in which to live. And in that consecration they are finding that exalted self-realization which no human spirit can achieve apart from self-forgetful consecration to some great, worthy and religious cause.

PROBLEMS

1. Enumerate and discuss historically the social effects of new means of communication.
2. Let each student see how long a list of social organizations he can write out.
3. Can you think of human activities that are carried on without any social organization whatever?
4. How is social reform accomplished? Give examples.
5. What about that old saw that people cannot be made good by compulsion?
6. Compare Question 6, Chapter X.
7. Can you give examples, either from your own experience or from your reading, of serious social disorder?
8. What are the means of social control in high school? Which are most effective?
9. Is the efficiency of high schools discounted by lack of adequate control?
10. What do you think about our definitions of conscience and self-respect?
11. Does art (as well as religion) function as a means of social control?
12. Do you suppose that we, in our age, are subject to "freaks of the moral life" that posterity will condemn and ridicule?
13. Does the class understand the term mores? Illustrate.
14. Define freedom.
15. What do you know about "Hell week" in college fraternities? What is it for? Why is it submitted to? What inferences can you draw?
16. Ask your parents whether they would like to go back to the ways of living of thirty years ago. Ask them to specify gains and losses.
17. Discuss the sentence beginning: "To live a satisfactory life, etc." Do you believe it? What about fashionable clothes, recreation, furniture, etc.?

18. Illustrate our changed method of getting meat, now and a thousand years ago. Music.

19. What reorganization is necessary to world peace?

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

BLACKMAR and GILLIN, *Outlines of Sociology*, Part Four.

Fifty pages on social ideals and social control.

CASE, C. M., *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Part Three.

Two hundred pages on the subject matter of this chapter.

COOLEY, CHARLES HORTON, *Human Nature and the Social Order, Social Organization, The Social Process*. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Professor Cooley's work was on the subject-matter briefly sketched in this chapter. These three books constitute his principal contributions to the literature of sociology. They were produced in the order mentioned; and should be read in the same order. They entitle him to be regarded as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, sociologist that America has produced.

FINNEY, ROSS L., *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, Chapters VI and XXV.

Education is discussed as a means of social control in Chapter VI. This idea runs throughout the book, being its keynote. Chapter XXV is on education as a factor in social progress.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters XXII and XXIII.

A short chapter on each of these two subjects.

ROSS, E. A., *Social Control*.

One of the great books in American sociological literature. As fascinating in literary style as it is brilliant in sociological insight. Parts One and Three may be omitted.

TODD, A. J., *Theories of Social Progress*.

The outstanding book on this subject.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapters VIII and XIX.

Shows the significance of custom. One of these chapters is on the subject of social progress.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SOCIAL MIND

Definition of the social mind. "The social mind" is a term much used in sociology. It is a metaphor. Each individual person has a mind of his own. But society has no mind. The metaphor means that many minds act harmoniously together, so that the social group acts as a unit. The members of the social company keep step in their minds, as it were. Many associates act as if they were of one mind. It is obvious that this mental harmony and unity are necessary to the social life; without it no society would be possible at all.

The social nature of the human mind. It is one of the tasks of social psychology to explain how this mental harmony is possible. It begins in the social instincts¹ of human nature. People are sympathetic, imitative, and suggestible. Feelings are more or less contagious. We laugh because the rest of the group are laughing; we feel sad and even shed tears when we are in a sorrow-stricken group, as at a funeral. The spread of patriotic feeling during the World War is a historic example. Children are imitative; but they are scarcely more so than adults. We yawn when others yawn. If one person in an audience coughs, others are likely to do the same. The vogue of a fashion (like the toothbrush mustache), the epidemic-like popularity of a game (like mah-jongg), or the spread of some foolish craze (like reducing in weight), are good examples. "Everybody is doing 'it'" is often an irresistible argument.

Suggestion is a technical term in psychology, with a very special meaning that we must use in this chapter. It means to accept *ideas* from other persons, just because they are

¹See footnote, page 49.

presented. It is the exact opposite of thinking for oneself. In suggestion there is not a trace of skepticism nor critical examination. In short, it is a matter of simply believing what one is told.

All human beings are suggestible. Suggestibility is a distinguishing and characteristic trait of the human mind, and quite as important as the power of thinking for ourselves. As a matter of fact, human suggestibility is natural, fortunate, and praiseworthy; for it is through suggestion that we get most of the contents of our minds. This is especially obvious in childhood. All the child's notions about conventional behavior and moral conduct he gets, not by thinking them out, of course, but merely by being told. He gets his religion in the same way; and all his *explanations* of the things and happenings in nature. The twentieth-century youngster who knows that the earth is round is no brighter than the tenth-century youngster who knew that it was flat. Each got his notion through suggestion; but a different notion ran current in the tenth than in the twentieth century. Thus almost all our knowledge of nature, and especially of how to adapt ourselves to it, we get second hand from other people through suggestion. Likewise are most of the knowledges and techniques of our vocations learned passively from other people. And so are practically all the beliefs by which we live. Thinking for ourselves is really a very rare performance; most of the contents of our minds are acquired by suggestion. "Passive mentation" is the normal process of the human mind.

Suggestion and the culture heritage. Here we must turn back to the principles set forth in the first five chapters, especially in the last few paragraphs of Chapter IV, and the summary of Chapter V. What each of us acquires through suggestion is nothing less than the social heritage. Hence the importance of the passive, absorbing method of learning. If each of us had to depend upon himself for

knowledge, he would never acquire enough to rise above the social level of savagery, or the individual level of imbecility. This was made clear in Chapter IV. It is only through suggestion that any of us are able to acquire enough of the culture base to become normal human beings, capable of taking part in the teamwork of the social life.

We are often urged to think for ourselves; but we should not take that advice too seriously. It is better to be right than to be original; and if one tries to be too original he is likely to be right but seldom. We are dependent for our knowledge upon others; and all of us together are dependent upon the past. A worthier ambition is to find out who those specialists and experts are who really do know; and sit humbly at their feet, so as to acquire from them the best knowledge available in the age in which we are living. Much has been said in modern teaching about creating in pupils "the problem-solving attitude"; it would be far more useful to set up in them the *expert-hunting attitude*. It is only after one has possessed himself of all the knowledge available on any given subject that he can expect to do any worth while thinking on his own account. However, to aspire to become one of the few who really can think for themselves in their chosen fields, and so actually add something to the sum total of the knowledge available for popular guidance, is the loftiest ambition that a young mind can entertain. To select and encourage such is the most vital function of the schools.

Popular fallacies. However, there is no unmixed blessing in this world. Life is a struggle, and most progress in knowledge is but an escape from previous myths and superstitions. Suggestion, therefore, has this inevitable disadvantage; that it carries along the misbeliefs and follies from which the age has not yet quite escaped. Hence society always has the problem of purifying the social mind by getting new knowledge *into* the stream of popular belief

as soon as possible, and getting *out* of it the old discredited illusions. It is knowledge that makes the difference between barbarism and civilization; and it seems a pity for people to be suffering the pains, fears, and disappointments of the Dark Ages when sufficient knowledge is now extant to liberate them.

The public is peculiarly susceptible to fraud and humbug in the fields of medicine, psychology, sociology, and religion. When a person is suffering physical pain his mind is hospitable to almost anything that promises relief. If the sufferer has heard wonderful stories of the miracles wrought by surgery, medicine, and other means, he is in a frame of mind to believe almost anything. Here is the opportunity for the quack, the fraud, and the fanatic. It is unquestionably desirable to discover the resources and weaknesses of one's own personality. The public has heard that psychology is a growing young science. Now if one really knows little or nothing about scientific psychology and mental hygiene he will be quite in the frame of mind to pay fifty dollars to some traveling charlatan to be humbugged. It is clear that our collective prosperity and happiness depend upon the solution of our social problems. The public knows almost nothing about the science of society; why should it not expect the politicians to work the miracles they so generously promise during the election campaigns? And why should the public not be disappointed? The politicians are themselves usually ignorant, and often insincere.

Against all these deceptions facts are the only defense. Ignorant people are of course more gullible than educated people. Fill a person's mind with a rich store of facts and principles, and suggestions are rejected unless they harmonize with the known facts. But if a person knows but few facts he can easily be misled by false suggestions. Lincoln made a famous remark about fooling the people. Unless the people are well supplied with facts it is a relatively simple

matter to mislead them. Nor are irrelevant facts particularly useful. To know all the endings of the third declension will not help a people to reduce the miseries of poverty, modernize the tax system, prevent the recurrence of business depressions, or set up a wholesome program of eugenics. An ignorant populace falls easily a prey to demagogues; among them almost any sort of a wild, destructive scheme is likely to pass current as genuine reform. Hence sound education is the only safeguard against popular fallacies.

Leadership in a democracy. As a corollary of this problem of popular enlightenment is the problem of leadership. How to produce, select, and utilize competent leaders is one of the interesting, not to say vital, problems of democratic society. Human nature craves leadership, authority, dominance, and objects of hero worship. Why shut our eyes to this instinct? Its freshets frequently threaten to underwash and cave in the embankments of democracy. Leaders, the people must and will have; the question is how to get good ones. The answer is: popular enlightenment.

If cities, counties, and states are to have road building, school supervision, police inspection, prison administration, and so forth, performed by technical experts, the people must know at least enough about these jobs to know that each of them does involve a specialized professional technique. How many typical Americans understand, for instance, that it requires as much expert, scientific knowledge to be a prison warden as it does to administer a great hospital? Wardens have usually been selected almost entirely for political reasons. The result is that some of our penitentiaries are a disgrace to civilization. The accepted maxim has been to pass political offices around as if anybody could do almost anything. Some one has said that the typical American, if asked whether he could play the piano, would as likely as not reply that he didn't know, he had never tried!

And as for leadership by great statesmen instead of petty politicians, it has frequently been pointed out by writers like Bryce, that America's presidents have been notorious, as a rule, for mediocrity. Woodrow Wilson, one of the few presidents we have had whom posterity will certainly list among the world's great men, the American public repudiated by an overwhelming majority, the reason being that our populace was too ignorant of history and world relations to understand or appreciate the greatness of his ideals and aims. Mass mediocrity craves mediocrity in its leaders. A nation of sixth-graders on the average is quite as likely to appreciate athletic prowess or tonsorial elegance in the men to whom it commits its destiny, as to appreciate superlative intellectual qualities. Enlightened leadership in a democratic society depends upon enlightened followership on the part of the citizenry. It is of the utmost importance that the rising generation come to appreciate this fundamental principle.

Education for followership. However, as to this matter of enlightened followership, a serious question arises, namely: the extent to which popular enlightenment is possible. Half the people have I.Q.'s of .99+ or less; and this represents a rather poor capacity for enlightenment. Even the more intelligent are, for the most part, interested chiefly in their own private affairs, and not willing to put forth much mental effort on public problems. Moreover, many public problems can be understood only by experts. Is not popular enlightenment almost too much to hope for, therefore?

The answer, so far as there is any, is in the fact of suggestion. Everybody learns by suggestion. Even the dull can swallow capsules of concentrated knowledge, in the form of epigrams, slogans, wise sayings, etc.; and having done so they can *behave* exactly like intelligent people who really do understand. For example, when the "full dinner pail" slogan meant to vote for William McKinley and the

high protective tariff, a dull voter could do that as well as could a bright one. The problem of democracy is, therefore, to see to it that the truth, instead of untruth, is offered to the voters by suggestion. The question of followership is whether the masses shall be propagandized with the truth that can free them, or with untruths that will enslave them. Popular government is bound to be government by echo. The natural and inescapable suggestibility of the human mind decrees this law. The important question is, *who* shall be echoed, deceivers or enlighteners?

This fact leads directly to the responsibility of the school system for the enlightenment of public opinion. The school must pass out to the rising generation the best knowledge of the age on political, social, and economic matters—in easily memorizable form for all, and with explanations for the bright. Which further means that the schools must be kept free from the influence of the dominating political parties and economic groups, taking its curriculum only from impartial scientists and scholars. If curriculum making in a democracy can be influenced by the ignorant or the selfish, then there is an end to democracy.

How minorities deceive and exploit the masses. The Connecticut Yankee in the court of King Arthur undertook to inaugurate a great political reform intended to liberate the peasantry from oppression by the nobility. At the critical moment the peasantry, to the Yankee's utter dismay, sided in of their own accord with the nobility, and furnished the common soldiery to defend the institutions by which the nobility were exploiting them. This is one of the most usual occurrences in history. Not by force alone, however, are the masses constrained to serve the will of selfish minorities. It proves quite as effective to "dope" their minds with theories or with garbled facts; and that, because of social suggestion, is surprisingly easy to accomplish. The common people believed the doctrine of the

divine right of kings quite as religiously as did the kings and courtiers themselves; and in the five-hundred-year struggle for political democracy through which the world has just passed, the masses always furnished willing armies to defend the oppressive privileges of the kings. By the sedulous use of the press, the school, and the pulpit, the ruling class in Germany, between 1870 and 1914, molded the social mind to their policies; and when "The Day" came, the masses loyally furnished the cannon fodder. Such control of the masses by selfish minorities still continues in our modern democracies; and as the sway of force declines the sway of propaganda increases. In representative governments where all the people vote, it is only by keeping the people fooled that the beneficiaries of special power and privilege can keep their seats in the saddle. One of the lessons that students should learn from American history, especially industrial history since the Civil War, is the amazing degree to which the people actually have been fooled. Lincoln's famous remark about fooling the people may have been unfortunate. By flattering popular conceit it has resulted in throwing the people off their guard against the ever-present danger of being fooled, and thereby made them all the more easily foolable. Powerful minorities with selfish purposes always seek to lay hold on the sources and agencies of public opinion. In Germany they controlled the press, the church, and the school.

Education as a defence against deceptive propaganda. If we in America are to escape the menace of sinister and selfish propaganda by powerful minorities, our chief hope lies therefore, in our system of public education. The business of the schools is to teach facts; they must never be permitted to hand out propaganda. Impartially devoted to the welfare of all classes alike, they must teach the plain, unbiased truth. The truth will make the people free.

The question is, how can the schools be safeguarded

against special propaganda, and kept steadily at their task of discovering and retaining facts? The answer lies, first, in adequate professional training for teachers. Their training should make them independent judges of what the truth is, and how it should be handed out to young people, just as doctors or architects are independent judges in their respective fields. To put teachers on such a professional level will require (a) a very liberal general education, (b) a thorough training in the technique of their profession, (c) some insight into the methods of scientific research, and (d) craft organization of a strictly professional sort. With such teachers in the schools, half-truth theories and garbled facts will get into the classroom with extreme difficulty.

The answer lies, second, in academic freedom for the higher level of scholars in our universities and other centers of research. Academic freedom means the right of scholars to search for facts in their special fields, and to publish or teach their findings absolutely without outside interference. This is a right that need not be accorded to elementary nor high-school teachers, nor even to the lower level of scholars in the universities; but only to those of socially approved scholarship. But academic freedom for them is one of the most precious resources of democracy. If they remain free, there is always a source of liberating truth open for the enlightenment of the social mind. But if sinister interests can succeed in throttling them, no defence is left against selfish propaganda. All citizens should raise the cry of alarm, therefore, whenever any attack, however plausible, is made upon the academic freedom of our higher scholars.

These two items are not a complete answer to the question mentioned, but they are doubtless the most important items in such an answer.

The social function of free speech. For public protection against special class propaganda, freedom of speech and of the press is only second in importance to an adequate

system of public education. The schools produce new knowledge, and retail new and old knowledge to the rising generation. Public discussion winnows the chaff from the wheat in matters of current import to the adult generation. If discussion is free the truth comes to light, while error gets itself recognized as such. The surest way to kill the dangerous schemes of cranks is to give them the fullest possible airing in public. But to forbid them expression in public is to drive them into hiding, where they will attract a misguided following and grow to dangerous proportions. This is why the Constitution guarantees the rights of freedom of speech and of the press.

Mental epidemics. The social mind has its semi-ludicrous, as well as its serious, aspect. The public mind is constantly subject to mental epidemics, sometimes referred to as mob crazes. A certain idea gets started, is passed on by suggestion, attracts an undue amount of public attention for a time, and then blows over, giving place to something else. For a few weeks after the sinking of the Titanic that subject almost monopolized conversation and newspaper space. For a short period during the latter part of 1918 the chief topic of conversation was the popular demand for personal vengeance upon the Kaiser. For a few months in 1912 "Ish-ka-Bibble" seemed to be the only laconic slang expression anybody could think of. A few years earlier it had been "nit!" After the war spiritualism and the ouija board were in great vogue. The people were more susceptible to mental epidemics during and immediately after the war than usual, for two reasons: first, because there were so many unprecedented public problems challenging an opinion, and second, because everybody was too much distraught with emotion to think soberly. A typical political campaign is a regular fireworks display of popular crazes: thinking and search for facts are largely suspended as long as the fun lasts. A surprising proportion of what the public thinks it thinks

on current questions is only the mental process of catching step with the misguided crowd.

This phenomenon of mental epidemics is one of the most interesting and significant aspects of social life. The classical treatise on the subject is Professor Ross' *Social Psychology*.

Fashion. Fashion is a peculiar type of mental epidemic. It involves a very complex and baffling mixture of motives, most of which the followers of fashion never admit to themselves. There is usually a small element of art or convenience in a fashion. During the fall of 1922, for example, the young ladies wore rubber boots with the tops folded down about their ankles. They protected the feet from the spring slush; but so would ordinary rubbers. Only a few fashions survive permanently because of their intrinsic utility or beauty. The dominating motive in fashion is the desire to enhance one's personality by imitating supposed superiors. But the effort is both tragic and ludicrous. Tragic, because the standards of comparison are deceptive. The devotees of fashion are straining every nerve in the pursuit of nothing worth getting. Ludicrous, because by straining to keep up one tacitly concedes his own inferiority, and that in a race where his handicaps foredoom him to mortifying defeat before he begins. Hence the love of fashion seldom runs to excess in persons of real refinement, substantial ideals, and conspicuous achievement.

Manufacturers take advantage of the craze for fashion to make frequent and radical changes in the designs of their products. Men's business suits are fairly well standardized; but ladies' party dresses soon become quite impossible. Furniture is very noticeably subject to changing styles. It is probable that davenport, for example, are more often discarded because they are out of date than because they are worn out. The business policy of putting new styles on the market increases profits; but it entails enormous waste.

Fine arts and education are too often tinged with the acrid motives of fashion. Interest in grand opera and old paintings is often affected for motives of conventionality. Certain curricular subjects, and certain types of private schools, persist for similar reasons. In frankness, such education should be called fashionable, not cultural. It is of very doubtful social value.

The extreme pursuit of fashion is a very destructive social disease, for two reasons. First, it causes enormous waste. Second, its satisfactions are almost entirely illusory, and their pursuit turns their victims' minds away from the joys and achievements that are of real worth and lasting satisfaction. Successful democracy is promoted not by individuals who are ambitious to belong to the exclusive set, but by persons who are ambitious to contribute something useful to the general welfare.

The ideals of the social mind. Another interesting aspect of social suggestion is the ideals that dominate the social mind of any given age or people. Each age and people has its own peculiar theory of the values of life; in other words, its own peculiar philosophy of life. Take Puritan New England of the eighteenth century as an illustration. Life was austere. Beauty and pleasure were regarded as almost sinful. A religion of fear and self-denial was overdone. Children were disciplined with unreasonable rigor. Morality was severe. There were good elements in this way of living, to be sure; and our civilization owes it very much indeed. But life was made needlessly somber. The point of the illustration is that the Puritans regarded this as *the* way of life, whereas it was only *a* way of life. They filled the atmosphere of their own little environment with the blue smoke of the ideals they had kindled themselves, and then imagined that blue was the color of the whole universe. As a result of social suggestion, everybody accepted the current ideals and believed them because everybody else

believed them. It was quite impossible to do otherwise, because there were no other ideals accessible as a basis of comparison.

Every age and people have done the same thing. The Middle Ages, ancient Rome, ancient Greece, the Chinese, the Germans of the period before the Great War, each had a philosophy of life which each regarded as *the* philosophy of life. The different ideals of different peoples constitute a most interesting aspect of history.

We ourselves are in the same predicament, of course: obsessed by the peculiar and factional ideals of the age in which we live. Are we not quite certain that wealth is the measure of personality, that personal happiness is the chief end of life, that compulsion is of very doubtful utility, that personal liberty is the highest good, that social salvation is in material prosperity, and that the achievements of the last century are greater than those of all other centuries, and so forth, and so forth? Is it not quite as impossible for us to stand apart from our ideals and criticize them as it was for the Puritans to do so in their day? Do we not all believe in these ideals because everybody else believes in them? And yet may they not well be leading us blindly into the ditch? If our ideals were as sound as we fancy them to be, how could there be so much restlessness and social turmoil? No age was ever characterized by more.

Sound ideals for the present age. How shall we solve the problem of the ideals by which we are to live? By what test can the fractional and fatuous ideals of our times be judged? Where shall we find the materials out of which to build a complete, rational, and really satisfying philosophy of life? We shall find them first of all in the innate needs of human nature, as set forth in Chapter I. Not in part of those needs, but in all of them. Human husbandry, like animal husbandry, must employ the concept of a balanced ration. If we feed ourselves only on a part of what

human nature needs (say, upon business achievement, luxuries, and hilarious amusement), starving ourselves for the lack of other equally important satisfactions (as, say, domestic responsibilities, intellectual achievements, contact with nature, and religious peace of mind)—then of course our human husbandry will be a failure. And what a well balanced human life really is we may learn, in the second place, from history. Each of the great peoples of the past—the Greeks, the Puritans, the Chinese, the Germans, and all the rest—has emphasized, often over-emphasized, something important, at the same time omitting something else of equal importance. From these experiences of other peoples should we not be able to lay out a better balanced program of life than any people that ever lived before us?

Confused as the social mind may be as to how to get what it wants, there is no doubt as to what the central wish of the social mind in our day is. It is a happy, satisfying life for every individual. Democracy has emphasized the idea that each human being is an end in himself, as Kant declared, and has an “unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Never were the people more impatient with preventable privations, miseries, and the thwarting of their latent possibilities. Never had they so glorious a vision of what life might be; never so insistent a desire that its possibilities be realized. And that is the reason they are so eager for reforms. They want family life, community life, industrial society, the state, the church, education, the moral code, every social institution, perfected so that these institutions will all contribute more effectively to the needs of human life. Never has any previous age or people dreamed so exultantly of a better society, in the not too distant future, in which every individual will have a fair chance at the feast of life. The limitless perfectibility of individual personalities, and the limitless perfectibility of human society—these are the dominant ideals that are

gradually coming to consciousness in the confused social mind of our age.

The problem of social homogeneity. Another problem connected with the social mind is that of securing social homogeneity, that is, a like-mindedness on the part of all. It is not well for a society, especially a democratic society, to be divided into classes. In an autocratic society the lower classes can be coerced by force to act in harmony with the purposes of the ruling class. If the different classes of a democratic society are to act together it must be voluntarily; and that can only happen as they possess a common body of ideas, participate in the same social ideals, and have common interests. This is almost like saying that democracy can succeed only in a society in which classes do not exist. Certainly, irreconcilable class antagonisms would be destructive of democracy. If there must be class distinctions they should be based only on achievement; and individuals should readily rise and fall from level to level as a direct result of their character and brains, or the lack of them. There must be a common "we-feeling" in which all participate. To produce such a social homogeneity as this there must be a good distribution of wealth, and universal education.

The nature of human association. On the last page of this book we may return to a phrase that was introduced on the very first page, namely: the nature of human association. There the problem was presented; here the final answer may be given. Human societies carry out activities that have been learned, and learned alike, by all the members of the group. Back of any human program of social activities lies an enormous mass of racially accumulated learning, which each individual participant has learned through sheer suggestibility. The culture base or social heritage, with the resulting imitation and mental interdependence, are the peculiar, characteristic features of human association. The unique nature of human association consists, therefore,

in the common use of a vast culture heritage. The implications of this principle are of the greatest possible interest to advanced students, not only of sociology, but also of all other social sciences.

PROBLEMS

1. Recall things you were told in childhood and reconsider whether they really are true.
2. Is our appraisal of classical authors got by reflection or by suggestion? Illustrate.
3. What school subjects tend to protect persons against gullibility in the fields of medicine, psychology, sociology, and religion?
4. Enumerate examples of mental epidemics. What harm do they do?
5. Discuss the wastes of fashion, and the damage this mental disease does to democracy.
6. What ideals were contributed to subsequent civilization by the Hebrews? By the Greeks? By the Romans? By chivalry? The modern age? See Ellwood's *The Social Problem*, Chapter II; or Davis, Barnes, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book I, Chapters IV, V, and VI.
7. Why is Tarzan an impossibility?
8. What ideal was expressed by the medieval cathedrals? By the triumphal arches of Rome? By typical works of Greek art? By the Statue of Liberty?
9. Enumerate works of art that express the modern ideals of personal well-being and social progress.
10. Illustrate the dependence of democratic society upon experts.
11. What mental equipment should a president have? A senator? An ambassador to Great Britain?
12. Give historic examples of deceived and exploited majorities.
13. What sort of information does the public need to prevent their being deceived and exploited in matters of taxation, tariff, immigration, trust regulation, public utilities rates, etc., etc.?
14. Is the press free?
15. Are there laws in your state that infringe the constitutional right of free speech?
16. What kind of persons is it safe and wise for present-day citizens to imitate?

17. Make a list of public issues, and suggest how and where the experts can be found whose judgments are likely to be sound.

18. Why do the common people so often fear and almost hate the scholars?

19. Give illustrations of persons who do not understand, doing things by sheer imitation.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

COOLEY, CHARLES H., *Human Nature and the Social Order*.

Brilliantly expounds the mental interdependence of persons in and through the culture base.

LUMLEY, FREDERICK E., *Principles of Sociology*, Chapters IV, V, VII, XI.

PARK and BURGESS, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chapter II.

The sum and substance of this chapter is that "human nature and the person are products of society."

ROSS, E. A., *Social Psychology*. The Macmillan Company.

A classic. Full of fascinating descriptions of mental epidemics.

WALLIS, WILSON D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chapters XIII and XIV.

Explaining how the individual is socialized into the group.

WALLIS and WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapters VI and VII.

Showing the nature of the social mind, and the behavior of crowds.

INDEX

This index is prepared with special reference to its use for purposes of review. There are numerous important topics to which repeated reference is made throughout the text, but which are not treated systematically in any one place. To follow such topics through the text, organize the material, and present it before the class, would prove a very helpful review exercise.

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